Merge commit 'jrollins/master'

Conflicts:
	website/sidebar.mdwn

18 files changed, 908 insertions, 166 deletions

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 7493b1f..8d9ab2f 100755
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ tarball: clean
 
 debian-package: tarball
 	tar xzf monkeysphere_$(MONKEYSPHERE_VERSION).orig.tar.gz
+	sed -i "s|__VERSION__|$(MONKEYSPHERE_VERSION)|g" monkeysphere-$(MONKEYSPHERE_VERSION)/src/common
 	cp -a packaging/debian monkeysphere-$(MONKEYSPHERE_VERSION)
 	(cd monkeysphere-$(MONKEYSPHERE_VERSION) && debuild -uc -us)
 	rm -rf monkeysphere-$(MONKEYSPHERE_VERSION)
@@ -49,7 +50,7 @@ install: all installman
 	mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/bin $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/sbin $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/share/monkeysphere
 	mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/share/doc/monkeysphere
 	mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(ETCPREFIX)/etc/monkeysphere
-	install src/monkeysphere src/monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand src/keytrans/openpgp2ssh $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/bin
+	install src/monkeysphere src/monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand src/keytrans/openpgp2ssh src/keytrans/pem2openpgp $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/bin
 	install src/monkeysphere-server $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/sbin
 	install -m 0644 src/common $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/share/monkeysphere
 	install doc/* $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/share/doc/monkeysphere
diff --git a/doc/george/changelog b/doc/george/changelog
index 83d6843..7cd700c 100644
--- a/doc/george/changelog
+++ b/doc/george/changelog
@@ -7,6 +7,28 @@
 *  changes to this system (first command at top, last at bottom)             *
 ******************************************************************************
 
+2009-01-31 - jrollins
+	* applied diff represented in commit
+	f75a5747a8b99e04c02c475791c476f1fbd2b674 to change log level for
+	unacceptable untranslatable keys.
+
+2009-01-30 - micah
+	* Replaced nullmailer with postfix, nullmailer doesn't handle aliases
+	  and insisted either on constantly respooling mail when there was no
+	  where to go. 
+
+2009-01-24 - micah
+	* Configured /etc/aliases to have root go to mjgoins, micah, dkg, jrollins
+	* Configured /etc/nullmailer/remotes to have mail.riseup.net so remote delivery will work
+	* Removed the hundreds of queued cron emails that had resulted in 30gig of mail.err logs
+	* Rotated the giant logs out 
+
+2009-01-11 - dkg
+	* extended the expiration date for george's key three months into
+	the future.
+	* aptitude update && aptitude full-upgrade (brings monkeysphere to
+	0.22-1)
+	
 2008-10-29 - dkg
 	* aptitude update && aptitude full-upgrade
 	* brought monkeysphere up to 0.19-1
diff --git a/man/man1/openpgp2ssh.1 b/man/man1/openpgp2ssh.1
index 89df047..8374a9f 100644
--- a/man/man1/openpgp2ssh.1
+++ b/man/man1/openpgp2ssh.1
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ only acts on keys associated with the first primary key
 passed in.  If you send it more than one primary key, it will silently
 ignore later ones.
 .Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr pem2openpgp 1 ,
 .Xr monkeysphere 1 ,
 .Xr monkeysphere 7 ,
 .Xr ssh 1 ,
diff --git a/packaging/debian/changelog b/packaging/debian/changelog
index 2aaa9ca..a282c58 100644
--- a/packaging/debian/changelog
+++ b/packaging/debian/changelog
@@ -3,8 +3,13 @@ monkeysphere (0.23~pre-1) UNRELEASED; urgency=low
   * New upstream release:
     - added better checks for the existence of a host private key for
       functions that require it to be there.
+    - add checks for root users, for functions where it is required.
+    - get rid of getopts.
+    - added version output option
+    - check that existing authentication keys are valid in gen_key
+      function.
 
- -- Jameson Graef Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>  Sun, 30 Nov 2008 17:14:50 -0500
+ -- Jameson Graef Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>  Tue, 30 Dec 2008 20:21:16 -0500
 
 monkeysphere (0.22-1) unstable; urgency=low
 
diff --git a/packaging/freebsd/security/monkeysphere/Makefile b/packaging/freebsd/security/monkeysphere/Makefile
index 976f543..24f9b2b 100644
--- a/packaging/freebsd/security/monkeysphere/Makefile
+++ b/packaging/freebsd/security/monkeysphere/Makefile
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 #
 
 PORTNAME=      monkeysphere
-PORTVERSION=   0.22~pre
+PORTVERSION=   0.22
 CATEGORIES=    security
 MASTER_SITES=  http://archive.monkeysphere.info/debian/pool/monkeysphere/m/monkeysphere/
 # hack for debian orig tarballs
diff --git a/packaging/freebsd/security/monkeysphere/distinfo b/packaging/freebsd/security/monkeysphere/distinfo
index 51edfbe..d6c6e5e 100644
--- a/packaging/freebsd/security/monkeysphere/distinfo
+++ b/packaging/freebsd/security/monkeysphere/distinfo
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-MD5 (monkeysphere_0.22~pre.orig.tar.gz) = fd19f09ed9a720f673d74c9cb58e9d6d
-SHA256 (monkeysphere_0.22~pre.orig.tar.gz) = 337c7fdb93b697fba5a9e35cdff2b5faf0e4914fd8beab7994b456d58d19abb6
-SIZE (monkeysphere_0.22~pre.orig.tar.gz) = 69345
+MD5 (monkeysphere_0.22.orig.tar.gz) = 2bb00c86323409b98aff53f94d9ce0a6
+SHA256 (monkeysphere_0.22.orig.tar.gz) = 2566facda807a67a4d2d6de3833cccfa0b78b454909e8d25f47a235a9e621b24
+SIZE (monkeysphere_0.22.orig.tar.gz) = 70245
diff --git a/packaging/freebsd/security/monkeysphere/files/patch-sharelocation b/packaging/freebsd/security/monkeysphere/files/patch-sharelocation
index 99c9604..e41c479 100644
--- a/packaging/freebsd/security/monkeysphere/files/patch-sharelocation
+++ b/packaging/freebsd/security/monkeysphere/files/patch-sharelocation
@@ -20,3 +20,14 @@
  export SYSSHAREDIR
  . "${SYSSHAREDIR}/common" || exit 1
  
