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-
-
-
-The presentation is in three parts:
-
-Background
-----------
-
- * Why authentication using asymmetric crypto (as opposed to shared
-   secrets) is important on today's network.
-
- * Overview of how ssh uses asymmetric crypto authentication (user ->
-   host, host -> user)
-
- * Overview of relevant bits of OpenPGP (key -> User ID bindings,
-   certifications, usage flags, key -> subkey bindings)
-
- * Overview of keyservers (the idea of gossip, One Big Network,
-   propagation, issues around redundancy, logging, private access)
-
-
-How
----
-
- * How does the monkeysphere do it?  (very brief under-the-hood)
-
- * How does a server administrator publish a host's ssh key to the Web
-   of Trust?  How do they maintain it?
-
- * How does a user incorporate WoT-based host-key checking into their
-   regular ssh usage?
-
- * How does a user publish their own ssh identity to the WoT for hosts
-   to find it?  How do they maintain it?
-
- * How does a server administrator tell a server to admit certain
-   people (as identified by the WoT) to certain accounts?  How do they
-   tell the server which certifications are trustworthy?
-
-Possible Futures
-----------------
-
- * Use the Monkeysphere with ssh implementations other than OpenSSH
-   (dropbear, lsh, putty, etc)
-
- * Expansion of the Monkeysphere's out-of-band PKI mechanism for
-   authentication in protocols other than SSH (TLS, HTTPS) without
-   protocol modification.
-
- * Use of OpenPGP certificates directly in SSH.  OpenPGP is referenced
-   in RFC 4253 already: optional, rarely implemented, and deliberately
-   ambiguous about how to calculate key->identity bindings.
-
- * Use of OpenPGP certificates for authentication directly in
-   protocols.  RFC 5081 provides a mechanism for OpenPGP certificates
-   in TLS, but is similarly ambiguous about certificate verification.
-
- * Better end-user control over verification: Who or what are you
-   really connecting to?  How do you know?  How can this information
-   be effectively and intuitively displayed to a typical user?
-
- * What would you like to see?