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| -rw-r--r-- | website/doc.mdwn | 30 |
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/website/doc.mdwn b/website/doc.mdwn index 80eca79..eaeecfd 100644 --- a/website/doc.mdwn +++ b/website/doc.mdwn @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ it, so widespread adoption is important. [openssh-gpg](http://www.red-bean.com/~nemo/openssh-gpg/) is a patch against OpenSSH to support OpenPGP certificates. According to its documentation, it is intended to support [`pgp-sign-rsa` and -`pgp-sign-dss` public key algorithms, as specified by the +`pgp-sign-dss` public key algorithms for hosts, as specified by the IETF](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#section-6.6). Some concerns with `openssh-gpg`: @@ -41,8 +41,26 @@ Some concerns with `openssh-gpg`: maintained beyond OpenSSH 3.6p1. As of this writing, OpenSSH is on version 5.1p1. + * It only provides infrastructure in one direction: the user + authenticating the host by name. There doesn't seem to be a + mechanism for dealing with identifying users by name, or allowing + users to globally revoke or update keys. + + * The choice of User ID (`anything goes here (and here!) + <ssh@foo.example.net>`) for host keys overlaps with the current use + of the User ID space. While it's unlikely that someone actually + uses this e-mail address in the web of trust, it would be a nasty + collision, as the holder of that key could impersonate the server + in question. The monkeysphere uses [User IDs of the form + `ssh://foo.example.net`](http://tools.ietf.org/wg/secsh/draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri/) + to avoid collisions with existing use. + + * It's not clear that `openssh-gpg` acknowledges or respects the + usage flags on the host keys. + * It requires patching OpenSSH. + ### Perspectives OpenSSH client ### [The Perspectives project](http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~perspectives/) at @@ -66,6 +84,11 @@ Some concerns with the Perspectives OpenSSH client: notaries during your verification. Who are the notaries? How could they be compromised? + * It only provides infrastructure in one direction: the user + authenticating the host by name. There is no mechanism for dealing + with identifying users by name, or allowing users to globally + revoke or change keys. + * It requires patching OpenSSH ### OpenSSH with X.509v3 certificates ### @@ -88,7 +111,8 @@ Some concerns about OpenSSH with X.509v3: Depending on how you declare your trust relationships, OpenPGP is capable of providing the same hierarchical structure as X.509, but - it is not limited to it. The Web of Trust model is more flexible - and more adaptable than X.509. + it is not limited to such a structure. The OpenPGP Web of Trust + model is more flexible and more adaptable to represent real-world + trust than X.509's rigid hierarchy. * It requires patching OpenSSH. |