+--- src/monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand.orig
++++ src/monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
+ ########################################################################
+ PGRM=$(basename $0)
+ 
+-SYSSHAREDIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSSHAREDIR:-"/usr/share/monkeysphere"}
++SYSSHAREDIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSSHAREDIR:-"/usr/local/share/monkeysphere"}
+ export SYSSHAREDIR
+ . "${SYSSHAREDIR}/common" || exit 1
+ 
diff --git a/src/common b/src/common
index f6000d3..815aacc 100644
--- a/src/common
+++ b/src/common
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
 SYSCONFIGDIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSCONFIGDIR:-"/etc/monkeysphere"}
 export SYSCONFIGDIR
 
+# monkeysphere version
+VERSION=__VERSION__
+
 ########################################################################
 ### UTILITY FUNCTIONS
 
@@ -671,7 +674,7 @@ process_user_id() {
 		else
 		    log debug "  - unacceptable primary key."
 		    if [ -z "$sshKey" ] ; then
-			log error "    ! primary key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
+			log debug "    ! primary key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
 		    else
 			echo "1:${sshKey}"
 		    fi
@@ -729,7 +732,7 @@ process_user_id() {
 		else
 		    log debug "  - unacceptable sub key."
 		    if [ -z "$sshKey" ] ; then
-			log error "    ! sub key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
+			log debug "    ! sub key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
 		    else
 			echo "1:${sshKey}"
 		    fi
diff --git a/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp b/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..3d9f6f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp
@@ -0,0 +1,469 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl -w -T
+
+# pem2openpgp: take a PEM-encoded RSA private-key on standard input, a
+# User ID as the first argument, and generate an OpenPGP secret key
+# and certificate from it.
+
+# WARNING: the secret key material *will* appear on stdout (albeit in
+# OpenPGP form) -- if you redirect stdout to a file, make sure the
+# permissions on that file are appropriately locked down!
+
+# Usage:
+
+# pem2openpgp 'ssh://'$(hostname -f) < /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key | gpg --import
+
+# Authors:
+#  Jameson Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>
+#  Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+
+# Started on: 2009-01-07 02:01:19-0500
+
+# License: GPL v3 or later (we may need to adjust this given that this
+# connects to OpenSSL via perl)
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA;
+use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum;
+use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX;
+use Digest::SHA1;
+use MIME::Base64;
+
+## make sure all length() and substr() calls use bytes only:
+use bytes;
+
+my $uid = shift;
+
+# FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID; or should we default to
+# hostname_long() from Sys::Hostname::Long ?
+
+
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.1 (ignoring deprecated algorithms for now)
+my $asym_algos = { rsa => 1,
+		   elgamal => 16,
+		   dsa => 17,
+		   };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.2
+my $ciphers = { plaintext => 0,
+		idea => 1,
+		tripledes => 2,
+		cast5 => 3,
+		blowfish => 4,
+		aes128 => 7,
+		aes192 => 8,
+		aes256 => 9,
+		twofish => 10,
+	      };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.3
+my $zips = { uncompressed => 0,
+	     zip => 1,
+	     zlib => 2,
+	     bzip2 => 3,
+	   };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.4
+my $digests = { md5 => 1,
+		sha1 => 2,
+		ripemd160 => 3,
+		sha256 => 8,
+		sha384 => 9,
+		sha512 => 10,
+		sha224 => 11,
+	      };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.21
+my $usage_flags = { certify => 0x01,
+		    sign => 0x02,
+		    encrypt_comms => 0x04,
+		    encrypt_storage => 0x08,
+		    encrypt => 0x0c, ## both comms and storage
+		    split => 0x10, # the private key is split via secret sharing
+		    authenticate => 0x20,
+		    shared => 0x80, # more than one person holds the entire private key
+		  };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 4.3
+my $packet_types = { pubkey_enc_session => 1,
+		     sig => 2,
+		     symkey_enc_session => 3,
+		     onepass_sig => 4,
+		     seckey => 5,
+		     pubkey => 6,
+		     sec_subkey => 7,
+		     compressed_data => 8,
+		     symenc_data => 9,
+		     marker => 10,
+		     literal => 11,
+		     trust => 12,
+		     uid => 13,
+		     pub_subkey => 14,
+		     uat => 17,
+		     symenc_w_integrity => 18,
+		     mdc => 19,
+		   };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.1
+my $sig_types = { binary_doc => 0x00,
+		  text_doc => 0x01,
+		  standalone => 0x02,
+		  generic_certification => 0x10,
+		  persona_certification => 0x11,
+		  casual_certification => 0x12,
+		  positive_certification => 0x13,
+		  subkey_binding => 0x18,
+		  primary_key_binding => 0x19,
+		  key_signature => 0x1f,
+		  key_revocation => 0x20,
+		  subkey_revocation => 0x28,
+		  certification_revocation => 0x30,
+		  timestamp => 0x40,
+		  thirdparty => 0x50,
+		};
+
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.1
+my $subpacket_types = { sig_creation_time => 2,
+			sig_expiration_time => 3,
+			exportable => 4,
+			trust_sig => 5,
+			regex => 6,
+			revocable => 7,
+			key_expiration_time => 9,
+			preferred_cipher => 11,
+			revocation_key => 12,
+			issuer => 16,
+			notation => 20,
+			preferred_digest => 21,
+			preferred_compression => 22,
+			keyserver_prefs => 23,
+			preferred_keyserver => 24,
+			primary_uid => 25,
+			policy_uri => 26,
+			usage_flags => 27,
+			signers_uid => 28,
+			revocation_reason => 29,
+			features => 30,
+			signature_target => 31,
+			embedded_signature => 32,
+		       };
+
+# bitstring (see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.24)
+my $features = { mdc => 0x01
+	       };
+
+# bitstring (see RFC 4880 5.2.3.17)
+my $keyserver_prefs = { nomodify => 0x80
+		      };
+
+###### end lookup tables ######
+
+# FIXME: if we want to be able to interpret openpgp data as well as
+# produce it, we need to produce key/value-swapped lookup tables as well.
+
+
+########### Math/Utility Functions ##############
+
+
+# see the bottom of page 43 of RFC 4880
+sub simple_checksum {
+  my $bytes = shift;
+
+  return unpack("%32W*",$bytes) % 65536;
+}
+
+# calculate the multiplicative inverse of a mod b this is euclid's
+# extended algorithm.  For more information see:
+# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Euclidean_algorithm the
+# arguments here should be Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum objects.  $a should
+# be the larger of the two values, and the two values should be
+# coprime.
+
+sub modular_multi_inverse {
+  my $a = shift;
+  my $b = shift;
+
+  my $ctx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX->new();
+  my $x = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero();
+  my $y = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one();
+  my $lastx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one();
+  my $lasty = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero();
+
+  while (! $b->is_zero()) {
+    my ($quotient, $remainder) = $a->div($b, $ctx);
+
+    $a = $b;
+    $b = $remainder;
+
+    my $temp = $x;
+    $x = $lastx->sub($quotient->mul($x, $ctx));
+    $lastx = $temp;
+
+    $temp = $y;
+    $y = $lasty->sub($quotient->mul($y, $ctx));
+    $lasty = $temp;
+  }
+
+  if (!$a->is_one()) {
+    die "did this math wrong.\n";
+  }
+
+  return $lastx;
+}
+
+
+############ OpenPGP formatting functions ############
+
+# make an old-style packet out of the given packet type and body.
+# old-style  (see RFC 4880 section 4.2)
+sub make_packet {
+  my $type = shift;
+  my $body = shift;
+
+  my $len = length($body);
+
+  my $lenbytes;
