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-rw-r--r--src/keytrans/Makefile15
-rw-r--r--src/keytrans/gnutls-helpers.c466
-rw-r--r--src/keytrans/gnutls-helpers.h89
-rw-r--r--src/keytrans/openpgp2ssh.c507
-rwxr-xr-xsrc/keytrans/pem2openpgp519
-rwxr-xr-xsrc/monkeysphere16
-rwxr-xr-xsrc/monkeysphere-authentication31
-rwxr-xr-xsrc/monkeysphere-host17
l---------src/openpgp2ssh1
l---------src/pem2openpgp1
-rw-r--r--src/share/common124
-rw-r--r--src/share/defaultenv29
-rwxr-xr-xsrc/share/keytrans802
-rw-r--r--src/share/m/subkey_to_ssh_agent63
-rw-r--r--src/share/ma/add_certifier2
-rw-r--r--src/share/ma/diagnostics2
-rw-r--r--src/share/ma/setup6
-rw-r--r--src/share/ma/update_users10
-rw-r--r--src/share/mh/diagnostics4
-rwxr-xr-xsrc/transitions/0.2357
20 files changed, 990 insertions, 1771 deletions
diff --git a/src/keytrans/Makefile b/src/keytrans/Makefile
deleted file mode 100644
index 4d54be7..0000000
--- a/src/keytrans/Makefile
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-CFLAGS=`libgnutls-config --libs --cflags` -g -Wall --pedantic
-CC=gcc
-
-all: openpgp2ssh
-
-openpgp2ssh: openpgp2ssh.c gnutls-helpers.o
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o openpgp2ssh openpgp2ssh.c gnutls-helpers.o
-
-.c.o:
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $<
-
-clean:
- rm -f openpgp2ssh *.o
-
-.PHONY: clean all
diff --git a/src/keytrans/gnutls-helpers.c b/src/keytrans/gnutls-helpers.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 8d8ec17..0000000
--- a/src/keytrans/gnutls-helpers.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,466 +0,0 @@
-/* Author: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> */
-/* Date: Fri, 04 Apr 2008 19:31:16 -0400 */
-/* License: GPL v3 or later */
-
-#include "gnutls-helpers.h"
-/* for htonl() */
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-/* for setlocale() */
-#include <locale.h>
-
-/* for isalnum() */
-#include <ctype.h>
-
-/* for exit() */
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <assert.h>
-
-/* higher levels allow more frivolous error messages through.
- this is set with the MONKEYSPHERE_DEBUG variable */
-static int loglevel = 0;
-
-void err(int level, const char* fmt, ...) {
- va_list ap;
- if (level > loglevel)
- return;
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
- fflush(stderr);
-}
-
-void logfunc(int level, const char* string) {
- fprintf(stderr, "GnuTLS Logging (%d): %s\n", level, string);
-}
-
-void init_keyid(gnutls_openpgp_keyid_t keyid) {
- memset(keyid, 'x', sizeof(gnutls_openpgp_keyid_t));
-}
-
-
-
-void make_keyid_printable(printable_keyid out, gnutls_openpgp_keyid_t keyid)
-{
- assert(sizeof(out) >= 2*sizeof(keyid));
- hex_print_data((char*)out, (const unsigned char*)keyid, sizeof(keyid));
-}
-
-/* you must have twice as many bytes in the out buffer as in the in buffer */
-void hex_print_data(char* out, const unsigned char* in, size_t incount)
-{
- static const char hex[16] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
- unsigned int inix = 0, outix = 0;
-
- while (inix < incount) {
- out[outix] = hex[(in[inix] >> 4) & 0x0f];
- out[outix + 1] = hex[in[inix] & 0x0f];
- inix++;
- outix += 2;
- }
-}
-
-unsigned char hex2bin(unsigned char x) {
- if ((x >= '0') && (x <= '9'))
- return x - '0';
- if ((x >= 'A') && (x <= 'F'))
- return 10 + x - 'A';
- if ((x >= 'a') && (x <= 'f'))
- return 10 + x - 'a';
- return 0xff;
-}
-
-void collapse_printable_keyid(gnutls_openpgp_keyid_t out, printable_keyid in) {
- unsigned int pkix = 0, outkix = 0;
- while (pkix < sizeof(printable_keyid)) {
- unsigned hi = hex2bin(in[pkix]);
- unsigned lo = hex2bin(in[pkix + 1]);
- if (hi == 0xff) {
- err(0, "character '%c' is not a hex char\n", in[pkix]);
- exit(1);
- }
- if (lo == 0xff) {
- err(0, "character '%c' is not a hex char\n", in[pkix + 1]);
- exit(1);
- }
- out[outkix] = lo | (hi << 4);
-
- pkix += 2;
- outkix++;
- }
-}
-
-unsigned int hexstring2bin(unsigned char* out, const char* in) {
- unsigned int pkix = 0, outkix = 0;
- int hi = 0; /* which nybble is it? */
-
- while (in[pkix]) {
- unsigned char z = hex2bin(in[pkix]);
- if (z != 0xff) {
- if (!hi) {
- if (out) out[outkix] = (z << 4);
- hi = 1;
- } else {
- if (out) out[outkix] |= z;
- hi = 0;
- outkix++;
- }
- pkix++;
- }
- }
- return outkix*8 + (hi ? 4 : 0);
-}
-
-int convert_string_to_keyid(gnutls_openpgp_keyid_t out, const char* str) {
- printable_keyid p;
- int ret;
-
- ret = convert_string_to_printable_keyid(p, str);
- if (ret == 0)
- collapse_printable_keyid(out, p);
- return ret;
-}
-int convert_string_to_printable_keyid(printable_keyid pkeyid, const char* str) {
- int arglen, x;
- arglen = 0;
- x = 0;
- while ((arglen <= sizeof(printable_keyid)) &&
- (str[x] != '\0')) {
- if (isxdigit(str[x])) {
- if (arglen == sizeof(printable_keyid)) {
- err(0, "There are more than %d hex digits in the keyid '%s'\n", sizeof(printable_keyid), str);
- return 1;
- }
- pkeyid[arglen] = str[x];
- arglen++;
- }
- x++;
- }
-
- if (arglen != sizeof(printable_keyid)) {
- err(0, "Keyid '%s' is not %d hex digits in length\n", str, sizeof(printable_keyid));
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-int init_gnutls() {
- const char* version = NULL;
- const char* debug_string = NULL;
- int ret;
-
- if (debug_string = getenv("MONKEYSPHERE_DEBUG"), debug_string) {
- loglevel = atoi(debug_string);
- }
-
- if (ret = gnutls_global_init(), ret) {
- err(0, "Failed to do gnutls_global_init() (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
-
- version = gnutls_check_version(NULL);
-
- if (version)
- err(1, "gnutls version: %s\n", version);
- else {
- err(0, "no gnutls version found!\n");
- return 1;
- }
-
- gnutls_global_set_log_function(logfunc);
-
- gnutls_global_set_log_level(loglevel);
- err(1, "set log level to %d\n", loglevel);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-void init_datum(gnutls_datum_t* d) {
- d->data = NULL;
- d->size = 0;
-}
-void copy_datum(gnutls_datum_t* dest, const gnutls_datum_t* src) {
- dest->data = gnutls_realloc(dest->data, src->size);
- dest->size = src->size;
- memcpy(dest->data, src->data, src->size);
-}
-int compare_data(const gnutls_datum_t* a, const gnutls_datum_t* b) {
- if (a->size > b->size) {
- err(0,"a is larger\n");
- return 1;
- }
- if (a->size < b->size) {
- err(0,"b is larger\n");
- return -1;
- }
- return memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->size);
-}
-void free_datum(gnutls_datum_t* d) {
- gnutls_free(d->data);
- d->data = NULL;
- d->size = 0;
-}
-
-/* read the passed-in string, store in a single datum */
-int set_datum_string(gnutls_datum_t* d, const char* s) {
- unsigned int x = strlen(s)+1;
- unsigned char* c = NULL;
-
- c = gnutls_realloc(d->data, x);
- if (NULL == c)
- return -1;
- d->data = c;
- d->size = x;
- memcpy(d->data, s, x);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* read the passed-in file descriptor until EOF, store in a single
- datum */
-int set_datum_fd(gnutls_datum_t* d, int fd) {
- unsigned int bufsize = 1024;
- unsigned int len = 0;
-
- FILE* f = fdopen(fd, "r");
- if (bufsize > d->size) {
- bufsize = 1024;
- d->data = gnutls_realloc(d->data, bufsize);
- if (d->data == NULL) {
- err(0,"out of memory!\n");
- return -1;
- }
- d->size = bufsize;
- } else {
- bufsize = d->size;
- }
- f = fdopen(fd, "r");
- if (NULL == f) {
- err(0,"could not fdopen FD %d\n", fd);
- }
- clearerr(f);
- while (!feof(f) && !ferror(f)) {
- if (len == bufsize) {
- /* allocate more space by doubling: */
- bufsize *= 2;
- d->data = gnutls_realloc(d->data, bufsize);
- if (d->data == NULL) {
- err(0,"out of memory!\n");
- return -1;
- };
- d->size = bufsize;
- }
- len += fread(d->data + len, 1, bufsize - len, f);
