Next-Steps Monkeysphere Projects: --------------------------------- Detail advantages of monkeysphere: detail the race conditions in ssh, and how the monkeysphere can help you reduce these threat vectors: threat model reduction diagrams. Handle unverified monkeysphere hosts in such a way that they're not always removed from known_hosts file. Ask user to lsign the host key? Resolve the bugs listed in openpgp2ssh(1):BUGS. Understand and document the output of gpg --check-trustdb: gpg: 3 marginal(s) needed, 1 complete(s) needed, PGP trust model gpg: depth: 0 valid: 2 signed: 20 trust: 0-, 0q, 0n, 0m, 0f, 2u gpg: depth: 1 valid: 20 signed: 67 trust: 15-, 0q, 1n, 3m, 1f, 0u gpg: next trustdb check due at 2008-10-09 Understand and document the numeric values between sig! and the keyid in "gpg --check-sigs $KEYID" . Compare with the details found from "gpg --with-colons --check-sigs $KEYID". This has to do with trust signatures. Fix gpg's documentation to clarify the difference between validity and ownertrust. Include better documentation for trust signatures. Make it easier to do domain-relative ssh host trust signatures with gnupg. (e.g. "i trust Jamie McClelland (keyID 76CC057D) to properly identify ssh servers in the mayfirst.org domain") See: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3.21 and grep for "tsign" in gpg(1). Fix the order of questions when user does a tsign in gpg or gpg2. When using ssh-proxycommand, if only host keys found are expired or revoked, then output loud warning with prompt, or fail hard. File bug against enigmail about lack of ability to create subkeys. Test and document what happens when any filesystem that the monkeysphere-server relies on and modifies (/tmp, /etc, and /var?) fills up. Optimize keyserver access, particularly on monkeysphere-server update-users -- is there a way to query the keyserver all in a chunk? Think about packaging monkeysphere for other (non-apt-based) operating systems. RPM-based linux systems, FreeBSD ports, and Mac OS X seem like the most likely candidates.