+  my $lencode;
+
+  if ($len < 2**8) {
+    $lenbytes = 0;
+    $lencode = 'C';
+  } elsif ($len < 2**16) {
+    $lenbytes = 1;
+    $lencode = 'n';
+  } elsif ($len < 2**31) {
+    ## not testing against full 32 bits because i don't want to deal
+    ## with potential overflow.
+    $lenbytes = 2;
+    $lencode = 'N';
+  } else {
+    ## what the hell do we do here?
+    $lenbytes = 3;
+    $lencode = '';
+  }
+
+  return pack('C'.$lencode, 0x80 + ($type * 4) + $lenbytes, $len).
+    $body;
+}
+
+
+# takes a Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum, returns it formatted as OpenPGP MPI
+# (RFC 4880 section 3.2)
+sub mpi_pack {
+  my $num = shift;
+
+  my $val = $num->to_bin();
+  my $mpilen = length($val)*8;
+
+# this is a kludgy way to get the number of significant bits in the
+# first byte:
+  my $bitsinfirstbyte = length(sprintf("%b", ord($val)));
+
+  $mpilen -= (8 - $bitsinfirstbyte);
+
+  return pack('n', $mpilen).$val;
+}
+
+# FIXME: genericize these to accept either RSA or DSA keys:
+sub make_rsa_pub_key_body {
+  my $key = shift;
+  my $timestamp = shift;
+
+  my ($n, $e) = $key->get_key_parameters();
+
+  return
+    pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
+      pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
+	mpi_pack($n).
+	  mpi_pack($e);
+}
+
+sub make_rsa_sec_key_body {
+  my $key = shift;
+  my $timestamp = shift;
+
+  # we're not using $a and $b, but we need them to get to $c.
+  my ($n, $e, $d, $p, $q) = $key->get_key_parameters();
+
+  my $secret_material = mpi_pack($d).
+    mpi_pack($p).
+      mpi_pack($q).
+	mpi_pack(modular_multi_inverse($p, $q));
+
+  # according to Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA, the closest value we can get out
+  # of get_key_parameters is 1/q mod p; but according to sec 5.5.3 of
+  # RFC 4880, we're actually looking for u, the multiplicative inverse
+  # of p, mod q.  This is why we're calculating the value directly
+  # with modular_multi_inverse.
+
+  return
+    pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
+      pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
+	mpi_pack($n).
+	  mpi_pack($e).
+	    pack('C', 0). # seckey material is not encrypted -- see RFC 4880 sec 5.5.3
+	      $secret_material.
+		pack('n', simple_checksum($secret_material));
+}
+
+# expects an RSA key (public or private) and a timestamp
+sub fingerprint {
+  my $key = shift;
+  my $timestamp = shift;
+
+  my $rsabody = make_rsa_pub_key_body($key, $timestamp);
+
+  return Digest::SHA1::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody);
+}
+
+# we're just not dealing with newline business right now.  slurp in
+# the whole file.
+undef $/;
+my $buf = <STDIN>;
+
+
+my $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($buf);
+
+$rsa->use_sha1_hash();
+
+# see page 22 of RFC 4880 for why i think this is the right padding
+# choice to use:
+$rsa->use_pkcs1_padding();
+
+if (! $rsa->check_key()) {
+  die "key does not check";
+}
+
+my $version = pack('C', 4);
+# strong assertion of identity:
+my $sigtype = pack('C', $sig_types->{positive_certification});
+# RSA
+my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa});
+# SHA1
+my $hash_algo = pack('C', $digests->{sha1});
+
+# FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP
+# certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run
+# this script more than once against the same key (because the
+# timestamps will differ).  How can we prevent this?
+
+# could an environment variable (if set) override the current time, to
+# be able to create a standard key?  If we read the key from a file
+# instead of stdin, should we use the creation time on the file?
+my $timestamp = time();
+
+my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{sig_creation_time}, $timestamp);
+
+
+# FIXME: HARDCODED: what if someone wants to select a different set of
+# usage flags?  For now, we do only authentication because that's what
+# monkeysphere needs.
+my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{usage_flags}, $usage_flags->{authenticate});
+
+
+# FIXME: HARDCODED: how should we determine how far off to set the
+# expiration date?  default is to expire in 2 days, which is insanely
+# short (but good for testing).  The user ought to be able to decide
+# this directly, rather than having to do "monkeysphere-server
+# extend-key".
+my $expires_in = 86400*2;
+my $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{key_expiration_time}, $expires_in);
+
+
+# prefer AES-256, AES-192, AES-128, CAST5, 3DES:
+my $pref_sym_algos = pack('CCCCCCC', 6, $subpacket_types->{preferred_cipher},
+			  $ciphers->{aes256},
+			  $ciphers->{aes192},
+			  $ciphers->{aes128},
+			  $ciphers->{cast5},
+			  $ciphers->{tripledes}
+			 );
+
+# prefer SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPE-MD/160
+my $pref_hash_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_digest},
+			   $digests->{sha1},
+			   $digests->{sha256},
+			   $digests->{ripemd160}
+			  );
+
+# prefer ZLIB, BZip2, ZIP
+my $pref_zip_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_compression},
+			  $zips->{zlib},
+			  $zips->{bzip2},
+			  $zips->{zip}
+			 );
+
+# we support the MDC feature:
+my $feature_subpacket = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{features},
+			     $features->{mdc});
+
+# keyserver preference: only owner modify (???):
+my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{keyserver_prefs},
+			  $keyserver_prefs->{nomodify});
+
+my $subpackets_to_be_hashed =
+  $creation_time_packet.
+  $usage_packet.
+  $expiration_packet.
+  $pref_sym_algos.
+  $pref_hash_algos.
+  $pref_zip_algos.
+  $feature_subpacket.
+  $keyserver_pref;
+
+my $subpacket_octets = pack('n', length($subpackets_to_be_hashed));
+
+my $sig_data_to_be_hashed =
+  $version.
+  $sigtype.
+  $pubkey_algo.
+  $hash_algo.
+  $subpacket_octets.
+  $subpackets_to_be_hashed;
+
+my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
+my $seckey = make_rsa_sec_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
+
+my $key_data = make_packet($packet_types->{pubkey}, $pubkey);
+
+# take the last 8 bytes of the fingerprint as the keyid:
+my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $timestamp), 20 - 8, 8);
+
+# the v4 signature trailer is:
+
+# version number, literal 0xff, and then a 4-byte count of the
+# signature data itself.
+my $trailer = pack('CCN', 4, 0xff, length($sig_data_to_be_hashed));
+
+my $uid_data =
+  pack('CN', 0xb4, length($uid)).
+  $uid;
+
+my $datatosign =
+  $key_data.
+  $uid_data.
+  $sig_data_to_be_hashed.
+  $trailer;
+
+my $data_hash = Digest::SHA1::sha1_hex($datatosign);
+
+
+my $issuer_packet = pack('CCa8', 9, $subpacket_types->{issuer}, $keyid);
+
+my $sig = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($rsa->sign($datatosign));
+
+my $sig_body =
+  $sig_data_to_be_hashed.
+  pack('n', length($issuer_packet)).
+  $issuer_packet.
+  pack('n', hex(substr($data_hash, 0, 4))).
+  mpi_pack($sig);
+
+print
+  make_packet($packet_types->{seckey}, $seckey).
+  make_packet($packet_types->{uid}, $uid).
+  make_packet($packet_types->{sig}, $sig_body);
+
+
diff --git a/src/monkeysphere b/src/monkeysphere
index 523ddfe..463a1b1 100755
--- a/src/monkeysphere
+++ b/src/monkeysphere
@@ -41,37 +41,69 @@ Monkeysphere client tool.
 subcommands:
  update-known_hosts (k) [HOST]...    update known_hosts file
  update-authorized_keys (a)          update authorized_keys file
+ import-subkey (i)                   import existing ssh key as gpg subkey
+   --keyfile (-f) FILE                 key file to import
+   --expire (-e) EXPIRE                date to expire
  gen-subkey (g) [KEYID]              generate an authentication subkey
    --length (-l) BITS                  key length in bits (2048)
    --expire (-e) EXPIRE                date to expire
  subkey-to-ssh-agent (s)             store authentication subkey in ssh-agent
+ version (v)                         show version number
  help (h,?)                          this help
 
