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-rw-r--r--website/bugs/add-man-pages-to-website.mdwn12
-rw-r--r--website/bugs/install-seckey2sshagent-in-usr-bin.mdwn16
-rw-r--r--website/bugs/monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand-quiet-option.mdwn12
-rw-r--r--website/index.mdwn2
-rw-r--r--website/why.mdwn4
5 files changed, 43 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/website/bugs/add-man-pages-to-website.mdwn b/website/bugs/add-man-pages-to-website.mdwn
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a8d2e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/bugs/add-man-pages-to-website.mdwn
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+[[meta title="Add man pages to web site"]]
+
+We should publish the various monkeysphere man pages in browsable form
+somewhere under http://monkeysphere.info/. Ideally, this would be
+updated automatically from the sources for the official man pages
+themselves.
+
+This strikes me as an ikiwiki subproject (implementing a man2html wiki
+compilation language perhaps?).
+
+Interestingly, [ikiwiki's own man page](http://ikiwiki.info/usage/)
+appears to be written in markdown and then converted to nroff.
diff --git a/website/bugs/install-seckey2sshagent-in-usr-bin.mdwn b/website/bugs/install-seckey2sshagent-in-usr-bin.mdwn
index 5b19b13..0163727 100644
--- a/website/bugs/install-seckey2sshagent-in-usr-bin.mdwn
+++ b/website/bugs/install-seckey2sshagent-in-usr-bin.mdwn
@@ -25,3 +25,19 @@ part about verifying you to a server. Then it could say: if you're really
interested, you can run this hacky script but we make no guarantees.
-- Sir Jam Jam
+
+---
+
+I just realized that i think i can test for the presence of [GNU-dummy
+support in
+GnuTLS](http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/gnutls-devel/2008-08/msg00005.html),
+which means that we can cleanly test whether the proposed [handling of
+passphrase-locked secret
+keys](bugs/handle-passphrase-locked-secret-keys/) is functional. With
+that in mind, I'd like to propose that we could resolve this bug
+simply by adding a new subcommand: `monkeysphere authkey-to-agent`,
+which would fail in the absence of a functionally-patched GnuTLS.
+
+Would this proposal be sufficient to resolve this bug?
+
+--dkg
diff --git a/website/bugs/monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand-quiet-option.mdwn b/website/bugs/monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand-quiet-option.mdwn
index 965f198..028c8f9 100644
--- a/website/bugs/monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand-quiet-option.mdwn
+++ b/website/bugs/monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand-quiet-option.mdwn
@@ -20,3 +20,15 @@ at least, would be for silent output to be the default and have a -v/--verbose
option to get the output. Or - maybe these should be environmental variables?
In any event - someway to suppress informational output would be a useful
improvement.
+
+------
+
+I'd be fine with silent mode as a default, with a more verbose mode
+accessible to the user who desires it.
+
+I'd prefer an environment variable (e.g. `MONKEYSPHERE_VERBOSE` or
+`MONKEYSPHERE_DEBUG`) over a command-line (e.g. `--verbose`) option,
+personally. It's more in keeping with the model we've used in general
+so far.
+
+--dkg
diff --git a/website/index.mdwn b/website/index.mdwn
index 495d963..6583e18 100644
--- a/website/index.mdwn
+++ b/website/index.mdwn
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ yourself and the servers you administer or connect to. OpenPGP keys
are tracked via GnuPG, and managed in the `known_hosts` and
`authorized_keys` files used by OpenSSH for connection authentication.
-[why you should be interested](/why) | [[bugs]] | [[download]] | [[news]] | [[documentation|doc]]
+[why?](/why) | [[bugs]] | [[download]] | [[news]] | [[documentation|doc]]
## Conceptual overview ##
diff --git a/website/why.mdwn b/website/why.mdwn
index 7f69614..3f6aa7c 100644
--- a/website/why.mdwn
+++ b/website/why.mdwn
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ you keep them from getting the big scary warning messages?
Have you ever wanted to allow a colleague key-based access to a
machine, *without* needing to have a copy of their public key on hand?
-Have you ever wanted to be able to revoke the ability of a key to
-authenticate across the entire infrastructure you manage, without
+Have you ever wanted to be able to revoke the ability of a user's key
+to authenticate across the entire infrastructure you manage, without
touching each host by hand?
## What's the connection? ##