summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/keytrans
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDaniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>2009-01-11 20:10:34 -0500
committerDaniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>2009-01-11 20:10:34 -0500
commit4af5666101d302692f76671c08188141289f13f3 (patch)
tree376fe4e62ad880c532b958af6793c6f4ca7923d4 /src/keytrans
parent3f5960cf4ba2f938c677c27e3296e6feae2f56aa (diff)
pem2openpgp: reorganized some code, put in initial function to try to create secret keys. we seem to be a bit of modular arithmetic away from creating private keys in an OpenPGP-style format.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/keytrans')
-rwxr-xr-xsrc/keytrans/pem2openpgp191
1 files changed, 115 insertions, 76 deletions
diff --git a/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp b/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp
index 637eba2..fa92297 100755
--- a/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp
+++ b/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp
@@ -32,83 +32,7 @@ my $uid = shift;
# FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID; or should we default to
# hostname_long() from Sys::Hostname::Long ?
-# make an old-style packet out of the given packet type and body.
-# old-style (see RFC 4880 section 4.2)
-sub make_packet {
- my $type = shift;
- my $body = shift;
-
- my $len = length($body);
-
- my $lenbytes;
- my $lencode;
-
- if ($len < 2**8) {
- $lenbytes = 0;
- $lencode = 'C';
- } elsif ($len < 2**16) {
- $lenbytes = 1;
- $lencode = 'n';
- } elsif ($len < 2**31) {
- ## not testing against full 32 bits because i don't want to deal
- ## with potential overflow.
- $lenbytes = 2;
- $lencode = 'N';
- } else {
- ## what the hell do we do here?
- $lenbytes = 3;
- $lencode = '';
- }
-
- return pack('C'.$lencode, 0x80 + ($type * 4) + $lenbytes, $len).
- $body;
-}
-
-
-# takes a Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum, returns it formatted as OpenPGP MPI
-# (RFC 4880 section 3.2)
-sub mpi_pack {
- my $num = shift;
-
- my $val = $num->to_bin();
- my $mpilen = length($val)*8;
-# this is a kludgy way to get the number of significant bits in the
-# first byte:
- my $bitsinfirstbyte = length(sprintf("%b", ord($val)));
-
- $mpilen -= (8 - $bitsinfirstbyte);
-
- return pack('n', $mpilen).$val;
-}
-
-# FIXME: genericize this to accept either RSA or DSA keys:
-sub make_rsa_pub_key_body {
- my $key = shift;
- my $timestamp = shift;
-
- my ($n, $e) = $key->get_key_parameters();
-
- return
- pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
- pack('C', 1). # RSA
- mpi_pack($n).
- mpi_pack($e);
-
-}
-
-# expects an RSA key (public or private) and a timestamp
-sub fingerprint {
- my $key = shift;
- my $timestamp = shift;
-
- my $rsabody = make_rsa_pub_key_body($key, $timestamp);
-
- return Digest::SHA1::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody);
-}
-
-# FIXME: replace the opaque numbers below with
-# semantically-meaningful references based on these tables.
# see RFC 4880 section 9.1 (ignoring deprecated algorithms for now)
my $asym_algos = { rsa => 1,
@@ -229,6 +153,120 @@ my $features = { mdc => 0x01
my $keyserver_prefs = { nomodify => 0x80
};
+###### end lookup tables ######
+
+# FIXME: if we want to be able to interpret openpgp data as well as
+# produce it, we need to produce key/value-swapped lookup tables as well.
+
+
+# make an old-style packet out of the given packet type and body.
+# old-style (see RFC 4880 section 4.2)
+sub make_packet {
+ my $type = shift;
+ my $body = shift;
+
+ my $len = length($body);
+
+ my $lenbytes;
+ my $lencode;
+
+ if ($len < 2**8) {
+ $lenbytes = 0;
+ $lencode = 'C';
+ } elsif ($len < 2**16) {
+ $lenbytes = 1;
+ $lencode = 'n';
+ } elsif ($len < 2**31) {
+ ## not testing against full 32 bits because i don't want to deal
+ ## with potential overflow.
+ $lenbytes = 2;
+ $lencode = 'N';
+ } else {
+ ## what the hell do we do here?
+ $lenbytes = 3;
+ $lencode = '';
+ }
+
+ return pack('C'.$lencode, 0x80 + ($type * 4) + $lenbytes, $len).
+ $body;
+}
+
+
+# takes a Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum, returns it formatted as OpenPGP MPI
+# (RFC 4880 section 3.2)
+sub mpi_pack {
+ my $num = shift;
+
+ my $val = $num->to_bin();
+ my $mpilen = length($val)*8;
+
+# this is a kludgy way to get the number of significant bits in the
+# first byte:
+ my $bitsinfirstbyte = length(sprintf("%b", ord($val)));
+
+ $mpilen -= (8 - $bitsinfirstbyte);
+
+ return pack('n', $mpilen).$val;
+}
+
+# see the bottom of page 43 of RFC 4880
+sub simple_checksum {
+ my $bytes = shift;
+
+ return unpack("%C*",$bytes) % 65536;
+}
+
+# FIXME: genericize these to accept either RSA or DSA keys:
+sub make_rsa_pub_key_body {
+ my $key = shift;
+ my $timestamp = shift;
+
+ my ($n, $e) = $key->get_key_parameters();
+
+ return
+ pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
+ pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
+ mpi_pack($n).
+ mpi_pack($e);
+}
+sub make_rsa_sec_key_body {
+ my $key = shift;
+ my $timestamp = shift;
+
+ # we're not using $a and $b, but we need them to get to $c.
+ my ($n, $e, $d, $p, $q, $a, $b, $c) = $key->get_key_parameters();
+
+ my $secret_material = mpi_pack($d).
+ mpi_pack($p).
+ mpi_pack($q).
+ mpi_pack($c);
+
+ # FIXME: according to Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA, $c is 1/q mod p; but
+ # according to sec 5.5.3 of RFC 4880, this last argument should
+ # instead be: u, the multiplicative inverse of p, mod q. i don't
+ # see a simple way to generate this number from the perl module
+ # directly yet.
+
+ return
+ pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
+ pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
+ mpi_pack($n).
+ mpi_pack($e).
+ pack('C', 0). # seckey material is not encrypted -- see RFC 4880 sec 5.5.3
+ $secret_material.
+ simple_checksum($secret_material);
+}
+
+# expects an RSA key (public or private) and a timestamp
+sub fingerprint {
+ my $key = shift;
+ my $timestamp = shift;
+
+ my $rsabody = make_rsa_pub_key_body($key, $timestamp);
+
+ return Digest::SHA1::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody);
+}
+
# we're just not dealing with newline business right now. slurp in
# the whole file.
undef $/;
@@ -330,6 +368,7 @@ my $sig_data_to_be_hashed =
$subpackets_to_be_hashed;
my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
+my $seckey = make_rsa_sec_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
my $key_data = make_packet($packet_types->{pubkey}, $pubkey);