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+<A name=1></a><IMG src="Greens-IslandsofResilience-1.png"><br>
+<b>Islands of Resilience</b><br>
+<b>Comparative Model for Energy, Connectivity and Jurisdiction</b><br>
+<b>Realizing European ICT possibilities through a case study of Iceland</b><br>
+Smári McCarthy and Eleanor Saitta<br>
+<A name=2></a><IMG src="Greens-IslandsofResilience-2.png"><br>
+&nbsp;<br>Prepared at the request of:<br>
+on behalf of Members of the European Parliament&nbsp;<br>Christian Engström, Indrek Tarand, Carl Schlyter, Sandrine Bélier, Karima Delli, Eva Lichtenberger, Raül&nbsp;<br>Romeva i Rueda, Heide Rühle, Judith Sargentini, Bas Eickhout and Marije Cornelissen<br>&nbsp;<br>&nbsp;<br><b>&nbsp;<br>&nbsp;<br>Prepared at the request of The Greens / European Free Alliance<br>&nbsp;<br>Authors:</b><br>
+<b>On behalf of Members of the European Parliament:</b><br>
+<b>&nbsp; &nbsp;</b>Smári McCarthy<br>
+&nbsp; &nbsp; Christian Engström<br>
+&nbsp; &nbsp;Eleanor Saitta<br>
+&nbsp; &nbsp; Indrek Tarand<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; Carl Schlyter<br>
+<b>Contributing Researchers:</b><br>
+&nbsp; &nbsp; Sandrine Bélier<br>
+<b>&nbsp; &nbsp;</b>Guðjón Idir<br>
+&nbsp; &nbsp; Karmima Delli<br>
+&nbsp; &nbsp;Jason Scott<br>
+&nbsp; &nbsp; Eva Lichtenberger<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; Paül Romeva i Rueda<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; Heide Rühle<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; Judith Sargentini<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; Bas Eickhout<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; Marije Cornelissen<br>
+<b>Produced by:<br>&nbsp;</b><br>
+<b>&nbsp;<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;</b><br>
+<b>&nbsp; &nbsp; International Modern Media Institute<br></b>&nbsp; &nbsp; Laugavegur 3<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; 101 Reykjavík<br>&nbsp; &nbsp; Iceland<br>
+<A name=3></a><IMG src="Greens-IslandsofResilience-3.png"><br>
+&nbsp;Distributed under the terms of the&nbsp;<br>
+Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0-unported License<br>
+<A name=4></a><b>Abstract</b><br>
+Locale is rapidly becoming one of the most important competitive differentiators in the&nbsp;<br>provision of cloud-based information technology services. Broadly speaking, three&nbsp;<br>categories of issues define a locale's fitness for hosting the cloud: energy, connectivity, and&nbsp;<br>jurisdiction.<br>
+Energy is the largest cost center for most cloud hosts. Beyond price per kilowatt hour,&nbsp;<br>hosting companies must consider redundant network availability, power grid resilience,&nbsp;<br>environmental sustainability, climate, and equipment cooling requirements as core parts of&nbsp;<br>their energy strategy.<br>
+Connectivity is clearly essential for hosts, and differentiating factors here include total&nbsp;<br>installed bandwidth, current utilized bandwidth, hub redundancy, international uplink&nbsp;<br>redundancy, round trip latency, traffic shaping and network neutrality.<br>
+Jurisdictional issues are an area of emerging concern and awareness for cloud hosts, where&nbsp;<br>the landscape is shifting rapidly. &nbsp;Hosting companies are deeply affected by intermediary&nbsp;<br>liability, hosting liability, state and corporate surveillance, state and corporate censorship, the&nbsp;<br>accessibility of and cost of interacting with courts, corruption, and socioeconomic stability.<br>
+This report considers Iceland's relative competitive advantages and drawbacks as a hosting&nbsp;<br>locale relating to these issues.<br>
+<A name=5></a><b>Table of Contents</b><br>
+<a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#4">Abstract</a><br>
+<a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#6">Introduction<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#7">Energy</a><br>
+<a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#7">Energy&nbsp;Sources<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#9">Energy&nbsp;Utilization&nbsp;and&nbsp;Pricing<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#10">Grid&nbsp;Resilience&nbsp;and&nbsp;Redundancy<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#11">Climate&nbsp;and&nbsp;Cooling</a><br>
+<a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#12">Connectivity</a><br>
+<a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#12">Submarine&nbsp;Cables<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#13">Installed&nbsp;and&nbsp;Utilized&nbsp;Capacity<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#14">Domestic&nbsp;Network<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#15">Round&nbsp;Trip&nbsp;Latency<br>Network&nbsp;Security<br>Future&nbsp;Connectivity&nbsp;Developments</a><br>
+<a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#18">Jurisdiction</a><br>
