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Diffstat (limited to 'doc/plugins/contrib')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/plugins/contrib/field/discussion.mdwn | 49 |
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/doc/plugins/contrib/field/discussion.mdwn b/doc/plugins/contrib/field/discussion.mdwn index dd9342224..24c37cc4c 100644 --- a/doc/plugins/contrib/field/discussion.mdwn +++ b/doc/plugins/contrib/field/discussion.mdwn @@ -239,13 +239,60 @@ smcv's discuission of field author vs meta author above. --[[Joey]] >>> set values in pagetemplate which are prefixed with *field_*. I don't think >>> this is quite satisfactory, since that would still mean that people could >>> put un-scrubbed values into a pagetemplate, albeit they would be values ->>> named field_foo, etc. +>>> named field_foo, etc. --[[KathrynAndersen]] + +>>>> They can already do similar; `PERMALINK` is pre-sanitized to +>>>> ensure that it's a "safe" URL, but if an extremely confused wiki admin was +>>>> to put `COPYRIGHT` in their RSS/Atom feed's `<link>`, a malicious user +>>>> could put an unsafe (e.g. Javascript) URL in there (`COPYRIGHT` *is* +>>>> HTML-scrubbed, but "javascript:alert('pwned!')" is just text as far as a +>>>> HTML sanitizer is concerned, so it passes straight through). The solution +>>>> is to not use variables in situations where that variable would be +>>>> inappropriate. Because `field` is so generic, the definition of what's +>>>> appropriate is difficult. --[[smcv]] >>> An alternative solution would be to classify field registration as "secure" >>> and "insecure". Sources such as ymlfront would be insecure, sources such >>> as concon (or the $config hash) would be secure, since they can't be edited >>> as pages. Then, when doing pagetemplate substitution (but not ftemplate >>> substitution) the insecure sources could be HTML-escaped. +>>> --[[KathrynAndersen]] + +>>>> Whether you trust the supplier of data seems orthogonal to whether its value +>>>> is (meant to be) interpreted as plain text, HTML, a URL or what? +>>>> +>>>> Even in cases where you trust the supplier, you need to escape things +>>>> suitably for the context, not for security but for correctness. The +>>>> definition of the value, and the context it's being used in, changes the +>>>> processing you need to do. An incomplete list: +>>>> +>>>> * HTML used as HTML needs to be html-scrubbed if and only if untrusted +>>>> * URLs used as URLs need to be put through `safeurl()` if and only if +>>>> untrusted +>>>> * HTML used as plain text needs tags removed regardless +>>>> * URLs used as plain text are safe +>>>> * URLs or plain text used in HTML need HTML-escaping (and URLs also need +>>>> `safeurl()` if untrusted) +>>>> * HTML or plain text used in URLs need URL-escaping (and the resulting +>>>> URL might need sanitizing too?) +>>>> +>>>> I can't immediately think of other data types we'd be interested in beyond +>>>> text, HTML and URL, but I'm sure there are plenty. +>>>> +>>>> One reasonable option would be to declare that `field` takes text-valued +>>>> fields, in which case either consumers need to escape +>>>> it with `<TMPL_VAR FIELD_FOO ESCAPE=HTML>`, and not interpret it as a URL +>>>> without first checking `safeurl`), or the pagetemplate hook needs to +>>>> pre-escape. +>>>> +>>>> Another reasonable option would be to declare that `field` takes raw HTML, +>>>> in which case consumers need to only use it in contexts that will be +>>>> HTML-scrubbed (but it becomes unsuitable for using as text - problematic +>>>> for text-based things like sorting or URLs, and not ideal for searching). +>>>> +>>>> You could even let each consumer choose how it's going to use the field, +>>>> by having the `foo` field generate `TEXT_FOO` and `HTML_FOO` variables? +>>>> --[[smcv]] >>> Another problem, as you point out, is special-case fields, such as a number of >>> those defined by `meta`, which have side-effects associated with them, more |