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authorJameson Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>2010-03-23 02:12:33 -0400
committerJameson Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>2010-03-23 02:12:33 -0400
commitdbeab30f940705e3813746ccf7480619d8261d37 (patch)
tree099a0b3224b666bfc1289462f1a6d01a24763102 /doc/conferences/lca2010/outline
parent0f6ef9923f4d70e2a79edd898f6ac46b617480c9 (diff)
parent2f9fe93b98ed32b662212899db6ba2174c1138d3 (diff)
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-
-
-
-The presentation is in three parts:
-
-Background
-----------
-
- * Why authentication using asymmetric crypto (as opposed to shared
- secrets) is important on today's network.
-
- * Overview of how ssh uses asymmetric crypto authentication (user ->
- host, host -> user)
-
- * Overview of relevant bits of OpenPGP (key -> User ID bindings,
- certifications, usage flags, key -> subkey bindings)
-
- * Overview of keyservers (the idea of gossip, One Big Network,
- propagation, issues around redundancy, logging, private access)
-
-
-How
----
-
- * How does the monkeysphere do it? (very brief under-the-hood)
-
- * How does a server administrator publish a host's ssh key to the Web
- of Trust? How do they maintain it?
-
- * How does a user incorporate WoT-based host-key checking into their
- regular ssh usage?
-
- * How does a user publish their own ssh identity to the WoT for hosts
- to find it? How do they maintain it?
-
- * How does a server administrator tell a server to admit certain
- people (as identified by the WoT) to certain accounts? How do they
- tell the server which certifications are trustworthy?
-
-Possible Futures
-----------------
-
- * Use the Monkeysphere with ssh implementations other than OpenSSH
- (dropbear, lsh, putty, etc)
-
- * Expansion of the Monkeysphere's out-of-band PKI mechanism for
- authentication in protocols other than SSH (TLS, HTTPS) without
- protocol modification.
-
- * Use of OpenPGP certificates directly in SSH. OpenPGP is referenced
- in RFC 4253 already: optional, rarely implemented, and deliberately
- ambiguous about how to calculate key->identity bindings.
-
- * Use of OpenPGP certificates for authentication directly in
- protocols. RFC 5081 provides a mechanism for OpenPGP certificates
- in TLS, but is similarly ambiguous about certificate verification.
-
- * Better end-user control over verification: Who or what are you
- really connecting to? How do you know? How can this information
- be effectively and intuitively displayed to a typical user?
-
- * What would you like to see?