 EOF
 }
 
-# generate a subkey with the 'a' usage flags set
-gen_subkey(){
-    local keyLength
+# import an existing ssh key as a gpg subkey
+import_subkey() {
+    local keyFile="~/.ssh/id_rsa"
     local keyExpire
     local keyID
     local gpgOut
     local userID
 
-    # set default key parameter values
-    keyLength=
-    keyExpire=
-
     # get options
-    TEMP=$(PATH="/usr/local/bin:$PATH" getopt -o l:e: -l length:,expire: -n "$PGRM" -- "$@") || failure "getopt failed!  Does your getopt support GNU-style long options?"
+    while true ; do
+	case "$1" in
+	    -f|--keyfile)
+		keyFile="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
+	    -e|--expire)
+		keyExpire="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
+	    *)
+		if [ "$(echo "$1" | cut -c 1)" = '-' ] ; then
+		    failure "Unknown option '$1'.
+Type '$PGRM help' for usage."
+		fi
+		break
+		;;
+	esac
+    done
 
-    if [ $? != 0 ] ; then
-	exit 1
-    fi
+    log verbose "importing ssh key..."
+    fifoDir=$(mktemp -d ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/tmp.XXXXXXXXXX)
+    (umask 077 && mkfifo "$fifoDir/pass")
+    ssh2openpgp | gpg --passphrase-fd 3 3< "$fifoDir/pass" --expert --command-fd 0 --import &
+
+    passphrase_prompt  "Please enter your passphrase for $keyID: " "$fifoDir/pass"
+
+    rm -rf "$fifoDir"
+    wait
+    log verbose "done."
+}
 
-    # Note the quotes around `$TEMP': they are essential!
-    eval set -- "$TEMP"
+# generate a subkey with the 'a' usage flags set
+gen_subkey(){
+    local keyLength
+    local keyExpire
+    local keyID
+    local gpgOut
+    local userID
 
+    # get options
     while true ; do
 	case "$1" in
 	    -l|--length)
@@ -82,51 +114,69 @@ gen_subkey(){
 		keyExpire="$2"
 		shift 2
 		;;
-	    --)
-		shift
-		;;
-            *)
+	    *)
+		if [ "$(echo "$1" | cut -c 1)" = '-' ] ; then
+		    failure "Unknown option '$1'.
+Type '$PGRM help' for usage."
+		fi
 		break
 		;;
 	esac
     done
 