- /* err(0,"read %d bytes\n", len); */
- }
- if (ferror(f)) {
- err(0,"Error reading from fd %d (error: %d) (error: %d '%s')\n", fd, ferror(f), errno, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* touch up buffer size to match reality: */
- d->data = gnutls_realloc(d->data, len);
- d->size = len;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* read the file indicated (by name) in the fname parameter. store
- its entire contents in a single datum. */
-int set_datum_file(gnutls_datum_t* d, const char* fname) {
- struct stat sbuf;
- unsigned char* c = NULL;
- FILE* file = NULL;
- size_t x = 0;
-
- if (0 != stat(fname, &sbuf)) {
- err(0,"failed to stat '%s'\n", fname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- c = gnutls_realloc(d->data, sbuf.st_size);
- if (NULL == c) {
- err(0,"failed to allocate %d bytes for '%s'\n", sbuf.st_size, fname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- d->data = c;
- d->size = sbuf.st_size;
- file = fopen(fname, "r");
- if (NULL == file) {
- err(0,"failed to open '%s' for reading\n", fname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- x = fread(d->data, d->size, 1, file);
- if (x != 1) {
- err(0,"tried to read %d bytes, read %d instead from '%s'\n", d->size, x, fname);
- fclose(file);
- return -1;
- }
- fclose(file);
- return 0;
-}
-
-int write_datum_fd(int fd, const gnutls_datum_t* d) {
- if (d->size != write(fd, d->data, d->size)) {
- err(0,"failed to write body of datum.\n");
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-int write_datum_fd_with_length(int fd, const gnutls_datum_t* d) {
- uint32_t len;
- int looks_negative = (d->data[0] & 0x80);
- unsigned char zero = 0;
-
- /* if the first bit is 1, then the datum will appear negative in the
- MPI encoding style used by OpenSSH. In that case, we'll increase
- the length by one, and dump out one more byte */
-
- if (looks_negative) {
- len = htonl(d->size + 1);
- } else {
- len = htonl(d->size);
- }
- if (write(fd, &len, sizeof(len)) != sizeof(len)) {
- err(0,"failed to write size of datum.\n");
- return -2;
- }
- if (looks_negative) {
- if (write(fd, &zero, 1) != 1) {
- err(0,"failed to write padding byte for MPI.\n");
- return -2;
- }
- }
- return write_datum_fd(fd, d);
-}
-
-int write_data_fd_with_length(int fd, const gnutls_datum_t** d, unsigned int num) {
- unsigned int i;
- int ret;
-
- for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
- if (ret = write_datum_fd_with_length(fd, d[i]), ret != 0)
- return ret;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-int datum_from_string(gnutls_datum_t* d, const char* str) {
- d->size = strlen(str);
- d->data = gnutls_realloc(d->data, d->size);
- if (d->data == 0)
- return ENOMEM;
- memcpy(d->data, str, d->size);
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-int create_writing_pipe(pid_t* pid, const char* path, char* const argv[]) {
- int p[2];
- int ret;
-
- if (pid == NULL) {
- err(0,"bad pointer passed to create_writing_pipe()\n");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (ret = pipe(p), ret == -1) {
- err(0,"failed to create a pipe (error: %d \"%s\")\n", errno, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
-
- *pid = fork();
- if (*pid == -1) {
- err(0,"Failed to fork (error: %d \"%s\")\n", errno, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if (*pid == 0) { /* this is the child */
- close(p[1]); /* close unused write end */
-
- if (0 != dup2(p[0], 0)) { /* map the reading end into stdin */
- err(0,"Failed to transfer reading file descriptor to stdin (error: %d \"%s\")\n", errno, strerror(errno));
- exit(1);
- }
- execvp(path, argv);
- err(0,"exec %s failed (error: %d \"%s\")\n", path, errno, strerror(errno));
- /* close the open file descriptors */
- close(p[0]);
- close(0);
-
- exit(1);
- } else { /* this is the parent */
- close(p[0]); /* close unused read end */
- return p[1];
- }
-}
-
-int validate_ssh_host_userid(const char* userid) {
- char* oldlocale = setlocale(LC_ALL, "C");
-
- /* choke if userid does not match the expected format
- ("ssh://fully.qualified.domain.name") */
- if (strncmp("ssh://", userid, strlen("ssh://")) != 0) {
- err(0,"The user ID should start with ssh:// for a host key\n");
- goto fail;
- }
- /* so that isalnum will work properly */
- userid += strlen("ssh://");
- while (0 != (*userid)) {
- if (!isalnum(*userid)) {
- err(0,"label did not start with a letter or a digit! (%s)\n", userid);
- goto fail;
- }
- userid++;
- while (isalnum(*userid) || ('-' == (*userid)))
- userid++;
- if (('.' == (*userid)) || (0 == (*userid))) { /* clean end of label:
- check last char
- isalnum */
- if (!isalnum(*(userid - 1))) {
- err(0,"label did not end with a letter or a digit!\n");
- goto fail;
- }
- if ('.' == (*userid)) /* advance to the start of the next label */
- userid++;
- } else {
- err(0,"invalid character in domain name: %c\n", *userid);
- goto fail;
- }
- }
- /* ensure that the last character is valid: */
- if (!isalnum(*(userid - 1))) {
- err(0,"hostname did not end with a letter or a digit!\n");
- goto fail;
- }
- /* FIXME: fqdn's can be unicode now, thanks to RFC 3490 -- how do we
- make sure that we've got an OK string? */
-
- return 0;
-
- fail:
- setlocale(LC_ALL, oldlocale);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.2 */
-size_t get_openpgp_mpi_size(gnutls_datum_t* d) {
- return 2 + d->size;
-}
-
-int write_openpgp_mpi_to_fd(int fd, gnutls_datum_t* d) {
- uint16_t x;
-
- x = d->size * 8;
- x = htons(x);
-
- write(fd, &x, sizeof(x));
- write(fd, d->data, d->size);
-
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/src/keytrans/gnutls-helpers.h b/src/keytrans/gnutls-helpers.h
deleted file mode 100644
index bf54af0..0000000
--- a/src/keytrans/gnutls-helpers.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-/* Author: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> */
-/* Date: Fri, 04 Apr 2008 19:31:16 -0400 */
-/* License: GPL v3 or later */
-
-
-#include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
-#include <gnutls/openpgp.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
-/* Functions to help dealing with GnuTLS for monkeysphere key
- translation projects: */
-
-/* set everything up, including logging levels. Return 0 on
- success */
-int init_gnutls();
-
-/* logging and output functions: */
-
-void err(int level, const char* fmt, ...);
-void logfunc(int level, const char* string);
-
-/* basic datum manipulations: */
-
-void init_datum(gnutls_datum_t* d);
-void copy_datum(gnutls_datum_t* dest, const gnutls_datum_t* src);
-int compare_data(const gnutls_datum_t* a, const gnutls_datum_t* b);
-void free_datum(gnutls_datum_t* d);
-int write_datum_fd(int fd, const gnutls_datum_t* d);
-int write_datum_fd_with_length(int fd, const gnutls_datum_t* d);
-int write_data_fd_with_length(int fd, const gnutls_datum_t** d, unsigned int num);
-
-/* set up a datum from a null-terminated string */
-int datum_from_string(gnutls_datum_t* d, const char* str);
-
-/* keyid manipulations: */
-typedef unsigned char printable_keyid[16];
-
-void init_keyid(gnutls_openpgp_keyid_t keyid);
-void make_keyid_printable(printable_keyid out, gnutls_openpgp_keyid_t keyid);
-void collapse_printable_keyid(gnutls_openpgp_keyid_t out, printable_keyid in);
-int convert_string_to_keyid(gnutls_openpgp_keyid_t out, const char* str);
-int convert_string_to_printable_keyid(printable_keyid out, const char* str);
-
-/* you must have twice as many bytes in the out buffer as in the in buffer */
-void hex_print_data(char* out, const unsigned char* in, size_t incount);
-
-/* expects a null-terminated string as in, containing an even number
- of hexadecimal characters.