+<a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#18">Commercial&nbsp;Issues<br>Overview&nbsp;of&nbsp;Icelandic&nbsp;Information&nbsp;Regulation<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#19">Compatibility&nbsp;with&nbsp;European&nbsp;Union&nbsp;Directives<br>Intermediary&nbsp;Liability&nbsp;Limitations<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#20">Surveillance<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#22">Censorship<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#19">Data&nbsp;Protection<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#23">Human&nbsp;Resources<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#24">Icelandic&nbsp;Modern&nbsp;Media&nbsp;Initiative<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#25">Source&nbsp;Protection<br>Freedom&nbsp;of&nbsp;Information&nbsp;Act<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#26">Network&nbsp;Neutrality<br>Communications&nbsp;Protection&nbsp;and&nbsp;Communications&nbsp;Data&nbsp;Retention<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#27">Intermediary&nbsp;Liability&nbsp;Limitations<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#28">Libel&nbsp;Tourism&nbsp;Protection<br>Libel&nbsp;Reform&nbsp;and&nbsp;Publishing&nbsp;Liability&nbsp;Limitations<br></a><a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#29">Whistleblower&nbsp;Protection<br>Prior&nbsp;Restraint&nbsp;Limitations<br>Virtual&nbsp;Limited&nbsp;Liability&nbsp;Companies</a><br>
+<a href="Greens-IslandsofResiliences.html#30">Selected&nbsp;Bibliography</a><br>
+<A name=6></a><b>Introduction</b><br>
+This preliminary study is intended to give a birds-eye view of the primary factors pertaining&nbsp;<br>to energy, connectivity and jurisdiction in Iceland, as applicable to ICT1&nbsp;growth in general&nbsp;<br>and cloud hosting in particular.. It is necessarily narrow in scope and largely based on&nbsp;<br>aggregating publicly available information. As a result, some inaccuracies may exist, largely&nbsp;<br>due to poor information made available by private actors. A more in-depth follow up study&nbsp;<br>will &nbsp;remedy this by seeking out more detailed expert insights, detailed statistics, and&nbsp;<br>comparing against sourced cases.<br>
+Regardless, this report clearly shows the advantages Iceland has in relation to ICTs, as well&nbsp;<br>as showing some of its potential weaknesses and possible remedies.<br>
+Iceland’s key strengths are:<br>
+Cheap and abundant energy generated from green, renewable, sustainable and&nbsp;<br>resilient energy sources, distributed over a well designed and resilient power grid.<br>
+Increasingly good connectivity to the outside world with reasonable redundancy&nbsp;<br>and a large amount of unused capacity available for expansion, and a very highly&nbsp;<br>developed internal network with high resiliency.<br>
+An advanced and stable jurisdiction, with clear information rights and regulations,&nbsp;<br>well structured administration, and well informed governing bodies.<br>
+Iceland’s main weaknesses are:<br>
+Scale discrepancies both in energy generation and consumption which could&nbsp;<br>potentially threaten grid resilience in extreme cases. This can be improved with&nbsp;<br>further diversification of energy consumers, such as large-scale ICT deployments.<br>
+Iceland’s data connectivity is provided by a relatively small number of submarine&nbsp;<br>cables connecting to the outside world, creating some network precarity. &nbsp;This is&nbsp;<br>currently being improved with the addition of new cables.<br>
+International data transport bandwidth through submarine cables is currently&nbsp;<br>expensive. This could be mitigated by further investments, subsidies, or other&nbsp;<br>methods to reduce the price for connection, with the intention of increasing the&nbsp;<br>overall usage.<br>
+Iceland has similar issues with blanket communications surveillance as in the EU,&nbsp;<br>which make it less attractive for hosting than countries where communications are&nbsp;<br>not monitored. This is hard to fix without political will in the EU.<br>
+Wildcard properties exist in the implementation of the e-Commerce directive,&nbsp;<br>connected to injunctive powers that district sheriffs still have. This can be solved by&nbsp;<br>clarifying the instances under which injunctions can be made, and restricting the&nbsp;<br>issuing authority to courts.<br>
+Together Iceland’s key strengths form a very sound basis for the expansion of ICT in&nbsp;<br>Iceland, especially cloud hosting. &nbsp;Most of the weaknesses in Iceland’s position are either&nbsp;<br>
+1&nbsp;Information and Communication Technologies<br>
+<A name=7></a>structural weaknesses common amongst all EU member states or are relatively trivial issues&nbsp;<br>which can be resolved easily.<br>
+Energy is the largest cost center for most cloud hosting companies. Beyond price per&nbsp;<br>kilowatt hour, hosting companies must consider redundant network availability, power grid&nbsp;<br>resilience, environmental sustainability, climate, and equipment cooling requirements as&nbsp;<br>core parts of their energy strategy.&nbsp;<br>
+In our analytical model for energy, we asked the following questions:<br>
+<b>How prevalent are renewable energy sources in current electrical production?</b><br>
+1.&nbsp;Less than 3% of all energy production based on renewable energy sources.<br>2.&nbsp;Between 4 and 40% of all energy production based on renewable energy sources.<br>3.&nbsp;Between 40 and 60% of all energy production based on renewable energy sources.<br>4.&nbsp;Between 60 and 97% of all energy production based on renewable energy sources.<br>5.&nbsp;More than 97% of all energy production based on renewable energy sources.<br>