-    if [ -z "$1" ] ; then
-	# find all secret keys
-	keyID=$(gpg --with-colons --list-secret-keys | grep ^sec | cut -f5 -d: | sort -u)
-	# if multiple sec keys exist, fail
-	if (( $(echo "$keyID" | wc -l) > 1 )) ; then
-	    echo "Multiple secret keys found:"
-	    echo "$keyID"
+    case "$#" in
+	0)
+	    gpgSecOut=$(gpg --quiet --fixed-list-mode --list-secret-keys --with-colons 2>/dev/null | egrep '^sec:')
+	    ;;
+	1)
+	    gpgSecOut=$(gpg --quiet --fixed-list-mode --list-secret-keys --with-colons "$1" | egrep '^sec:') || failure
+	    ;;
+	*)
+	    failure "You must specify only a single primary key ID."
+	    ;;
+    esac
+
+    # check that only a single secret key was found
+    case $(echo "$gpgSecOut" | grep -c '^sec:') in
+	0)
+	    failure "No secret keys found.  Create an OpenPGP key with the following command:
+ gpg --gen-key"
+	    ;;
+	1)
+	    keyID=$(echo "$gpgSecOut" | cut -d: -f5)
+	    ;;
+	*)
+	    echo "Multiple primary secret keys found:"
+	    echo "$gpgSecOut" | cut -d: -f5
 	    failure "Please specify which primary key to use."
+	    ;;
+    esac
+
+    # check that a valid authentication key does not already exist
+    IFS=$'\n'
+    for line in $(gpg --quiet --fixed-list-mode --list-keys --with-colons "$keyID") ; do
+	type=$(echo "$line" | cut -d: -f1)
+	validity=$(echo "$line" | cut -d: -f2)
+	usage=$(echo "$line" | cut -d: -f12)
+
+	# look at keys only
+	if [ "$type" != 'pub' -a "$type" != 'sub' ] ; then
+	    continue
 	fi
-    else
-	keyID="$1"
-    fi
-    if [ -z "$keyID" ] ; then
-	failure "You have no secret key available.  You should create an OpenPGP
-key before joining the monkeysphere. You can do this with:
-   gpg --gen-key"
-    fi
-
-    # get key output, and fail if not found
-    gpgOut=$(gpg --quiet --fixed-list-mode --list-secret-keys --with-colons \
-	"$keyID") || failure
-
-    # fail if multiple sec lines are returned, which means the id
-    # given is not unique
-    if [ $(echo "$gpgOut" | grep -c '^sec:') -gt '1' ] ; then
-	failure "Key ID '$keyID' is not unique."
-    fi
-
-    # prompt if an authentication subkey already exists
-    if echo "$gpgOut" | egrep "^(sec|ssb):" | cut -d: -f 12 | grep -q a ; then
-	echo "An authentication subkey already exists for key '$keyID'."
-	read -p "Are you sure you would like to generate another one? (y/N) " OK; OK=${OK:N}
-	if [ "${OK/y/Y}" != 'Y' ] ; then
-	    failure "aborting."
+	# check for authentication capability
+	if ! check_capability "$usage" 'a' ; then
+	    continue
 	fi
-    fi
+	# if authentication key is valid, prompt to continue
+	if [ "$validity" = 'u' ] ; then
+	    echo "A valid authentication key already exists for primary key '$keyID'."
+	    read -p "Are you sure you would like to generate another one? (y/N) " OK; OK=${OK:N}
+	    if [ "${OK/y/Y}" != 'Y' ] ; then
+		failure "aborting."
+	    fi
+	    break
+	fi
+    done
 
     # set subkey defaults
     # prompt about key expiration if not specified
@@ -151,6 +201,7 @@ EOF
     (umask 077 && mkfifo "$fifoDir/pass")
     echo "$editCommands" | gpg --passphrase-fd 3 3< "$fifoDir/pass" --expert --command-fd 0 --edit-key "$keyID" &
 
+    # FIXME: this needs to fail more gracefully if the passphrase is incorrect
     passphrase_prompt  "Please enter your passphrase for $keyID: " "$fifoDir/pass"
 
     rm -rf "$fifoDir"
@@ -365,6 +416,10 @@ case $COMMAND in
 	RETURN="$?"
 	;;
 
+    'import-subkey'|'i')
+	import_key "$@"
+	;;
+
     'gen-subkey'|'g')
 	gen_subkey "$@"
 	;;
@@ -373,6 +428,10 @@ case $COMMAND in
 	subkey_to_ssh_agent "$@"
 	;;
 
+    'version'|'v')
+	echo "$VERSION"
+	;;
+
     '--help'|'help'|'-h'|'h'|'?')
         usage
         ;;
diff --git a/src/monkeysphere-server b/src/monkeysphere-server
index c4f6985..96f5b56 100755
--- a/src/monkeysphere-server
+++ b/src/monkeysphere-server
@@ -46,13 +46,20 @@ Monkeysphere server admin tool.
 subcommands:
  update-users (u) [USER]...          update user authorized_keys files
 
- gen-key (g) [NAME[:PORT]]           generate gpg key for the server
+ import-key (i)                      import existing ssh key to gpg
+   --hostname (-h) NAME[:PORT]         hostname for key user ID
+   --keyfile (-f) FILE                 key file to import
+   --expire (-e) EXPIRE                date to expire
+ gen-key (g)                         generate gpg key for the host
+   --hostname (-h) NAME[:PORT]         hostname for key user ID
    --length (-l) BITS                  key length in bits (2048)
    --expire (-e) EXPIRE                date to expire
    --revoker (-r) FINGERPRINT          add a revoker
- extend-key (e) EXPIRE               extend expiration to EXPIRE
- add-hostname (n+) NAME[:PORT]       add hostname user ID to server key
+ extend-key (e) EXPIRE               extend host key expiration
+ add-hostname (n+) NAME[:PORT]       add hostname user ID to host key
  revoke-hostname (n-) NAME[:PORT]    revoke hostname user ID
+ add-revoker (o) FINGERPRINT         add a revoker to the host key
+ revoke-key (r)                      revoke host key
  show-key (s)                        output all server host key information
  publish-key (p)                     publish server host key to keyserver
  diagnostics (d)                     report on server monkeysphere status
@@ -64,8 +71,10 @@ subcommands:
  remove-id-certifier (c-) KEYID      remove a certification key
  list-id-certifiers (c)              list certification keys
 
- gpg-authentication-cmd CMD          gnupg-authentication command
+ gpg-authentication-cmd CMD          give a gpg command to the
+                                     authentication keyring
 
+ version (v)                         show version number
  help (h,?)                          this help
 
 EOF
@@ -117,40 +126,59 @@ gpg_authentication() {
     su_monkeysphere_user "gpg $@"
 }
 
-# function to check for host secret keys
-# fails if host sec key exists, exits true otherwise
-check_host_keyring() {
-    if ! gpg_host --list-secret-keys --fingerprint \
-	--with-colons --fixed-list-mode 2>/dev/null | grep -q '^sec:' ; then
+# check if user is root
+is_root() {
+    [ $(id -u 2>/dev/null) = '0' ]
+}
 
-	failure "You don't appear to have a Monkeysphere host key on this server.  Please run 'monkeysphere-server gen-key' first."
-    fi
+# check that user is root, for functions that require root access
+check_user() {
+    is_root || failure "You must be root to run this command."
 }
 
