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authorhttp://oneingray.myopenid.com/ <http://oneingray.myopenid.com/@web>2010-03-12 21:24:53 +0000
committerJoey Hess <joey@finch.kitenet.net>2010-03-12 21:24:53 +0000
commitb5e27e60ba38365f3e252df80c2a22503f00eb06 (patch)
tree766510d7457180928822c34bf6aa75b40b1773b7 /doc/todo
parent08485ec444cf81015e39c52e6ce8e7b933a036f6 (diff)
Note that <object /> still may be allowed, although in a form not suitable for, say, SVG inclusion.
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/todo')
-rw-r--r--doc/todo/finer_control_over___60__object___47____62__s.mdwn34
1 files changed, 33 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/doc/todo/finer_control_over___60__object___47____62__s.mdwn b/doc/todo/finer_control_over___60__object___47____62__s.mdwn
index ac4b55568..c37d052db 100644
--- a/doc/todo/finer_control_over___60__object___47____62__s.mdwn
+++ b/doc/todo/finer_control_over___60__object___47____62__s.mdwn
@@ -27,13 +27,43 @@ For Ikiwiki, it may be nice to be able to restrict [URI's][URI] (as required by
[[wishlist]]
-> SVG can contain embedded javascript. The spec that you link to contains
+> SVG can contain embedded javascript.
+
+>> Indeed.
+
+>> So, a more general tool (`XML::Scrubber`?) will be necessary to
+>> refine both [XHTML][] and SVG.
+
+>> &hellip; And to leave [MathML][] as is (?.)
+
+>> &mdash;&nbsp;[[Ivan_Shmakov]], 2010-03-12Z.
+
+> The spec that you link to contains
> examples of objects that contain python scripts, Microsoft OLE
> objects, and Java. And then there's flash. I don't think ikiwiki can
> assume all the possibilities are handled securely, particularly WRT XSS
> attacks.
> --[[Joey]]
+>> I've scanned over all the `object` examples in the specification and
+>> all of those that hold references to code (as opposed to data) have a
+>> distinguishing `classid` attribute.
+
+>> While I won't assert that it's impossible to reference code with
+>> `data` (and, thanks to `text/xhtml+xml` and `image/svg+xml`, it is
+>> *not* impossible), throwing away any of the &ldquo;insecure&rdquo;
+>> attributes listed above together with limiting the possible URI's
+>> (i.&nbsp;e., only *local* and certain `data:` ones for `data` and
+>> `usemap`) should make `object` almost as harmless as, say, `img`.
+
+>> (Though it certainly won't solve the [[SVG_problem|/todo/SVG]] being
+>> restricted in such a way.)
+
+>> Of the remaining issues I could only think of recursive
+>> `object` &mdash; the one that references its container document.
+
+>> &mdash;&nbsp;[[Ivan_Shmakov]], 2010-03-12Z.
+
## See also
* [Objects, Images, and Applets in HTML documents][objects-html]
@@ -43,6 +73,8 @@ For Ikiwiki, it may be nice to be able to restrict [URI's][URI] (as required by
* [Uniform Resource Identifier &mdash; the free encyclopedia][URI]
[HTML::Scrubber]: http://search.cpan.org/~podmaster/HTML-Scrubber-0.08/Scrubber.pm
+[MathML]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MathML
[objects-html]: http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-html401-19991224/struct/objects.html
[RFC 2397]: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2397
[URI]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniform_Resource_Identifier
+[XHTML]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XHTML