+<b>How much can current electrical production be increased without the construction of&nbsp;<br>new (not currently planned) power plants?</b><br>
+1.&nbsp;By less than 5% of current average power use.<br>2.&nbsp;By less than 25% of current average power use.<br>3.&nbsp;By less than 50% of current average power use.<br>4.&nbsp;By more than 75% of current average power use<br>5.&nbsp;By more than 100% of current average power use.<br>
+<b>What is the annual average price per kiloWatt hour for a commercial customer using&nbsp;<br>less than 2 GWh/year, including generation and distribution?</b><br>
+1.&nbsp;&gt; €0.20/kWh<br>2.&nbsp;&gt; €0.14/kWh<br>3.&nbsp;&lt;= €0.14/kWh<br>4.&nbsp;&lt; €0.09/kWh<br>5.&nbsp;&lt; €0.07/kWh<br>
+Iceland's national energy plan was last updated in November of 2011.<br>
+<b>Energy Sources</b><br>
+<A name=8></a>In 2009, Iceland’s total energy utilization was roughly 240 PJ2&nbsp;of primary energy sources,&nbsp;<br>which equates to roughly 67 TWh3. The primary energy sources were, in order of magnitude:&nbsp;<br>geothermal, hydroelectric, oil, and coal. Geothermal energy use was greater than all other&nbsp;<br>energy sources combined, while coal use was relatively minuscule. Energy use in Iceland&nbsp;<br>has risen substantially since the 1940’s with the industrialization of the country, which up&nbsp;<br>until roughly 1960 was almost entirely rural.<br>
+A vast amount of geothermal energy is used for house-heating (45%), followed by electricity&nbsp;<br>production (39%). In addition, it is used for snow-melting, swimming pools, fish farming,&nbsp;<br>greenhouses and for industrial purposes. In 2009 a total of 22.3 PJ of geothermal energy&nbsp;<br>was used for electricity production.<br>
+Only 18% of Iceland’s primary energy utilization comes from petrochemicals, of which&nbsp;<br>90% is oil and 10% coal. The majority of the coal is used by the iron smelting plant at&nbsp;<br>Grundartangi, with other industrial processes consuming the remainder. Almost no natural&nbsp;<br>gas is used in Iceland. Roughly 660 thousand tonnes of oil were used in Iceland in 2009,&nbsp;<br>of which 41% went to powering cars, 18% for aircraft, and 29% for fishing. Petroleum use&nbsp;<br>for cars has increased by 64% since 1990 in Iceland, contributing to the overall increase in&nbsp;<br>use. Oil is not used for electricity production except for some emergency backup generators.&nbsp;<br>Some towns have backup generators capable of sustaining basic operations throughout the&nbsp;<br>town temporarily, but the redundancy of the electricity grid renders this use minimal.<br>
+As a result, the electricity production in Iceland is almost exclusively from geothermal and&nbsp;<br>hydroelectric primary energy sources. The theoretical maximum energy production in Iceland&nbsp;<br>is 64 TWh per year from hydroelectric sources and between 10 and 30 TWh per year from&nbsp;<br>geothermal sources. However, for natural protection purposes substantial regions of Iceland&nbsp;<br>have been classified as natural reserves, parks, or other protected areas. In addition, certain&nbsp;<br>areas have been classified as energy reserves that will not be used in coming years, in part&nbsp;<br>for sustainability reasons. This lowers the effective energy available for production.<br>
+The current installed production capacity is 12.3 TWh per year for hydroelectric power,&nbsp;<br>and 4.6 TWh per year for geothermal power. After subtracting the protected and reserve&nbsp;<br>production categories, the total available hydroelectric and geothermal energy available for&nbsp;<br>future expansion is 11.91 TWh per year.<br>
+Variability of energy pricing and availability is a critical issue for data centers.&nbsp;&nbsp;As Iceland has&nbsp;<br>little or no hydrocarbon-based electricity production, electricity prices are largely unaffected&nbsp;<br>by fluctuations in the oil, gas, and coal markets, and will not be affected by supply chain&nbsp;<br>interruptions in these markets. &nbsp;This provides a critical level of energy resilience for the&nbsp;<br>Icelandic electrical system at the supply end. &nbsp;Cheap, reliable, resilience, and predictably&nbsp;<br>priced energy sources are, in combination, a significant advantage for potential hosting&nbsp;<br>companies.<br>
+2&nbsp;Petajoules. 1&nbsp;PJ&nbsp;= 1015&nbsp;J<br>3&nbsp;Terawatt&nbsp;hours. 1&nbsp;TWh&nbsp;= 1012&nbsp;W·h<br>
+<A name=9></a><IMG src="Greens-IslandsofResilience-9.png"><br>
+(Primary energy sources in Iceland 1940-2009. Inset: Proportional use. Top to bottom: Coal,&nbsp;<br>
+oil, geothermal and hydroelectric. Source: Orkuáætlun 2011)<br>
+<b>Energy Utilization and Pricing</b><br>
+In 2009, 74% of produced electricity in Iceland went to the aluminum industry, with roughly&nbsp;<br>4.9 TWh/year to Alcoa Fjarðarál, 4.0 TWh/year to Rio Tinto Alcan, and 4.0 TWh/year to&nbsp;<br>Norðurál. 6% of produced electricity was used in the services industry, 5% for iron smelting&nbsp;<br>plants, 5% for household appliances, 4% for utilities, 4% for general industries, and 1% in&nbsp;<br>agriculture.<br>
+<A name=10></a><IMG src="Greens-IslandsofResilience-10.png"><br>