-
- returns length in *bits* of raw data as output.
-
- the out buffer must be at least half as long as in to hold the
- output. if out is NULL, no output will be generated, but the
- length will still be returned.
-*/
-unsigned int hexstring2bin(unsigned char* out, const char* in);
-
-/* functions to get data into datum objects: */
-
-/* read the passed-in string, store in a single datum */
-int set_datum_string(gnutls_datum_t* d, const char* s);
-
-/* read the passed-in file descriptor until EOF, store in a single
- datum */
-int set_datum_fd(gnutls_datum_t* d, int fd);
-
-/* read the file indicated (by name) in the fname parameter. store
- its entire contents in a single datum. */
-int set_datum_file(gnutls_datum_t* d, const char* fname);
-
-/* set up file descriptor pipe for writing (child process pid gets
- stored in pid, fd is returned)*/
-int create_writing_pipe(pid_t* pid, const char* path, char* const argv[]);
-
-/* return 0 if userid matches the monkeysphere spec for ssh host user IDs */
-int validate_ssh_host_userid(const char* userid);
-
-/* how many bytes will it take to write out this datum in OpenPGP MPI form? */
-size_t get_openpgp_mpi_size(gnutls_datum_t* d);
-
-/* write the MPI stored in gnutls_datum_t to file descriptor fd: */
-int write_openpgp_mpi_to_fd(int fd, gnutls_datum_t* d);
diff --git a/src/keytrans/openpgp2ssh.c b/src/keytrans/openpgp2ssh.c
deleted file mode 100644
index f16eac5..0000000
--- a/src/keytrans/openpgp2ssh.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,507 +0,0 @@
-#include "gnutls-helpers.h"
-
-#include <gnutls/openpgp.h>
-#include <gnutls/x509.h>
-
-/* for waitpid() */
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-
-/*
- Author: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
- Date: 2008-06-12 13:47:41-0400
- License: GPL v3 or later
-
- monkeysphere key translator: execute this with an OpenPGP key on
- stdin, (please indicate the specific keyid that you want as the
- first argument if there are subkeys). At the moment, only public
- keys and passphraseless secret keys work.
-
- For secret keys, it will spit out a PEM-encoded version of the key
- on stdout, which can be fed into ssh-add like this:
-
- gpg --export-secret-keys $KEYID | openpgp2ssh $KEYID | ssh-add -c /dev/stdin
-
- For public keys, it will spit out a single line of text that can
- (with some massaging) be used in an openssh known_hosts or
- authorized_keys file. For example:
-
- echo server.example.org $(gpg --export $KEYID | openpgp2ssh $KEYID) >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts
-
- Requirements: I've only built this so far with GnuTLS v2.3.x.
- GnuTLS 2.2.x does not contain the appropriate functionality.
-
- */
-
-
-/* FIXME: keyid should be const as well */
-int convert_private_pgp_to_x509(gnutls_x509_privkey_t* output, const gnutls_openpgp_privkey_t* pgp_privkey, const unsigned char* keyfpr, unsigned int fprlen) {
- gnutls_datum_t m, e, d, p, q, u, g, y, x;
- gnutls_pk_algorithm_t pgp_algo;
- unsigned int pgp_bits;
- int ret;
- int subkeyidx;
- int subkeycount;
- int found = 0;
- unsigned char fingerprint[20];
- size_t fingerprint_length = sizeof(fingerprint);
-
- init_datum(&m);
- init_datum(&e);
- init_datum(&d);
- init_datum(&p);
- init_datum(&q);
- init_datum(&u);
- init_datum(&g);
- init_datum(&y);
- init_datum(&x);
-
- subkeycount = gnutls_openpgp_privkey_get_subkey_count(*pgp_privkey);
- if (subkeycount < 0) {
- err(0,"Could not determine subkey count (got value %d)\n", subkeycount);
- return 1;
- }
-
- if ((keyfpr == NULL) &&
- (subkeycount > 0)) {
- err(0,"No key identifier passed in, but there were %d keys to choose from\n", subkeycount + 1);
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (keyfpr != NULL) {
- ret = gnutls_openpgp_privkey_get_fingerprint(*pgp_privkey, fingerprint, &fingerprint_length);
- if (ret) {
- err(0,"Could not get fingerprint (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
- if (fprlen > fingerprint_length) {
- err(0, "Requested key identifier is longer than computed fingerprint\n");
- return 1;
- }
- if (fingerprint_length > fprlen) {
- err(0, "Only comparing last %d bits of key fingerprint\n", fprlen*8);
- }
- }
- if ((keyfpr == NULL) || (memcmp(fingerprint + (fingerprint_length - fprlen), keyfpr, fprlen) == 0)) {
- /* we want to export the primary key: */
- err(0,"exporting primary key\n");
-
- /* FIXME: this is almost identical to the block below for subkeys.
