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  1. .TH MONKEYSPHERE "7" "March 2010" "monkeysphere" "System Frameworks"
  2. .SH NAME
  3. monkeysphere - ssh and TLS authentication framework using OpenPGP Web of Trust
  4. .SH DESCRIPTION
  5. \fBMonkeysphere\fP is a framework to leverage the OpenPGP web of trust
  6. for OpenSSH and TLS key-based authentication. OpenPGP keys are
  7. tracked via GnuPG, and added to the authorized_keys and known_hosts
  8. files used by OpenSSH for connection authentication. Monkeysphere can
  9. also be used by a validation agent to validate TLS connections
  10. (e.g. https).
  11. .SH IDENTITY CERTIFIERS
  12. Each host that uses the \fBMonkeysphere\fP to authenticate its remote
  13. users needs some way to determine that those users are who they claim
  14. to be. SSH permits key-based authentication, but we want instead to
  15. bind authenticators to human-comprehensible user identities. This
  16. switch from raw keys to User IDs makes it possible for administrators
  17. to see intuitively who has access to an account, and it also enables
  18. end users to transition keys (and revoke compromised ones)
  19. automatically across all \fBMonkeysphere\fP-enabled hosts. The User
  20. IDs and certifications that the \fBMonkeysphere\fP relies on are found
  21. in the OpenPGP Web of Trust.
  22. However, in order to establish this binding, each host must know whose
  23. cerifications to trust. Someone who a host trusts to certify User
  24. Identities is called an Identity Certifier. A host must have at least
  25. one Identity Certifier in order to bind User IDs to keys. Commonly,
  26. every ID Certifier would be trusted by the host to fully identify any
  27. User ID, but more nuanced approaches are possible as well. For
  28. example, a given host could specify a dozen ID certifiers, but assign
  29. them all "marginal" trust. Then any given User ID would need to be
  30. certified in the OpenPGP Web of Trust by at least three of those
  31. certifiers.
  32. It is also possible to limit the scope of trust for a given ID
  33. Certifier to a particular domain. That is, a host can be configured
  34. to fully (or marginally) trust a particular ID Certifier only when
  35. they certify identities within, say, example.org (based on the e-mail
  36. address in the User ID).
  37. .SH KEY ACCEPTABILITY
  38. The monkeysphere commands work from a set of user IDs to determine
  39. acceptable keys for ssh and TLS authentication. OpenPGP keys are
  40. considered acceptable if the following criteria are met:
  41. .TP
  42. .B capability
  43. The key must have the `authentication' (`a') usage flag set.
  44. .TP
  45. .B validity
  46. The key itself must be valid, i.e. it must be well-formed, not
  47. expired, and not revoked.
  48. .TP
  49. .B certification
  50. The relevant user ID must be signed by a trusted identity certifier.
  51. .SH HOST IDENTIFICATION
  52. The OpenPGP keys for hosts have associated `service names` (OpenPGP
  53. user IDs) that are based on URI specifications for the service. Some
  54. examples:
  55. .TP
  56. .B ssh:
  57. ssh://host.example.com[:port]
  58. .TP
  59. .B https:
  60. https://host.example.com[:port]
  61. .SH AUTHOR
  62. Written by:
  63. Jameson Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>,
  64. Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
  65. .SH SEE ALSO
  66. .BR monkeysphere (1),
  67. .BR monkeysphere\-host (8),
  68. .BR monkeysphere\-authentication (8),
  69. .BR openpgp2ssh (1),
  70. .BR pem2openpgp (1),
  71. .BR gpg (1),
  72. .BR http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880,
  73. .BR ssh (1),
  74. .BR http://tools.ietf.org/wg/secsh/draft\-ietf\-secsh\-scp\-sftp\-ssh\-uri/