+(Electricity use 2009. From top to bottom: Fisheries, agriculture, general industries, district&nbsp;<br>
+heating, home use, steel mills, services and aluminum industry. Source: Orkuátælun 2011)<br>
+Energy use for household appliances accounted for 627 GWh in 2009, accounting for 7.1&nbsp;<br>B ISK (€44.3 million) &nbsp;in consumer use, including VAT. Average household electricity costs&nbsp;<br>in Reykjavík are 11.30 ISK/kWh, or €0.07/kWh. This rate is substantially higher than the&nbsp;<br>price for industry. &nbsp;In the case of the aluminum smelters, these rates are 30% lower than&nbsp;<br>the European average4, although the energy prices for aluminum smelting have been&nbsp;<br>confidential. Alcoa Fjarðarál reportedly paid between 28-35 USD/MWh in 2006, or roughly&nbsp;<br>€0.044/kWh at 2006 exchange rates.<br>
+(Main power lines and power plants. Source: Landsnet. For realtime energy distribution&nbsp;<br>
+<a href="">figures, see&nbsp;</a>&nbsp;)<br>
+<b>Grid Resilience and Redundancy</b><br>
+Power grid resilience in Iceland is fairly high. The 61 power stations in Iceland are connected&nbsp;<br>with a circular grid which goes around the country, providing basic redundancy. In addition,&nbsp;<br>most power stations on the southwest corner have further grid redundancy simply due to the&nbsp;<br>higher population density and related network effects.<br>
+There are 50 hydroelectric power stations in Iceland, mostly small. There are 7 geothermal&nbsp;<br>power plants, and 4 fueled power plants—one that generates power through garbage&nbsp;<br>incineration, two diesel powered, and one methane plant.<br>
+4&nbsp;<a href=""></a><br>
+<A name=11></a>Some parts of the country, most notably the western fjords, are very poorly connected into&nbsp;<br>the grid and frequently get disconnected during the winter months due to poor weather&nbsp;<br>conditions. Power availability is maintained primarily with diesel generators when this&nbsp;<br>happens. Similarly, Flatey and Grímsey, two populated islands off the Icelandic west&nbsp;<br>and north coasts, respectively, are not connected to the main power grid, but are instead&nbsp;<br>powered by diesel generators.<br>
+Resilience is quite high on the southwest corner, where most economic activity is situated,&nbsp;<br>but the east coast has also improved substantially in recent years due to developments in&nbsp;<br>relation to the Kárahnjúkar dam project and the Alcoa Fjarðarál aluminum smelter.<br>
+The overall infrastructural elasticity on the power grid is high enough to handle most types of&nbsp;<br>outages due to line failures, power station shutdowns and disasters, but some very extreme&nbsp;<br>edge cases exist where grid resilience is threatened, notably sudden outages in production&nbsp;<br>units such as Kárahnjúkavirkjun, which could potentially lead to chain reactions of failures,&nbsp;<br>similar to the power outage at Itaipu power station in Brazil on 21 January, 2002. In general,&nbsp;<br>larger plants require larger transmission lines and inevitably cause more widespread&nbsp;<br>damage when they do fail. Similarly, larger consumption units may threaten grid resilience. &nbsp;<br>For instance, almost one third of Iceland’s total electricity consumption is used by a single&nbsp;<br>aluminum smelter, meaning that the unlikely edge case of an abrupt total disconnect would&nbsp;<br>momentarily increase the available electricity substantially. This kind of pathological outage&nbsp;<br>may however be mitigated by various means, not least the further diversification of power&nbsp;<br>production and consumption.<br>
+<b>Climate and Cooling</b><br>
+Estimates for data center energy utilization from IBM5&nbsp;suggest that roughly half of all energy&nbsp;<br>is used on cooling, and an additional fourth on heat waste, mostly due to internal electrical&nbsp;<br>resistance in system components. Therefore, a priori energy waste in typical data centers&nbsp;<br>is roughly 75% before any actual computation occurs. Mitigating this waste is clearly crucial&nbsp;<br>to the efficiency, cost-effectiveness and sustainability of any data center. The proportional&nbsp;<br>cost of cooling for data centers has risen dramatically over the past few years, relative to the&nbsp;<br>cost of hardware. &nbsp;Reduction in hardware deployments due to virtualization and increases&nbsp;<br>in system density have dramatically reduced equipment purchase costs as a proportion&nbsp;<br>of operating costs. &nbsp;As a result of this, component-level heat waste mitigation is a primary&nbsp;<br>industry research goal.<br>
+Increasingly, large data center operators have started to look to areas with relatively cold&nbsp;<br>climates. &nbsp;Cooling costs are significantly lower in cold areas, and most energy use in data&nbsp;<br>centers in those areas that goes to cooling is attributable to airflow management and de-<br>humidification rather than direct refrigeration. An example of this is the planned data center&nbsp;<br>that Facebook, Inc., is building near Luleå, Sweden6.<br>