- This clumsiness seems inherent in the gnutls OpenPGP API,
- though. ugh. */
- pgp_algo = gnutls_openpgp_privkey_get_pk_algorithm(*pgp_privkey, &pgp_bits);
- if (pgp_algo < 0) {
- err(0, "failed to get OpenPGP key algorithm (error: %d)\n", pgp_algo);
- return 1;
- }
- if (pgp_algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
- err(0,"OpenPGP RSA Key, with %d bits\n", pgp_bits);
- ret = gnutls_openpgp_privkey_export_rsa_raw(*pgp_privkey, &m, &e, &d, &p, &q, &u);
- if (GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS != ret) {
- err(0, "failed to export RSA key parameters (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
-
- } else if (pgp_algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA) {
- err(0,"OpenPGP DSA Key, with %d bits\n", pgp_bits);
- ret = gnutls_openpgp_privkey_export_dsa_raw(*pgp_privkey, &p, &q, &g, &y, &x);
- if (GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS != ret) {
- err(0,"failed to export DSA key parameters (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
- }
- found = 1;
- } else {
- /* lets trawl through the subkeys until we find the one we want: */
- for (subkeyidx = 0; (subkeyidx < subkeycount) && !found; subkeyidx++) {
- ret = gnutls_openpgp_privkey_get_subkey_fingerprint(*pgp_privkey, subkeyidx, fingerprint, &fingerprint_length);
- if (ret) {
- err(0,"Could not get fingerprint of subkey with index %d (error: %d)\n", subkeyidx, ret);
- return 1;
- }
- if (fprlen > fingerprint_length) {
- err(0, "Requested key identifier is longer than computed fingerprint\n");
- return 1;
- }
- if (fingerprint_length > fprlen) {
- err(1, "Only comparing last %d bits of key fingerprint\n", fprlen*8);
- }
- if (memcmp(fingerprint + (fingerprint_length - fprlen), keyfpr, fprlen) == 0) {
- err(0,"exporting subkey index %d\n", subkeyidx);
-
- /* FIXME: this is almost identical to the block above for the
- primary key. */
- pgp_algo = gnutls_openpgp_privkey_get_subkey_pk_algorithm(*pgp_privkey, subkeyidx, &pgp_bits);
- if (pgp_algo < 0) {
- err(0,"failed to get the algorithm of the OpenPGP public key (error: %d)\n", pgp_algo);
- return pgp_algo;
- } else if (pgp_algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
- err(0,"OpenPGP RSA key, with %d bits\n", pgp_bits);
- ret = gnutls_openpgp_privkey_export_subkey_rsa_raw(*pgp_privkey, subkeyidx, &m, &e, &d, &p, &q, &u);
- if (GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS != ret) {
- err(0,"failed to export RSA key parameters (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
- } else if (pgp_algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA) {
- err(0,"OpenPGP DSA Key, with %d bits\n", pgp_bits);
- ret = gnutls_openpgp_privkey_export_subkey_dsa_raw(*pgp_privkey, subkeyidx, &p, &q, &g, &y, &x);
- if (GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS != ret) {
- err(0,"failed to export DSA key parameters (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
- }
- found = 1;
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (!found) {
- err(0,"Could not find key in input\n");
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (pgp_algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
- ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_import_rsa_raw (*output, &m, &e, &d, &p, &q, &u);
- if (GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS != ret) {
- err(0, "failed to import RSA key parameters (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
- } else if (pgp_algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA) {
- ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_import_dsa_raw (*output, &p, &q, &g, &y, &x);
- if (GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS != ret) {
- err(0,"failed to import DSA key parameters (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
- } else {
- err(0,"OpenPGP Key was not RSA or DSA -- can't deal! (actual algorithm was: %d)\n", pgp_algo);
- return 1;
- }
-
- ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_fix(*output);
- if (ret != 0) {
- err(0,"failed to fix up the private key in X.509 format (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* FIXME: keyid should be const also */
-int emit_public_openssh_from_pgp(const gnutls_openpgp_crt_t* pgp_crt, const unsigned char* keyfpr, size_t fprlen) {
- int ret;
- int subkeyidx;
- int subkeycount;
- int found = 0;
- gnutls_datum_t m, e, p, q, g, y, algolabel;
- unsigned int bits;
- gnutls_pk_algorithm_t algo;
- const gnutls_datum_t* all[5];
- const char* algoname;
- int mpicount;
- /* output_data must be at least 2 chars longer than the maximum possible
- algorithm name: */
- char output_data[20];
-
- unsigned char fingerprint[20];
- size_t fingerprint_length = sizeof(fingerprint);
-
- /* variables for the output conversion: */
- int pipestatus;
- int pipefd, child_pid;
- char* const b64args[] = {"sh", "-c", "base64 | tr -c -d '[A-Za-z0-9=+/]'", NULL};
-
- init_datum(&m);
- init_datum(&e);
- init_datum(&p);
- init_datum(&q);
- init_datum(&g);
- init_datum(&algolabel);
-
-
- /* figure out if we've got the right thing: */
- subkeycount = gnutls_openpgp_crt_get_subkey_count(*pgp_crt);
- if (subkeycount < 0) {
- err(0,"Could not determine subkey count (got value %d)\n", subkeycount);
- return 1;
- }
-
- if ((keyfpr == NULL) &&
- (subkeycount > 0)) {
- err(0,"No key identifier passed in, but there were %d keys to choose from\n", subkeycount + 1);
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (keyfpr != NULL) {
- ret = gnutls_openpgp_crt_get_fingerprint(*pgp_crt, fingerprint, &fingerprint_length);
- if (ret) {
- err(0,"Could not get key fingerprint (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
- if (fprlen > fingerprint_length) {
- err(0, "Requested key identifier is longer than computed fingerprint\n");
- return 1;
- }
- if (fingerprint_length > fprlen) {
- err(0, "Only comparing last %d bits of key fingerprint\n", fprlen*8);
- }
- }
- if ((keyfpr == NULL) || (memcmp(fingerprint + (fingerprint_length - fprlen), keyfpr, fprlen) == 0)) {
- /* we want to export the primary key: */
- err(0,"exporting primary key\n");
-
- /* FIXME: this is almost identical to the block below for subkeys.