 # output just key fingerprint
 fingerprint_server_key() {
+    # set the pipefail option so functions fails if can't read sec key
+    set -o pipefail
+
     gpg_host --list-secret-keys --fingerprint \
 	--with-colons --fixed-list-mode 2> /dev/null | \
-	grep '^fpr:' | head -1 | cut -d: -f10
+	grep '^fpr:' | head -1 | cut -d: -f10 2>/dev/null
+}
+
+# function to check for host secret key
+check_host_keyring() {
+    fingerprint_server_key >/dev/null \
+	|| failure "You don't appear to have a Monkeysphere host key on this server.  Please run 'monkeysphere-server gen-key' first."
 }
 
 # output key information
 show_server_key() {
-    local fingerprint
-    local tmpkey
+    local fingerprintPGP
+    local fingerprintSSH
+    local ret=0
 
-    fingerprint=$(fingerprint_server_key)
-    gpg_authentication "--fingerprint --list-key --list-options show-unusable-uids $fingerprint"
-
-    # do some crazy "Here Strings" redirection to get the key to
-    # ssh-keygen, since it doesn't read from stdin cleanly
-    echo -n "ssh fingerprint: "
-    ssh-keygen -l -f /dev/stdin \
-	<<<$(gpg_authentication "--export $fingerprint" | \
-	openpgp2ssh "$fingerprint" 2>/dev/null) | \
-	awk '{ print $1, $2, $4 }'
-    echo -n "OpenPGP fingerprint: "
-    echo "$fingerprint"
+    # FIXME: you shouldn't have to be root to see the host key fingerprint
+    if is_root ; then
+	check_host_keyring
+	fingerprintPGP=$(fingerprint_server_key)
+	gpg_authentication "--fingerprint --list-key --list-options show-unusable-uids $fingerprintPGP" 2>/dev/null
+	echo "OpenPGP fingerprint: $fingerprintPGP"
+    else
+	log info "You must be root to see host OpenPGP fingerprint."
+	ret='1'
+    fi
+
+    if [ -f "${SYSDATADIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub" ] ; then
+	fingerprintSSH=$(ssh-keygen -l -f "${SYSDATADIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub" | \
+	    awk '{ print $1, $2, $4 }')
+	echo "ssh fingerprint: $fingerprintSSH"
+    else
+	log info "SSH host key not found."
+	ret='1'
+    fi
+
+    return $ret
 }
 
 # update authorized_keys for users
@@ -291,37 +319,107 @@ update_users() {
     done
 }
 
+# import an existing ssh key to a gpg key
+import_key() {
+    local hostName=$(hostname -f)
+    local keyFile="/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key"
+    local keyExpire
+    local userID
+
+    # check for presense of secret key
+    # FIXME: is this the proper test to be doing here?
+    fingerprint_server_key >/dev/null \
+	&& failure "An OpenPGP host key already exists."
+
+    # get options
+    while true ; do
+	case "$1" in
+	    -h|--hostname)
+		hostName="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
+	    -f|--keyfile)
+		keyFile="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
+	    -e|--expire)
+		keyExpire="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
+	    *)
+		if [ "$(echo "$1" | cut -c 1)" = '-' ] ; then
+		    failure "Unknown option '$1'.
+Type '$PGRM help' for usage."
+		fi
+		break
+		;;
+	esac
+    done
+
+    if [ ! -f "$keyFile" ] ; then
+	failure "SSH secret key file '$keyFile' not found."
+    fi
+
+    userID="ssh://${hostName}"
+
+    # prompt about key expiration if not specified
+    keyExpire=$(get_gpg_expiration "$keyExpire")
+
+    echo "The following key parameters will be used for the host private key:"
+    echo "Import: $keyFile"
+    echo "Name-Real: $userID"
+    echo "Expire-Date: $keyExpire"
+
+    read -p "Import key? (Y/n) " OK; OK=${OK:=Y}
+    if [ ${OK/y/Y} != 'Y' ] ; then
+	failure "aborting."
+    fi
+
+    log verbose "importing ssh key..."
+    # translate ssh key to a private key
+    (umask 077 && \
+	pem2openpgp "$userID" "$keyExpire" < "$sshKey" | gpg_host --import)
+
+    # find the key fingerprint of the newly converted key
+    fingerprint=$(fingerprint_server_key)
+
+    # export host ownertrust to authentication keyring
+    log verbose "setting ultimate owner trust for host key..."
+    echo "${fingerprint}:6:" | gpg_host "--import-ownertrust"
+    echo "${fingerprint}:6:" | gpg_authentication "--import-ownertrust"
+
+    # export public key to file
+    gpg_authentication "--export-options export-minimal --armor --export 0x${fingerprint}\!" > "${SYSDATADIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub.gpg"
+    log info "SSH host public key in OpenPGP form: ${SYSDATADIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub.gpg"
+
+    # show info about new key
+    show_server_key
+}
+
 # generate server gpg key
 gen_key() {
-    local keyType
-    local keyLength
-    local keyUsage
+    local keyType="RSA"
+    local keyLength="2048"
+    local keyUsage="auth"
     local keyExpire
     local revoker
-    local hostName
+    local hostName=$(hostname -f)
     local userID
     local keyParameters
     local fingerprint
 
-    # set default key parameter values
-    keyType="RSA"
-    keyLength="2048"
-    keyUsage="auth"
-    keyExpire=
-    revoker=
+    # check for presense of secret key
+    # FIXME: is this the proper test to be doing here?
+    fingerprint_server_key >/dev/null \
+	&& failure "An OpenPGP host key already exists."
 