+<A name=12></a>In this respect, Iceland's climate is clear benefit for cloud hosting providers even though&nbsp;<br>it’s not nearly as cold as some more northerly locales. The oceanic climate contributes to&nbsp;<br>relatively stable temperatures over the year. Apart from insolation, there is relatively little&nbsp;<br>seasonal variation in the factors that contribute to data center cooling. On the negative&nbsp;<br>side, Iceland’s climate is generally rather humid, with an annual average of roughly 70.75%. &nbsp;<br>In order for outside air to be used for cooling purposes some dehumidification would be&nbsp;<br>needed.<br>
+<b>Average temp. °C</b><br>
+<b>Insolation, kWh/m²/day</b><br>
+<b>Wind speed, m/s</b><br>
+<b>Humidity, %</b><br>
+(Reykjavík average temperature, insolation and windspeed, source:<br>
+Iceland’s connectivity to the outside world has improved substantially over the last two&nbsp;<br>decades. Since 1994, submarine fiber optics connections have existed to the Europe&nbsp;<br>and North America. Since 2004, domestic Internet connectivity has gone up from 81% of&nbsp;<br>households to 90%, compared to EU growth from 41% to 65%. Of the 10% of Icelandic&nbsp;<br>households not connected to the Internet, 40% (4% of the total) claim not to want an Internet&nbsp;<br>connection, whereas 25% (2.5% of the total) say it is due to price of connectivity.<br>
+<b>Submarine Cables</b><br>
+As of November 2011, there are four fiber optics cable links to Iceland: DanIce, Greenland&nbsp;<br>Connect, FarIce, and CANTAT-3, in order of decreasing capacity. Several projects have&nbsp;<br>been proposed to increase the number of fiber optics links to Iceland; of them, Emerald&nbsp;<br>Express is the furthest towards completion.<br>
+<b>Fiber optic cable</b><br>
+<b>Total capacity</b><br>
+<b>Installed capacity</b><br>
+<b>Utilized capacity</b><br>
+7.5 Gb/s<br>
+Farice ehf<br>
+720 Gb/s<br>
+Farice ehf<br>
+5.2 Tb/s<br>
+~20 Gb/s<br>
+Greenland connect<br>
+TELE Greenland<br>
+1.9 Tb/s<br>
+Emerald Express<br>
+Emerald Networks<br>
+58.6 Tb/s (planned)<br>
+Under construction<br>
+&nbsp;<br>The CANTAT-3 was the first fiber optics cable connection to Iceland, greatly increasing the&nbsp;<br>country’s telecommunications capacity. Installed in 1994, it was disrupted in late 2006 and&nbsp;<br>was not returned to full capacity until mid-year 2007. The CANTAT-3 cable was retired in&nbsp;<br>
+<A name=13></a>late 2010, due to age, operational costs, and low capacity.<br>
+Farice ehf operates two fiber-optic submarine systems as of late 2011. It is partially owned&nbsp;<br>by the Icelandic state and Arion bank, but a 20% stake is held by Faroese shareholders.<br>
+Their first system, FarIce, lies between Seyðisfjörður, Iceland and Dunnet Bay, Scotland with&nbsp;<br>a layover in Funningsfjørður in the Faroe Islands. From these locations it is backhauled to&nbsp;<br>Reykjavík, Edinburgh and Tórshavn respectively. It traverses a roughly 1,400 km route using&nbsp;<br>Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing (DWDM) transmission technology. It has been in&nbsp;<br>use since 2004 and is currently Iceland’s main communications line. Currently only roughly&nbsp;<br>3% of FarIce’s total potential capacity is installed, according to available sources.<br>
+Farice ehf’s second system, Danice, was laid in 2008 and connects Landeyjarsandur in&nbsp;<br>Iceland to Blaabjerg, Denmark, with a planned expansion to Eemshaven, Netherlands.&nbsp;<br>Despite having significantly greater capacity than FarIce, it is much less utilized and mostly&nbsp;<br>used as a redundancy cable for FarIce.<br>
+The most recent fiber optic connection to Iceland is through Greenland Connect, installed&nbsp;<br>in 2009 and owned and operated by TELE Greenland. It connects Milton, Trinity Bay,&nbsp;<br>Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada, to Nuuk, Greenland, Qaqortoq, Greenland, and&nbsp;<br>Landeyjarsandur, Iceland. It contains two fiber pairs specified for 128 wavelengths carrying&nbsp;<br>10 Gb/s each. As its landing point in Iceland is co-located with the Danice cable, direct&nbsp;<br>bridging between them is possible.<br>
+The Emerald Express is a planned 6x100x100 Gb/s fiber optics cable from the United States&nbsp;<br>to Ireland with an offshoot to the Reykjanes peninsula in Iceland. Being constructed by&nbsp;<br>Emerald Atlantis, Ltd. and TE SubCom, Ltd., it is scheduled to enter service in late 2012 and&nbsp;<br>intends to facilitate ultra-low-latency connections to Europe and North America. Its Iceland&nbsp;<br>branch will presumably carry two pairs, one for connection to Ireland, the other to the United&nbsp;<br>States; the last pair connecting the US to Ireland directly.<br>
+<b>Installed and Utilized Capacity</b><br>
+Total capacity of installed fiber optic cables is currently around 7.8 Tb/s, not counting the&nbsp;<br>CANTAT-3 cable. However, endpoint equipment has only been installed for a fraction of this&nbsp;<br>capacity. The installed capacity is not known, but conservative estimates put it close to 200&nbsp;<br>Gb/s, or around 2.5% of the total capacity.<br>
+Current utilized capacity is also unknown, but various estimates can be used to arrive at a&nbsp;<br>figure. The combined foreign connectivity of universities and secondary colleges in Iceland is&nbsp;<br>currently 16.5 Gb/s through RHNet. As RHNet typically accounts for between 14.2%-14.9%&nbsp;<br>of total traffic through the Reykjavík Internet Exchange, it can be estimated that total foreign&nbsp;<br>bandwidth consumption is close to 120 Gb/s. This number may turn out to be severely&nbsp;<br>understated, but more detailed data is not available.&nbsp;<br>