- This clumsiness seems inherent in the gnutls OpenPGP API,
- though. ugh. */
- algo = gnutls_openpgp_crt_get_pk_algorithm(*pgp_crt, &bits);
- if (algo < 0) {
- err(0,"failed to get the algorithm of the OpenPGP public key (error: %d)\n", algo);
- return algo;
- } else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
- err(0,"OpenPGP RSA certificate, with %d bits\n", bits);
- ret = gnutls_openpgp_crt_get_pk_rsa_raw(*pgp_crt, &m, &e);
- if (GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS != ret) {
- err(0,"failed to export RSA certificate parameters (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
- } else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA) {
- err(0,"OpenPGP DSA certificate, with %d bits\n", bits);
- ret = gnutls_openpgp_crt_get_pk_dsa_raw(*pgp_crt, &p, &q, &g, &y);
- if (GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS != ret) {
- err(0,"failed to export DSA certificate parameters (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
- }
- found = 1;
-
- } else {
- /* lets trawl through the subkeys until we find the one we want: */
- for (subkeyidx = 0; (subkeyidx < subkeycount) && !found; subkeyidx++) {
- ret = gnutls_openpgp_crt_get_subkey_fingerprint(*pgp_crt, subkeyidx, fingerprint, &fingerprint_length);
- if (ret) {
- err(0,"Could not get fingerprint of subkey with index %d (error: %d)\n", subkeyidx, ret);
- return 1;
- }
- if (fprlen > fingerprint_length) {
- err(0, "Requested key identifier is longer than computed fingerprint\n");
- return 1;
- }
- if (fingerprint_length > fprlen) {
- err(1, "Only comparing last %d bits of key fingerprint\n", fprlen*8);
- }
- if (memcmp(fingerprint + (fingerprint_length - fprlen), keyfpr, fprlen) == 0) {
- err(0,"exporting subkey index %d\n", subkeyidx);
-
- /* FIXME: this is almost identical to the block above for the
- primary key. */
- algo = gnutls_openpgp_crt_get_subkey_pk_algorithm(*pgp_crt, subkeyidx, &bits);
- if (algo < 0) {
- err(0,"failed to get the algorithm of the OpenPGP public key (error: %d)\n", algo);
- return algo;
- } else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
- err(0,"OpenPGP RSA certificate, with %d bits\n", bits);
- ret = gnutls_openpgp_crt_get_subkey_pk_rsa_raw(*pgp_crt, subkeyidx, &m, &e);
- if (GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS != ret) {
- err(0,"failed to export RSA certificate parameters (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
- } else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA) {
- err(0,"OpenPGP DSA certificate, with %d bits\n", bits);
- ret = gnutls_openpgp_crt_get_subkey_pk_dsa_raw(*pgp_crt, subkeyidx, &p, &q, &g, &y);
- if (GNUTLS_E_SUCCESS != ret) {
- err(0,"failed to export DSA certificate parameters (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
- }
- found = 1;
-
- }
- }
- }
-
- if (!found) {
- err(0,"Could not find key in input\n");
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* if we made it this far, we've got MPIs, and we've got the
- algorithm, so we just need to emit the info */
- if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_RSA) {
- algoname = "ssh-rsa";
- mpicount = 3;
-
- all[0] = &algolabel;
- all[1] = &e;
- all[2] = &m;
- } else if (algo == GNUTLS_PK_DSA) {
- algoname = "ssh-dss";
- mpicount = 5;
-
- all[0] = &algolabel;
- all[1] = &p;
- all[2] = &q;
- all[3] = &g;
- all[4] = &y;
- } else {
- err(0,"Key algorithm was neither DSA nor RSA (it was %d). Can't deal. Sorry!\n", algo);
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (ret = datum_from_string(&algolabel, algoname), ret) {
- err(0,"couldn't label string (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return ret;
- }
-
- snprintf(output_data, sizeof(output_data), "%s ", algoname);
-
- pipefd = create_writing_pipe(&child_pid, b64args[0], b64args);
- if (pipefd < 0) {
- err(0,"failed to create a writing pipe (returned %d)\n", pipefd);
- return pipefd;
- }
-
- write(1, output_data, strlen(output_data));
-
- if (0 != write_data_fd_with_length(pipefd, all, mpicount)) {
- err(0,"was not able to write out RSA key data\n");
- return 1;
- }
- close(pipefd);
- if (child_pid != waitpid(child_pid, &pipestatus, 0)) {
- err(0,"could not wait for child process to return for some reason.\n");
- return 1;
- }
- if (pipestatus != 0) {
- err(0,"base64 pipe died with return code %d\n", pipestatus);
- return pipestatus;
- }
-
- write(1, "\n", 1);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int main(int argc, char* argv[]) {
- gnutls_datum_t data;
- int ret = 0;
- gnutls_x509_privkey_t x509_privkey;
- gnutls_openpgp_privkey_t pgp_privkey;
- gnutls_openpgp_crt_t pgp_crt;
-
- char output_data[10240];
- size_t ods = sizeof(output_data);
-
- unsigned char * fingerprint = NULL;
- size_t fpr_size;
- char * prettyfpr = NULL;
-
- init_gnutls();
-
- /* figure out what key we should be looking for: */
- if (argv[1] != NULL) {
- if (strlen(argv[1]) > 81) {
- /* safety check to avoid some sort of wacky overflow situation:
- there's no reason that the key id should be longer than twice
- a sane fingerprint (one byte between chars, and then another
- two at the beginning and end) */
- err(0, "Key identifier is way too long. Please use at most 40 hex digits.\n");
- return 1;
- }
-
- fpr_size = hexstring2bin(NULL, argv[1]);
- if (fpr_size > 40*4) {
- err(0, "Key identifier is longer than 40 hex digits\n");
- return 1;
- }
- /* since fpr_size is initially in bits: */
- if (fpr_size % 8 != 0) {
- err(0, "Please provide an even number of hex digits for the key identifier\n");
- return 1;
- }
- fpr_size /= 8;
-
- fingerprint = malloc(sizeof(unsigned char) * fpr_size);
- bzero(fingerprint, sizeof(unsigned char) * fpr_size);
- hexstring2bin(fingerprint, argv[1]);
-
- prettyfpr = malloc(sizeof(unsigned char)*fpr_size*2 + 1);
- if (prettyfpr != NULL) {
- hex_print_data(prettyfpr, fingerprint, fpr_size);
- prettyfpr[sizeof(unsigned char)*fpr_size*2] = '\0';
- err(1, "searching for key with fingerprint '%s'\n", prettyfpr);
- free(prettyfpr);
- }
-
- if (fpr_size < 4) {
- err(0, "You MUST provide at least 8 hex digits in any key identifier\n");
- return 1;
- }
- if (fpr_size < 8)
- err(0, "You should provide at least 16 hex digits in any key identifier (proceeding with %d digits anyway)\n", fpr_size*2);
-
- }
-
-
- init_datum(&data);
-
- /* slurp in the key from stdin */
- if (ret = set_datum_fd(&data, 0), ret) {
- err(0,"didn't read file descriptor 0\n");
- return 1;
- }
-
-
- if (ret = gnutls_openpgp_privkey_init(&pgp_privkey), ret) {
- err(0,"Failed to initialized OpenPGP private key (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
- /* check whether it's a private key or a public key, by trying them: */
- if ((gnutls_openpgp_privkey_import(pgp_privkey, &data, GNUTLS_OPENPGP_FMT_RAW, NULL, 0) == 0) ||
- (gnutls_openpgp_privkey_import(pgp_privkey, &data, GNUTLS_OPENPGP_FMT_BASE64, NULL, 0) == 0)) {
- /* we're dealing with a private key */
- err(0,"Translating private key\n");
- if (ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_init(&x509_privkey), ret) {
- err(0,"Failed to initialize X.509 private key for output (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
-
- ret = convert_private_pgp_to_x509(&x509_privkey, &pgp_privkey, fingerprint, fpr_size);
-
- gnutls_openpgp_privkey_deinit(pgp_privkey);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- ret = gnutls_x509_privkey_export (x509_privkey,
- GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM,
- output_data,
- &ods);
- if (ret == 0) {
- write(1, output_data, ods);
- }
- gnutls_x509_privkey_deinit(x509_privkey);
-
- } else {
- if (ret = gnutls_openpgp_crt_init(&pgp_crt), ret) {
- err(0,"Failed to initialized OpenPGP certificate (error: %d)\n", ret);
- return 1;
- }
-
- if ((gnutls_openpgp_crt_import(pgp_crt, &data, GNUTLS_OPENPGP_FMT_RAW) == 0) ||
- (gnutls_openpgp_crt_import(pgp_crt, &data, GNUTLS_OPENPGP_FMT_BASE64) == 0)) {
- /* we're dealing with a public key */
- err(0,"Translating public key\n");
-
- ret = emit_public_openssh_from_pgp(&pgp_crt, fingerprint, fpr_size);
- if (ret != 0)
- return ret;
-
- } else {
- /* we have no idea what kind of key this is at all anyway! */
- err(0,"Input does not contain any form of OpenPGP key I recognize.\n");
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- gnutls_global_deinit();
- free(fingerprint);
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp b/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp
deleted file mode 100755
index 2631da6..0000000
--- a/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,519 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/perl -w -T
-
-# pem2openpgp: take a PEM-encoded RSA private-key on standard input, a
-# User ID as the first argument, and generate an OpenPGP secret key
-# and certificate from it.
-
-# WARNING: the secret key material *will* appear on stdout (albeit in
-# OpenPGP form) -- if you redirect stdout to a file, make sure the
-# permissions on that file are appropriately locked down!
