website/expansion.mdwn



[[!meta title="Expanding the Monkeysphere"]]
Expanding the Monkeysphere
The Monkeysphere currently has implementations that support two
popular protocols in use on the internet today:


SSH: Monkeysphere supports the OpenSSH implementation of the Secure
Shell protocol, for authenticating both hosts and users.


HTTPS: Monkeysphere supports secure web traffic by allowing users
of Mozilla-based browsers (such as
Firefox or
Iceweasel) to authenticate web
sites that are not authenticated by the browser's built-in X.509
verification.  This should work with any HTTPS-capable web server.


But there are many protocols and implementations on the 'net that
could use the Monkeysphere for key-based authentication but currently
do not.  Here are some examples of places we think it could be useful.
If you can help with these (or suggest others), please pitch in!


HTTPS client authentication: web servers should be able to
authenticate clients that use asymmetric crypto.  That is, the
client holds an RSA secret key, offers a (potentially self-signed)
X.509 Cert to the server as part of the TLS handshake, and the
server verifies the key material and commonName or subjectAltName
in the cert via the OpenPGP web of trust.


Other TLS connections: for example, SMTP services using STARTTLS
(server-to-server and client-to-server), IMAP or POP daemons (using
STARTTLS or a direct TLS wrapper), LDAP servers (or LDAPS), XMPP
connections (client-to-server and server-to-server)


IRC connections: this could be at the TLS layer, or maybe via some
exchange with the NickServ?


OTR client-to-client handshakes.


Integration with
OpenPGP Certificates for TLS (RFC 5081)
-- TLS clients or servers who receive an OpenPGP certificate from
their peer should be able to ask some part of the Monkeysphere
toolchain if the particular certificate is valid for the
connection.


PKINIT for
Kerberos