+<A name=14></a><IMG src="Greens-IslandsofResilience-14.png"><br>
+(Map of proposed Emerald Express cable. Source: Emerald Networks)<br>
+&nbsp;<br>Uplink redundancy to Europe is good due to the FarIce and DanIce cables going separate&nbsp;<br>routes. However, redundancy to the US is poor, since the only reliable connection is through&nbsp;<br>Greenland. Currently, in the case of an outage, rerouting would have to be through Europe—<br>presumably London. US redundancy will improve substantially when the Emerald Express is&nbsp;<br>completed.&nbsp;<br>&nbsp;<br>Overall uplink redundancy is becoming better, providing more infrastructural elasticity&nbsp;<br>and greater resilience. The older emergency satellite redundancy is slowly becoming less&nbsp;<br>relevant and is probably not realistically needed.<br>&nbsp;<br>
+<b>Domestic Network</b><br>
+The main domestic telecommunications hub is RIX (Reykjavík Internet Exchange), which is&nbsp;<br>operated by ISNIC. This hub connects the main Internet service providers and data centers&nbsp;<br>together.<br>
+In general, domestic fiber optics and copper networks are operated by Míla, Fjarski and&nbsp;<br>Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur. Míla is a subsidiary of the formerly state-run phone company (since&nbsp;<br>privatized, currently known as Síminn). It operates a fiber optics ring around the country&nbsp;<br>which were installed by NATO, but has expanded it substantially and introduced additional&nbsp;<br>redundancy. It also operates fiber and copper networks in most settlements.<br>
+Fjarki is a subsidiary of Landsvirkjun, the (mostly) state owned power company.<br>
+<A name=15></a>Gagnaveita Reykjavíkur is a subsidiary of Orkuveita Reykjavíkur, the Reykjavík city&nbsp;<br>power company. It provides mostly fiber to the home connections but also operates some&nbsp;<br>communications backbones within the Reykjavík metropolitan area.<br>
+<b>Round Trip Latency</b><br>
+Round-trip latency to Europe is generally low, but varies widely depending on destination city&nbsp;<br>and provider, origin location and provider, and various other variables. Generally speaking&nbsp;<br>the network latency has low stochasticity (“jitter”), averaging around 4ms (milliseconds),&nbsp;<br>suggesting natural latency rather than network congestion.<br>
+We did informal testing of multiple origin and endpoints on known locations to arrive at&nbsp;<br>some idea of latency trends. Typical round-trip times to London are close to 55ms; 31ms to&nbsp;<br>Copenhagen. Connections to Oslo trend around 70ms, Berlin around 71ms, and to Madrid&nbsp;<br>74ms. On connections closer to the uplinks, slightly better times were observed, while&nbsp;<br>household Internet connections showed slightly worse round-trip times. As such, none of this&nbsp;<br>was particularly unexpected.<br>
+The theoretical roundtrip time for a photon traveling over the big circle route from Reykjavík&nbsp;<br>to London is 12.64ms; to Copenhagen it is 14.02ms. Therefore the Copenhagen connection&nbsp;<br>is as close to reasonable expectations as is possible, while the London connection could&nbsp;<br>possibly be improved. The FarIce endpoint is in Edinburgh, so packets bound for London&nbsp;<br>must traverse potentially congested and slow UK networks after their initial arrival.<br>
+<b>Network Security</b><br>
+No major network security incidents have occurred in Iceland. Denial of Service attacks&nbsp;<br>happen on a relatively small scale on a fairly regular basis, but are easily mitigated with&nbsp;<br>standard techniques. No large scale online attacks have occurred in recent years, although&nbsp;<br>in some cases competent attackers have been able to disable individual service providers&nbsp;<br>for a number of hours. This is not considered to be more frequent in Iceland than in the EU,&nbsp;<br>based on anecdotal evidence.<br>
+Individual servers and home computers are moderately well protected from security threats&nbsp;<br>compared to other countries, owing to a fair degree of awareness, a comparatively low&nbsp;<br>incidence of pirated operating system software, and generally well configured routers on&nbsp;<br>home connections. That said, many computers run outdated operating systems with severe&nbsp;<br>security vulnerabilities, and many websites operate outdated web platforms, in particular&nbsp;<br>Wordpress and Joomla, which are common staging grounds for attack.<br>
+The Icelandic government is acutely aware of the threats posed to the security of networks,&nbsp;<br>and in recently proposed amendments to the telecommunications act, provisions are made&nbsp;<br>for the establishment of a CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team). This should&nbsp;<br>increase multi-party coordination and responsiveness in the case of online attacks or other&nbsp;<br>ICT-related emergency, and thus overall communications resilience.<br>
+<b>Future Connectivity Developments</b><br>
+A number of proposals have been made for future developments in connectivity in Iceland.&nbsp;<br>