-
-# Usage:
-
-# pem2openpgp 'ssh://'$(hostname -f) < /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key | gpg --import
-
-# Authors:
-# Jameson Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>
-# Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
-
-# Started on: 2009-01-07 02:01:19-0500
-
-# License: GPL v3 or later (we may need to adjust this given that this
-# connects to OpenSSL via perl)
-
-use strict;
-use warnings;
-use Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA;
-use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum;
-use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX;
-use Digest::SHA1;
-use MIME::Base64;
-
-## make sure all length() and substr() calls use bytes only:
-use bytes;
-
-my $uid = shift;
-
-# FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID; or should we default to
-# hostname_long() from Sys::Hostname::Long ?
-
-
-my $old_format_packet_lengths = { one => 0,
- two => 1,
- four => 2,
- indeterminate => 3,
-};
-
-# see RFC 4880 section 9.1 (ignoring deprecated algorithms for now)
-my $asym_algos = { rsa => 1,
- elgamal => 16,
- dsa => 17,
- };
-
-# see RFC 4880 section 9.2
-my $ciphers = { plaintext => 0,
- idea => 1,
- tripledes => 2,
- cast5 => 3,
- blowfish => 4,
- aes128 => 7,
- aes192 => 8,
- aes256 => 9,
- twofish => 10,
- };
-
-# see RFC 4880 section 9.3
-my $zips = { uncompressed => 0,
- zip => 1,
- zlib => 2,
- bzip2 => 3,
- };
-
-# see RFC 4880 section 9.4
-my $digests = { md5 => 1,
- sha1 => 2,
- ripemd160 => 3,
- sha256 => 8,
- sha384 => 9,
- sha512 => 10,
- sha224 => 11,
- };
-
-# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.21
-my $usage_flags = { certify => 0x01,
- sign => 0x02,
- encrypt_comms => 0x04,
- encrypt_storage => 0x08,
- encrypt => 0x0c, ## both comms and storage
- split => 0x10, # the private key is split via secret sharing
- authenticate => 0x20,
- shared => 0x80, # more than one person holds the entire private key
- };
-
-# see RFC 4880 section 4.3
-my $packet_types = { pubkey_enc_session => 1,
- sig => 2,
- symkey_enc_session => 3,
- onepass_sig => 4,
- seckey => 5,
- pubkey => 6,
- sec_subkey => 7,
- compressed_data => 8,
- symenc_data => 9,
- marker => 10,
- literal => 11,
- trust => 12,
- uid => 13,
- pub_subkey => 14,
- uat => 17,
- symenc_w_integrity => 18,
- mdc => 19,
- };
-
-# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.1
-my $sig_types = { binary_doc => 0x00,
- text_doc => 0x01,
- standalone => 0x02,
- generic_certification => 0x10,
- persona_certification => 0x11,
- casual_certification => 0x12,
- positive_certification => 0x13,
- subkey_binding => 0x18,
- primary_key_binding => 0x19,
- key_signature => 0x1f,
- key_revocation => 0x20,
- subkey_revocation => 0x28,
- certification_revocation => 0x30,
- timestamp => 0x40,
- thirdparty => 0x50,
- };
-
-
-# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.1
-my $subpacket_types = { sig_creation_time => 2,
- sig_expiration_time => 3,
- exportable => 4,
- trust_sig => 5,
- regex => 6,
- revocable => 7,
- key_expiration_time => 9,
- preferred_cipher => 11,
- revocation_key => 12,
- issuer => 16,
- notation => 20,
- preferred_digest => 21,
- preferred_compression => 22,
- keyserver_prefs => 23,
- preferred_keyserver => 24,
- primary_uid => 25,
- policy_uri => 26,
- usage_flags => 27,
- signers_uid => 28,
- revocation_reason => 29,
- features => 30,
- signature_target => 31,
- embedded_signature => 32,
- };
-
-# bitstring (see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.24)
-my $features = { mdc => 0x01
- };
-
-# bitstring (see RFC 4880 5.2.3.17)
-my $keyserver_prefs = { nomodify => 0x80
- };
-
-###### end lookup tables ######
-
-# FIXME: if we want to be able to interpret openpgp data as well as
-# produce it, we need to produce key/value-swapped lookup tables as well.
-
-
-########### Math/Utility Functions ##############
-
-
-# see the bottom of page 43 of RFC 4880
-sub simple_checksum {
- my $bytes = shift;
-
- return unpack("%32W*",$bytes) % 65536;
-}
-
-# calculate the multiplicative inverse of a mod b this is euclid's
-# extended algorithm. For more information see:
-# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Euclidean_algorithm the
-# arguments here should be Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum objects. $a should
-# be the larger of the two values, and the two values should be
-# coprime.
-
-sub modular_multi_inverse {
- my $a = shift;
- my $b = shift;
-
-
- my $origdivisor = $b->copy();
-
- my $ctx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX->new();
- my $x = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero();
- my $y = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one();
- my $lastx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one();
- my $lasty = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero();
-
- my $finalquotient;
- my $finalremainder;
-
- while (! $b->is_zero()) {
- my ($quotient, $remainder) = $a->div($b, $ctx);
-
- $a = $b;
- $b = $remainder;
-
- my $temp = $x;
- $x = $lastx->sub($quotient->mul($x, $ctx));
- $lastx = $temp;
-
- $temp = $y;
- $y = $lasty->sub($quotient->mul($y, $ctx));
- $lasty = $temp;
- }
-
- if (!$a->is_one()) {
- die "did this math wrong.\n";
- }
-
- # let's make sure that we return a positive value because RFC 4880,
- # section 3.2 only allows unsigned values:
-
- ($finalquotient, $finalremainder) = $lastx->add($origdivisor)->div($origdivisor, $ctx);
-
- return $finalremainder;
-}
-
-
-############ OpenPGP formatting functions ############
-
-# make an old-style packet out of the given packet type and body.
-# old-style (see RFC 4880 section 4.2)
-sub make_packet {
- my $type = shift;
- my $body = shift;
- my $options = shift;
-
- my $len = length($body);
- my $pseudolen = $len;
-
- # if the caller wants to use at least N octets of packet length,
- # pretend that we're using that many.
- if (defined $options && defined $options->{'packet_length'}) {
- $pseudolen = 2**($options->{'packet_length'} * 8) - 1;
- }
- if ($pseudolen < $len) {
- $pseudolen = $len;
- }
-
- my $lenbytes;
- my $lencode;
-
- if ($pseudolen < 2**8) {
- $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{one};
- $lencode = 'C';
- } elsif ($pseudolen < 2**16) {
- $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{two};
- $lencode = 'n';
- } elsif ($pseudolen < 2**31) {
- ## not testing against full 32 bits because i don't want to deal
- ## with potential overflow.
- $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{four};
- $lencode = 'N';
- } else {
- ## what the hell do we do here?
- $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{indeterminate};
- $lencode = '';
- }
-
- return pack('C'.$lencode, 0x80 + ($type * 4) + $lenbytes, $len).
- $body;
-}
-
-
-# takes a Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum, returns it formatted as OpenPGP MPI
-# (RFC 4880 section 3.2)
-sub mpi_pack {
- my $num = shift;
-
- my $val = $num->to_bin();
- my $mpilen = length($val)*8;
-
-# this is a kludgy way to get the number of significant bits in the
-# first byte:
- my $bitsinfirstbyte = length(sprintf("%b", ord($val)));
-
- $mpilen -= (8 - $bitsinfirstbyte);
-
- return pack('n', $mpilen).$val;
-}
-
-# FIXME: genericize these to accept either RSA or DSA keys:
-sub make_rsa_pub_key_body {
- my $key = shift;
- my $timestamp = shift;
-
- my ($n, $e) = $key->get_key_parameters();
-
- return
- pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
- pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
- mpi_pack($n).