     # get options
-    TEMP=$(PATH="/usr/local/bin:$PATH" getopt -o e:l:r -l expire:,length:,revoker: -n "$PGRM" -- "$@") || failure "getopt failed!  Does your getopt support GNU-style long options?"
-
-    if [ $? != 0 ] ; then
-	exit 1
-    fi
-
-    # Note the quotes around `$TEMP': they are essential!
-    eval set -- "$TEMP"
-
     while true ; do
 	case "$1" in
+	    -h|--hostname)
+		hostName="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
 	    -l|--length)
 		keyLength="$2"
 		shift 2
@@ -334,45 +432,36 @@ gen_key() {
 		revoker="$2"
 		shift 2
 		;;
-	    --)
-		shift
-		;;
-            *)
+	    *)
+		if [ "$(echo "$1" | cut -c 1)" = '-' ] ; then
+		    failure "Unknown option '$1'.
+Type '$PGRM help' for usage."
+		fi
 		break
 		;;
 	esac
     done
 
-    hostName=${1:-$(hostname -f)}
     userID="ssh://${hostName}"
 
-    # check for presense of key with user ID
-    # FIXME: is this the proper test to be doing here?
-    if gpg_host --list-key ="$userID" > /dev/null 2>&1 ; then
-	failure "Key for '$userID' already exists"
-    fi
-
     # prompt about key expiration if not specified
     keyExpire=$(get_gpg_expiration "$keyExpire")
 
     # set key parameters
-    keyParameters=$(cat <<EOF
-Key-Type: $keyType
+    keyParameters=\
+"Key-Type: $keyType
 Key-Length: $keyLength
 Key-Usage: $keyUsage
 Name-Real: $userID
-Expire-Date: $keyExpire
-EOF
-)
+Expire-Date: $keyExpire"
 
     # add the revoker field if specified
     # FIXME: the "1:" below assumes that $REVOKER's key is an RSA key.
     # FIXME: key is marked "sensitive"?  is this appropriate?
     if [ "$revoker" ] ; then
-	keyParameters="${keyParameters}"$(cat <<EOF
-Revoker: 1:$revoker sensitive
-EOF
-)
+	keyParameters=\
+"${keyParameters}
+Revoker: 1:${revoker} sensitive"
     fi
 
     echo "The following key parameters will be used for the host private key:"
@@ -384,24 +473,21 @@ EOF
     fi
 
     # add commit command
-    keyParameters="${keyParameters}"$(cat <<EOF
+    # must include blank line!
+    keyParameters=\
+"${keyParameters}
 
 %commit
-%echo done
-EOF
-)
+%echo done"
 
-    log verbose "generating server key..."
+    log verbose "generating host key..."
     echo "$keyParameters" | gpg_host --batch --gen-key
 
-    # output the server fingerprint
-    fingerprint_server_key "=${userID}"
-
     # find the key fingerprint of the newly generated key
     fingerprint=$(fingerprint_server_key)
 
     # export host ownertrust to authentication keyring
-    log verbose "setting ultimate owner trust for server key..."
+    log verbose "setting ultimate owner trust for host key..."
     echo "${fingerprint}:6:" | gpg_authentication "--import-ownertrust"
 
     # translate the private key to ssh format, and export to a file
@@ -415,6 +501,9 @@ EOF
     log info "SSH host public key output to file: ${SYSDATADIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub"
     gpg_authentication "--export-options export-minimal --armor --export 0x${fingerprint}\!" > "${SYSDATADIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub.gpg"
     log info "SSH host public key in OpenPGP form: ${SYSDATADIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub.gpg"
+
+    # show info about new key
+    show_server_key
 }
 
 # extend the lifetime of a host key:
@@ -478,7 +567,7 @@ $userID
 
 save
 EOF
-	)
+)
 
     # execute edit-key script
     if echo "$adduidCommand" | \
@@ -576,6 +665,18 @@ EOF
     fi
 }
 
+# add a revoker to the host key
+add_revoker() {
+    # FIXME: implement!
+    failure "not implemented yet!"
+}
+
+# revoke the host key
+revoke_key() {
+    # FIXME: implement!
+    failure "not implemented yet!"
+}
+
 # publish server key to keyserver
 publish_server_key() {
     read -p "Really publish host key to $KEYSERVER? (y/N) " OK; OK=${OK:=N}
@@ -778,15 +879,6 @@ add_certifier() {
     depth=1
 
     # get options
-    TEMP=$(PATH="/usr/local/bin:$PATH" getopt -o n:t:d: -l domain:,trust:,depth: -n "$PGRM" -- "$@") || failure "getopt failed!  Does your getopt support GNU-style long options?"
-
-    if [ $? != 0 ] ; then
-	exit 1
-    fi
-
-    # Note the quotes around `$TEMP': they are essential!
-    eval set -- "$TEMP"
-
     while true ; do
 	case "$1" in
 	    -n|--domain)
@@ -801,10 +893,11 @@ add_certifier() {
 		depth="$2"
 		shift 2
 		;;
-	    --)
-		shift
-		;;
-            *)
+	    *)
+		if [ "$(echo "$1" | cut -c 1)" = '-' ] ; then
+		    failure "Unknown option '$1'.
+Type '$PGRM help' for usage."
+		fi
 		break
 		;;
 	esac
@@ -1001,62 +1094,93 @@ shift
 
 case $COMMAND in
     'update-users'|'update-user'|'u')
+	check_user
 	check_host_keyring
 	update_users "$@"
 	;;
 
+    'import-key'|'i')
+	check_user
+	import_key "$@"
+	;;
+
     'gen-key'|'g')
+	check_user
 	gen_key "$@"
 	;;
 
     'extend-key'|'e')
+	check_user
 	check_host_keyring
 	extend_key "$@"
 	;;
 
     'add-hostname'|'add-name'|'n+')
+	check_user
 	check_host_keyring
 	add_hostname "$@"
 	;;
 
     'revoke-hostname'|'revoke-name'|'n-')
+	check_user
 	check_host_keyring
 	revoke_hostname "$@"
 	;;
 
-    'show-key'|'show'|'s')
+    'add-revoker'|'o')
+	check_user
 	check_host_keyring
+	add_revoker "$@"
+	;;
+
+    'revoke-key'|'r')
+	check_user
+	check_host_keyring
+	revoke_key "$@"
+	;;
+
+    'show-key'|'show'|'s')
 	show_server_key
 	;;
 
     'publish-key'|'publish'|'p')
+	check_user
 	check_host_keyring
 	publish_server_key
 	;;
 
     'diagnostics'|'d')
+	check_user
 	diagnostics
 	;;
 
     'add-identity-certifier'|'add-id-certifier'|'add-certifier'|'c+')
+	check_user
 	check_host_keyring
 	add_certifier "$@"
 	;;
 
     'remove-identity-certifier'|'remove-id-certifier'|'remove-certifier'|'c-')
+	check_user
 	check_host_keyring
 	remove_certifier "$@"
 	;;
 
     'list-identity-certifiers'|'list-id-certifiers'|'list-certifiers'|'list-certifier'|'c')
+	check_user
 	check_host_keyring
 	list_certifiers "$@"
 	;;
 