+<A name=16></a><IMG src="Greens-IslandsofResilience-16.png"><br>
+&nbsp;<br>One example which has frequently been brought up is that Iceland’s geographical situation&nbsp;<br>makes it ideal for connecting the American east coast, Europe, and East Asia, due to&nbsp;<br>the receding polar ice cover. Such a connection could land in Longyearbyen in Svalbard,&nbsp;<br>and have connections to Murmansk, some settlements along northern Siberia, and either&nbsp;<br>connect to Yakutsk via the Lena river or go through the Bering strait and connect to Alaska&nbsp;<br>on the one hand and Kamchatka and Japan on the other hand.<br>&nbsp;<br>This would shorten round-trip latency to East Asia substantially, as most current connections&nbsp;<br>go through the Mediterranean, down past India, and through the South China Sea. The&nbsp;<br>Longyearbyen connection would allow for redundancy to Norway through an existing&nbsp;<br>connection. &nbsp;Connections in Russia would help in Russia’s developing ICTs, as currently it is&nbsp;<br>estimated that 70% of Russian communications go through Sweden. However, it would be&nbsp;<br>vital to Europe’s communications security interests that such a connection have direct routes&nbsp;<br>to East Asia rather than an intermittent landing in Russia. There are numerous ways in&nbsp;<br>which such a proposal could be made beneficial to all parties, and it would open possibilities&nbsp;<br>for diverse applications from cross-continental high speed trading and currency arbitrage&nbsp;<br>to online gaming. For telephony applications, this connection would push the latency on&nbsp;<br>communications between Europe and East Asia down below the threshold of human&nbsp;<br>perception, itself a revolution in global telecommunications.<br>&nbsp;<br>Less ambitious potential developments that have been proposed include construction of&nbsp;<br>large data centers on the Reykjanes peninsula, construction of further fiber optics links to&nbsp;<br>Europe and America, and the establishment of data caches and mediation centers in Iceland&nbsp;<br>for high availability applications.<br>&nbsp;<br>
+(Example routes for a “polar express” cable; also shows autumn arctic ice cover)<br>
+<A name=17></a><IMG src="Greens-IslandsofResilience-17.png"><br>
+The Russian Optical Trans-Arctic Submarine Cable System (ROTACS) project aims to do&nbsp;<br>just that. According to an article&nbsp;<br>
+(ROTACS telecommunication project outline; source:&nbsp;<a href=""></a><br>
+(ROTACS and Arctic Fibre; source: Laser Focus World7)<br>
+TODO:&nbsp;<a href=""></a><br>
+7&nbsp;<a href=""><br>ocean.html</a><br>
+<A name=18></a><b>Jurisdiction</b><br>
+Iceland is a parliamentary republic which gained independence from Denmark in 1944. It&nbsp;<br>is a member of the United Nations, the Council of Europe (CoE), the European Economic&nbsp;<br>Area (EEA), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the North Atlantic Treaty&nbsp;<br>Organization (NATO), amongst others. It is party to numerous international agreements&nbsp;<br>including Schengen.<br>
+Iceland’s membership in the EEA means that outside of a few limited areas, all EU&nbsp;<br>commercial directives take effect in Iceland. In addition, both for conformity and utility,&nbsp;<br>Iceland has adopted various non-EEA relevant directives. This tendency has been&nbsp;<br>increasing as part of the preparations and negotiations for EU membership. As of 12&nbsp;<br>December, 2011, eight out of 33 chapters have been closed in Iceland’s EU accession&nbsp;<br>negotiations. Of particular interest to this report, the chapter on information society and&nbsp;<br>media is considered to generally already conform to the EU&nbsp;<i>acquis</i>.<br>
+<b>Commercial Issues</b><br>
+After the collapse of the Icelandic banking sector in 2008, the Icelandic Central Bank&nbsp;<br>(Seðlabanki Íslands) was authorized to put limitations on the flow of capital, in particular&nbsp;<br>those with no relevance to goods or services. The Central Bank is also authorized to require&nbsp;<br>domestic companies to deposit and exchange foreign currency. As of November 2009 all&nbsp;<br>restrictions have been lifted on new investments, and in practice trade from Iceland is not&nbsp;<br>hindered substantially by the capital restrictions.<br>
+VAT in Iceland is generally quite high, with most goods and services falling in the 25.5%&nbsp;<br>VAT category. However, law 163/2010 introduced new exceptions to the VAT law (law 50/<br>1988) which makes data processing and information provision, as well as “electronically&nbsp;<br>provided services” exempt from taxed capital flows.<br>
+Further, this law allowed an exemption from VAT for the importation of servers and related&nbsp;<br>equipment (i.e., equipment which is necessary for the functioning of the servers and is&nbsp;<br>only of direct benefit to the owners of the servers) in cases where the owners have official&nbsp;<br>residence in other member states in the EEA, EFTA, or the Faroe Islands, and do not&nbsp;<br>have fixed operations in Iceland in accordance with Icelandic tax law. This exception puts&nbsp;<br>more specific requirements, for example that the owners of the servers pay VAT in their&nbsp;<br>home country, that the purpose of the operations be of such a nature that it would require&nbsp;<br>commercial registration if it were domestic, that the servers were imported specifically for&nbsp;<br>the purpose of operation in a data center which their owner is in business with, that the&nbsp;<br>servers and other equipment are used only by the owners, but not for other purposes within&nbsp;<br>the data center, and that the servers be used from outside of Iceland. This exception is due&nbsp;<br>for reconsideration in late 2013, but as it stands is exceptionally beneficial for cloud hosting&nbsp;<br>providers.<br>