- mpi_pack($e);
-}
-
-sub make_rsa_sec_key_body {
- my $key = shift;
- my $timestamp = shift;
-
- # we're not using $a and $b, but we need them to get to $c.
- my ($n, $e, $d, $p, $q) = $key->get_key_parameters();
-
- my $c3 = modular_multi_inverse($p, $q);
-
- my $secret_material = mpi_pack($d).
- mpi_pack($p).
- mpi_pack($q).
- mpi_pack($c3);
-
- # according to Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA, the closest value we can get out
- # of get_key_parameters is 1/q mod p; but according to sec 5.5.3 of
- # RFC 4880, we're actually looking for u, the multiplicative inverse
- # of p, mod q. This is why we're calculating the value directly
- # with modular_multi_inverse.
-
- return
- pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
- pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
- mpi_pack($n).
- mpi_pack($e).
- pack('C', 0). # seckey material is not encrypted -- see RFC 4880 sec 5.5.3
- $secret_material.
- pack('n', simple_checksum($secret_material));
-}
-
-# expects an RSA key (public or private) and a timestamp
-sub fingerprint {
- my $key = shift;
- my $timestamp = shift;
-
- my $rsabody = make_rsa_pub_key_body($key, $timestamp);
-
- return Digest::SHA1::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody);
-}
-
-
-my $rsa;
-if (defined $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_NEWKEY}) {
- $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key($ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_NEWKEY});
-} else {
- # we're just not dealing with newline business right now. slurp in
- # the whole file.
- undef $/;
- $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key(<STDIN>);
-}
-
-$rsa->use_sha1_hash();
-
-# see page 22 of RFC 4880 for why i think this is the right padding
-# choice to use:
-$rsa->use_pkcs1_padding();
-
-if (! $rsa->check_key()) {
- die "key does not check";
-}
-
-my $version = pack('C', 4);
-# strong assertion of identity:
-my $sigtype = pack('C', $sig_types->{positive_certification});
-# RSA
-my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa});
-# SHA1
-my $hash_algo = pack('C', $digests->{sha1});
-
-# FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP
-# certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run
-# this script more than once against the same key (because the
-# timestamps will differ). How can we prevent this?
-
-# this environment variable (if set) overrides the current time, to
-# be able to create a standard key? If we read the key from a file
-# instead of stdin, should we use the creation time on the file?
-my $timestamp = 0;
-if (defined $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_TIMESTAMP}) {
- $timestamp = ($ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_TIMESTAMP} + 0);
-} else {
- $timestamp = time();
-}
-
-my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{sig_creation_time}, $timestamp);
-
-
-my $flags = 0;
-if (! defined $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_USAGE_FLAGS}) {
- $flags = $usage_flags->{certify};
-} else {
- my @ff = split(",", $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_USAGE_FLAGS});
- foreach my $f (@ff) {
- if (! defined $usage_flags->{$f}) {
- die "No such flag $f";
- }
- $flags |= $usage_flags->{$f};
- }
-}
-
-my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{usage_flags}, $flags);
-
-
-# how should we determine how far off to set the expiration date?
-# default is no expiration. Specify the timestamp in seconds from the
-# key creation.
-my $expiration_packet = '';
-if (defined $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_EXPIRATION}) {
- my $expires_in = $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_EXPIRATION} + 0;
- $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{key_expiration_time}, $expires_in);
-}
-
-
-# prefer AES-256, AES-192, AES-128, CAST5, 3DES:
-my $pref_sym_algos = pack('CCCCCCC', 6, $subpacket_types->{preferred_cipher},
- $ciphers->{aes256},
- $ciphers->{aes192},
- $ciphers->{aes128},
- $ciphers->{cast5},
- $ciphers->{tripledes}
- );
-
-# prefer SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPE-MD/160
-my $pref_hash_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_digest},
- $digests->{sha1},
- $digests->{sha256},
- $digests->{ripemd160}
- );
-
-# prefer ZLIB, BZip2, ZIP
-my $pref_zip_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_compression},
- $zips->{zlib},
- $zips->{bzip2},
- $zips->{zip}
- );
-
-# we support the MDC feature:
-my $feature_subpacket = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{features},
- $features->{mdc});
-
-# keyserver preference: only owner modify (???):
-my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{keyserver_prefs},
- $keyserver_prefs->{nomodify});
-
-my $subpackets_to_be_hashed =
- $creation_time_packet.
- $usage_packet.
- $expiration_packet.
- $pref_sym_algos.
- $pref_hash_algos.
- $pref_zip_algos.
- $feature_subpacket.
- $keyserver_pref;
-
-my $subpacket_octets = pack('n', length($subpackets_to_be_hashed));
-
-my $sig_data_to_be_hashed =
- $version.
- $sigtype.
- $pubkey_algo.
- $hash_algo.
- $subpacket_octets.
- $subpackets_to_be_hashed;
-
-my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
-my $seckey = make_rsa_sec_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
-
-# this is for signing. it needs to be an old-style header with a
-# 2-packet octet count.
-
-my $key_data = make_packet($packet_types->{pubkey}, $pubkey, {'packet_length'=>2});
-
-# take the last 8 bytes of the fingerprint as the keyid:
-my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $timestamp), 20 - 8, 8);
-
-# the v4 signature trailer is:
-
-# version number, literal 0xff, and then a 4-byte count of the
-# signature data itself.
-my $trailer = pack('CCN', 4, 0xff, length($sig_data_to_be_hashed));
-
-my $uid_data =
- pack('CN', 0xb4, length($uid)).
- $uid;
-
-my $datatosign =
- $key_data.
- $uid_data.
- $sig_data_to_be_hashed.
- $trailer;
-
-my $data_hash = Digest::SHA1::sha1_hex($datatosign);
-
-my $issuer_packet = pack('CCa8', 9, $subpacket_types->{issuer}, $keyid);
-
-my $sig = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($rsa->sign($datatosign));
-
-my $sig_body =
- $sig_data_to_be_hashed.
- pack('n', length($issuer_packet)).
- $issuer_packet.
- pack('n', hex(substr($data_hash, 0, 4))).
- mpi_pack($sig);
-
-print
- make_packet($packet_types->{seckey}, $seckey).
- make_packet($packet_types->{uid}, $uid).
- make_packet($packet_types->{sig}, $sig_body);
-
-
diff --git a/src/monkeysphere b/src/monkeysphere
index 371983f..f721108 100755
--- a/src/monkeysphere
+++ b/src/monkeysphere
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ PGRM=$(basename $0)
SYSSHAREDIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSSHAREDIR:-"/usr/share/monkeysphere"}
export SYSSHAREDIR
-. "${SYSSHAREDIR}/common" || exit 1
+. "${SYSSHAREDIR}/defaultenv"
+. "${SYSSHAREDIR}/common"
# sharedir for host functions
MSHAREDIR="${SYSSHAREDIR}/m"
@@ -69,7 +70,7 @@ check_gpg_sec_key_id() {
gpgSecOut=$(gpg_user --fixed-list-mode --list-secret-keys --with-colons 2>/dev/null | egrep '^sec:')
;;
1)
- gpgSecOut=$(gpg_user --fixed-list-mode --list-secret-keys --with-colons "$keyID" | egrep '^sec:') || failure
+ gpgSecOut=$(gpg_user --fixed-list-mode --list-secret-keys --with-colons "$1" | egrep '^sec:') || failure
;;
*)
failure "You must specify only a single primary key ID."
