The presentation is in three parts:
Background
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* Why authentication using asymmetric crypto (as opposed to shared
secrets) is important on today's network.
* Overview of how ssh uses asymmetric crypto authentication (user ->
host, host -> user)
* Overview of relevant bits of OpenPGP (key -> User ID bindings,
certifications, usage flags, key -> subkey bindings)
* Overview of keyservers (the idea of gossip, One Big Network,
propagation, issues around redundancy, logging, private access)
How
---
* How does the monkeysphere do it? (very brief under-the-hood)
* How does a server administrator publish a host's ssh key to the Web
of Trust? How do they maintain it?
* How does a user incorporate WoT-based host-key checking into their
regular ssh usage?
* How does a user publish their own ssh identity to the WoT for hosts
to find it? How do they maintain it?
* How does a server administrator tell a server to admit certain
people (as identified by the WoT) to certain accounts? How do they
tell the server which certifications are trustworthy?
Possible Futures
----------------
* Use the Monkeysphere with ssh implementations other than OpenSSH
(dropbear, lsh, putty, etc)
* Expansion of the Monkeysphere's out-of-band PKI mechanism for
authentication in protocols other than SSH (TLS, HTTPS) without
protocol modification.
* Use of OpenPGP certificates directly in SSH. OpenPGP is referenced
in RFC 4253 already: optional, rarely implemented, and deliberately
ambiguous about how to calculate key->identity bindings.
* Use of OpenPGP certificates for authentication directly in
protocols. RFC 5081 provides a mechanism for OpenPGP certificates
in TLS, but is similarly ambiguous about certificate verification.
* Better end-user control over verification: Who or what are you
really connecting to? How do you know? How can this information
be effectively and intuitively displayed to a typical user?
* What would you like to see?