+<b>Overview of Icelandic Information Regulation</b><br>
+<A name=19></a>Icelandic law conforms broadly to the European&nbsp;<i>acquis&nbsp;</i>regarding a number of different&nbsp;<br>information regulations.<br>&nbsp;<br>Telecommunications are in general governed by law 81/2003 (telecommunications act),&nbsp;<br>which implements EU directive 999/5/EC, regulation 2887/2000/EC, the Telecoms Package&nbsp;<br>(directives 2002/19/EC, 2002/20/EC, 2002/21/EC and 2002/22/EC), and directives 2002/58/<br>EC and 2002/77/EC.<br>&nbsp;<br>Electronic commerce and other electronic services are generally governed by law 30/<br>2002, which implements the e-Commerce directive (2000/31/EC), thereby establishing&nbsp;<br>intermediary liability limitations which are crucial to the functioning of Internet service&nbsp;<br>providers, hosting providers and data centers. The only practical failing of the Icelandic&nbsp;<br>implementation of the e-commerce directive is that allowance is made for injunctions&nbsp;<br>which, for historical reasons, can be issued by a regional sheriff (<i>sýslumaður</i>) without court&nbsp;<br>supervision. This has not caused problems in the context of intermediary liability limitations,&nbsp;<br>but has been used to stifle media on one occasion, and could potentially be abused further.<br>
+Media is regulated under the media law, 38/2011, which implements Audiovisual&nbsp;<br>Media Services Directive (2007/65/EC). Broadcast media is also regulated by the&nbsp;<br>telecommunications act (81/2003).<br>&nbsp;<br>Personal and private data is protected under law 77/2000, which implements the Data&nbsp;<br>Protection Directive (95/46/EC). Electronic signatures are allowed as a valid form of&nbsp;<br>signature under law 28/2001, and to this end a national authentication card scheme has&nbsp;<br>been developed and is being distributed as a feature of banking cards.<br>&nbsp;<br>Freedom of access to government information is defined in law 50/1996. This law has been&nbsp;<br>under review, and a broad-reaching proposal for a new freedom of information law was&nbsp;<br>submitted to the Parliament during its 139th term (ending in October 2011), but did not&nbsp;<br>pass. A small subset of the changes proposed in that law by the relevant parliamentary&nbsp;<br>committee were adopted into a new version of the bill which was submitted to parliament&nbsp;<br>at the beginning of the 140th term. This new version did not include provisions proposed&nbsp;<br>by the review committee regarding public registration of government documents and public&nbsp;<br>advertisement of confidentiality terms, reasons and durations for secret documents.<br>&nbsp;<br>With regard to intellectual monopoly rights, patents are defined in law 17/1991, biopatents&nbsp;<br>in law 58/2000, descriptions of electronic components are protected under law 78/1993,&nbsp;<br>trademarks under law 45/1997, and in particular corporate logos are protected under law&nbsp;<br>155/2002. Finally, copyrights are defined in law 73/1972, which implements EU directives&nbsp;<br>89/552/EEC, &nbsp;2003/4/EC, 2001/29/EC, 2001/84/EC, 91/250/EEC, 92/100/EEC, 93/83/<br>EEC, 93/98/EEC, 2004/48/EC (IPRED) and 2006/123/EC. Law 53/2006 defines specific&nbsp;<br>permissions regarding the collection of evidence pertaining to violations of intellectual&nbsp;<br>monopoly rights.<br>&nbsp;<br>
+<b>Compatibility with European Union Directives</b><br>
+As previously stated, Iceland’s laws regarding information technology and media are largely&nbsp;<br>in accordance with European&nbsp;<i>acquis</i>. However, in the European Commission’s Opinion on&nbsp;<br>
+<A name=20></a>Iceland's application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010) 62)8, a few minor&nbsp;<br>issues are laid out.<br>
+The most salient issue is that the EU Data Retention Directive (2006/24/EC) has not&nbsp;<br>been transposed. This is however a trivial issue——the telecommunications act contains&nbsp;<br>provisions for data retention which originate from early drafts of the data retention, and is in&nbsp;<br>all regards equivalent to the Data Retention Directive. Therefore, transposition is a formality.&nbsp;<br>Data retention will be discussed further in the later section on electronic surveillance.<br>
+Also according to the opinion, while “the legislative and administrative structure is similar to&nbsp;<br>most EU Member States” the appointment procedures for the national regulatory authority&nbsp;<br>(the post and telecoms administration,&nbsp;<i>póst- og fjarskiptastofnun</i>) have to be revisited to&nbsp;<br>ensure &nbsp;transparency, objectivity, and high standards regarding security of tenure.&