     'gpg-authentication-cmd')
+	check_user
 	gpg_authentication_cmd "$@"
 	;;
 
+    'version'|'v')
+	echo "$VERSION"
+	;;
+
     '--help'|'help'|'-h'|'h'|'?')
         usage
         ;;
diff --git a/website/bugs/use_getopts_instead_of_getopt.mdwn b/website/bugs/use_getopts_instead_of_getopt.mdwn
index af4c17a..2ec68d6 100644
--- a/website/bugs/use_getopts_instead_of_getopt.mdwn
+++ b/website/bugs/use_getopts_instead_of_getopt.mdwn
@@ -8,3 +8,12 @@ better for portability.
 So it looks like the sh built-in getopts does not include long options
 (eg. "--expire").  Is it worth getting rid of the long options for
 this?
+
+---
+
+Why not just get rid of getopts altogether and perform a simple
+argument-processing loop with bash string tests?  We're only invoking
+getopt in three places, and each invocation is no more complex than
+three arguments -- and most arguments take a separate parameter, which
+means that handling tricky arg blobs like -aCxr are not gonna be
+supported anyway.
diff --git a/website/local.css b/website/local.css
index c4b59e9..de0f196 100644
--- a/website/local.css
+++ b/website/local.css
@@ -58,31 +58,31 @@ pre {
   overflow: auto;
 }
 
-table.sitenav { 
+table.sitenav {
   border-bottom: 2px solid black;
   padding: 0px;
   width: 100%;
   font-size: larger;
 }
 
-table.sitenav img.logo { 
-  margin: 0px; 
-  padding: 0px; 
+table.sitenav img.logo {
+  margin: 0em;
+  padding: 0px;
   vertical-align: bottom;
 }
 
+table.sitenav img.title {
+  margin: 0px;
+  padding: 0px;
+  vertical-align: top;
+}
+
 table.sitenav a { 
   font-weight: bold;
   margin-right: 1em;
   font-size: smaller;
 }
 
-/* trying to align the sitenav links roughly with the text in the monkeysphere logo */
-td#sitenav { 
-  vertical-align: bottom;
-  padding-bottom: 30px;
-}
-
 table.sitenav span.selflink { 
   font-weight: bold;
   text-decoration: underline;
diff --git a/website/logo.simple.png b/website/logo.simple.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5cc69eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/logo.simple.png
diff --git a/website/logo.title.png b/website/logo.title.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a203f8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/logo.title.png
diff --git a/website/news/Monkeysphere-in-Debian.mdwn b/website/news/Monkeysphere-in-Debian.mdwn
index acba904..edad432 100644
--- a/website/news/Monkeysphere-in-Debian.mdwn
+++ b/website/news/Monkeysphere-in-Debian.mdwn
@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@
 [The Monkeysphere has made it into
 Debian!](http://packages.debian.org/sid/monkeysphere)
 
-It is in Debian unstable (sid) now, which means it won't make it into
-the next unstable release (lenny), but hopefully will be in the stable
-release after that (squeeze).
+It is in Debian unstable ("sid") now, which means it won't make it
+into the next stable release ("lenny"), but hopefully will make it
+into the stable release after that ("squeeze").
 
 Congratulations to all the work by all the [monkeysphere
 developers](/community), and to Micah Anderson for being our Debian
diff --git a/website/sidebar.mdwn b/website/sidebar.mdwn
index 381dff7..4783d2a 100644
--- a/website/sidebar.mdwn
+++ b/website/sidebar.mdwn
@@ -1,12 +1,19 @@
 <table class="sitenav" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0">
-<tbody><tr><td>
-<a class="logo" href="/"><img class="logo" src="/logo.png" alt="monkeysphere" width="343" height="85" /></a>
-</td><td id="sitenav">
-
+<colgroup span="1" width="120" />
+<tr>
+<td rowspan="2"><a href="/"><img class="logo" src="/logo.simple.png" alt="monkeysphere" /></a></td>
+<td><a href="/"><img class="title" src="/logo.title.png" alt="monkeysphere" /></a></td>
+</tr><tr>
+<td>
 [[WHY?|why]]
 [[DOWNLOAD|download]]
 [[DOCUMENTATION|doc]] 
 [[NEWS|news]]
 [[COMMUNITY|community]]
-[[BUGS|bugs]]
-</td></tr></tbody></table>
+<a href="https://labs.riseup.net/code/wiki/monkeysphere">WIKI</a>
+<a href="https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/monkeysphere/issues">BUGS</a>
+[[VISION|vision]]
+</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
diff --git a/website/vision.mdwn b/website/vision.mdwn
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..281bc72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/vision.mdwn
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+[[meta title="Our vision for the future of the monkeysphere"]]
+
+## External Validation Agent ##
+
+This is probably at the crux of the Monkeysphere vision for the future:
+
+* [Simon Josefsson proposed out-of-process certificate verification model in gnutls-devel](http://news.gmane.org/find-root.php?group=gmane.comp.encryption.gpg.gnutls.devel&article=3231)
+* [Werner Koch's dirmngr](http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/dirmngr/)
+* [GnuTLS wiki external validation](http://redmine.josefsson.org/wiki/gnutls/GnuTLSExternalValidation)
+* [Pathfinder PKI validation](http://code.google.com/p/pathfinder-pki/) (includes validation plugins for OpenSSL and LibNSS).
+
+## TLS transition strategies ##
+
+While [RFC 5081](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5081) is quite a while
+off from widespread adoption, it would be good to have an interim
+translation step.  This is analogous to the SSH work we've done, where
+the on-the-wire protocol remains the same, but the keys themselves are
+looked up in the OpenPGP WoT.
+
+Firefox extensions that deal with certificate validation seem to be
+the easiest path toward demonstrating this technique.  We should look
+at:
+
+* [SSL Blacklist](http://codefromthe70s.org/sslblacklist.aspx)
+* [Perspectives](http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~perspectives/firefox.html)
+* there is another firefox extension that basically disables all TLS certificate checking.  The download page says things like "this is a bad idea" and "do not install this extension", but i'm unable to find it at the moment.
+
+## Related discussions ##
+
+* [Wandering Thoughts blog discussion about Web of Trust flaws](http://utcc.utoronto.ca/~cks/space/blog/tech/WebOfTrustFlaws?showcomments)
+* [Wandering Thoughts blog discussion about certificate authorities](http://utcc.utoronto.ca/~cks/space/blog/web/SSLCANeed?showcomments)