@@ -86,10 +87,10 @@ check_gpg_sec_key_id() {
echo "$gpgSecOut" | cut -d: -f5
;;
*)
- echo "Multiple primary secret keys found:"
- echo "$gpgSecOut" | cut -d: -f5
- echo "Please specify which primary key to use."
- failure
+ local seckeys=$(echo "$gpgSecOut" | cut -d: -f5)
+ failure "Multiple primary secret keys found:
+$seckeys
+Please specify which primary key to use."
;;
esac
}
@@ -181,6 +182,7 @@ AUTHORIZED_KEYS=${MONKEYSPHERE_AUTHORIZED_KEYS:=$AUTHORIZED_KEYS}
AUTHORIZED_USER_IDS=${MONKEYSPHERE_AUTHORIZED_USER_IDS:="${MONKEYSPHERE_HOME}/authorized_user_ids"}
REQUIRED_HOST_KEY_CAPABILITY=${MONKEYSPHERE_REQUIRED_HOST_KEY_CAPABILITY:="a"}
REQUIRED_USER_KEY_CAPABILITY=${MONKEYSPHERE_REQUIRED_USER_KEY_CAPABILITY:="a"}
+LOG_PREFIX=${MONKEYSPHERE_LOG_PREFIX:='ms: '}
# export GNUPGHOME and make sure gpg home exists with proper
# permissions
@@ -239,7 +241,7 @@ case $COMMAND in
;;
'version'|'v')
- echo "$VERSION"
+ version
;;
'--help'|'help'|'-h'|'h'|'?')
diff --git a/src/monkeysphere-authentication b/src/monkeysphere-authentication
index 497470d..85ff04f 100755
--- a/src/monkeysphere-authentication
+++ b/src/monkeysphere-authentication
@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ PGRM=$(basename $0)
SYSSHAREDIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSSHAREDIR:-"/usr/share/monkeysphere"}
export SYSSHAREDIR
-. "${SYSSHAREDIR}/common" || exit 1
+. "${SYSSHAREDIR}/defaultenv"
+. "${SYSSHAREDIR}/common"
SYSDATADIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSDATADIR:-"/var/lib/monkeysphere"}
export SYSDATADIR
@@ -42,9 +43,6 @@ DATE=$(date -u '+%FT%T')
# unset some environment variables that could screw things up
unset GREP_OPTIONS
-# default return code
-RETURN=0
-
########################################################################
# FUNCTIONS
########################################################################
@@ -55,17 +53,17 @@ usage: $PGRM <subcommand> [options] [args]
Monkeysphere authentication admin tool.
subcommands:
- update-users (u) [USER]... update user authorized_keys files
+ update-users (u) [USER]... update user authorized_keys files
- add-id-certifier (c+) [KEYID|FILE] import and tsign a certification key
- --domain (-n) DOMAIN limit ID certifications to DOMAIN
- --trust (-t) TRUST trust level of certifier (full)
- --depth (-d) DEPTH trust depth for certifier (1)
- remove-id-certifier (c-) KEYID remove a certification key
- list-id-certifiers (c) list certification keys
+ add-id-certifier (c+) KEYID|FILE import and tsign a certification key
+ [--domain (-n) DOMAIN] limit ID certifications to DOMAIN
+ [--trust (-t) TRUST] trust level of certifier (default: full)
+ [--depth (-d) DEPTH] trust depth for certifier (default: 1)
+ remove-id-certifier (c-) KEYID remove a certification key
+ list-id-certifiers (c) list certification keys
- version (v) show version number
- help (h,?) this help
+ version (v) show version number
+ help (h,?) this help
See ${PGRM}(8) for more info.
EOF
@@ -102,7 +100,7 @@ core_fingerprint() {
gpg_core_sphere_sig_transfer() {
log debug "exporting core local sigs to sphere..."
gpg_core --export-options export-local-sigs --export | \
- gpg_sphere "--import-options import-local-sigs --import"
+ gpg_sphere "--import-options import-local-sigs --import" 2>&1 | log debug
}
########################################################################
@@ -131,6 +129,7 @@ REQUIRED_USER_KEY_CAPABILITY=${MONKEYSPHERE_REQUIRED_USER_KEY_CAPABILITY:="a"}
GNUPGHOME_CORE=${MONKEYSPHERE_GNUPGHOME_CORE:="${MADATADIR}/core"}
GNUPGHOME_SPHERE=${MONKEYSPHERE_GNUPGHOME_SPHERE:="${MADATADIR}/sphere"}
CORE_KEYLENGTH=${MONKEYSPHERE_CORE_KEYLENGTH:="2048"}
+LOG_PREFIX=${MONKEYSPHERE_LOG_PREFIX:='ms: '}
# export variables needed in su invocation
export DATE
@@ -199,7 +198,7 @@ case $COMMAND in
;;
'version'|'v')
- echo "$VERSION"
+ version
;;
'--help'|'help'|'-h'|'h'|'?')
@@ -211,5 +210,3 @@ case $COMMAND in
Type '$PGRM help' for usage."
;;
esac
-
-exit "$RETURN"
diff --git a/src/monkeysphere-host b/src/monkeysphere-host
index 1b0de0c..6136399 100755
--- a/src/monkeysphere-host
+++ b/src/monkeysphere-host
@@ -21,7 +21,8 @@ PGRM=$(basename $0)
SYSSHAREDIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSSHAREDIR:-"/usr/share/monkeysphere"}
export SYSSHAREDIR
-. "${SYSSHAREDIR}/common" || exit 1
+. "${SYSSHAREDIR}/defaultenv"
+. "${SYSSHAREDIR}/common"
SYSDATADIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSDATADIR:-"/var/lib/monkeysphere"}
export SYSDATADIR
@@ -41,9 +42,6 @@ DATE=$(date -u '+%FT%T')
# unset some environment variables that could screw things up
unset GREP_OPTIONS
-# default return code
-RETURN=0
-
########################################################################
# FUNCTIONS
########################################################################
@@ -60,7 +58,7 @@ subcommands:
set-expire (e) [EXPIRE] set host key expiration
add-hostname (n+) NAME[:PORT] add hostname user ID to host key
revoke-hostname (n-) NAME[:PORT] revoke hostname user ID
- add-revoker (r+) [KEYID|FILE] add a revoker to the host key
+ add-revoker (r+) KEYID|FILE add a revoker to the host key
revoke-key generate and/or publish revocation
certificate for host key
@@ -105,7 +103,7 @@ update_gpg_pub_file() {
load_fingerprint() {
if [ -f "$HOST_KEY_FILE" ] ; then
HOST_FINGERPRINT=$( \
- (FUBAR=$(mktemp -d) && export GNUPGHOME="$FUBAR" \
+ (FUBAR=$(msmktempdir) && export GNUPGHOME="$FUBAR" \
&& gpg --quiet --import \
&& gpg --quiet --list-keys --with-colons --with-fingerprint \
&& rm -rf "$FUBAR") <"$HOST_KEY_FILE" \
@@ -177,7 +175,7 @@ show_key() {
# create the ssh key
TMPSSH="$GNUPGHOME"/ssh_host_key_rsa_pub
- openpgp2ssh <"$HOST_KEY_FILE" 2>/dev/null >"$TMPSSH"
+ gpg --export | openpgp2ssh 2>/dev/null >"$TMPSSH"
# get the gpg fingerprint
HOST_FINGERPRINT=$(gpg --quiet --list-keys --with-colons --with-fingerprint \
@@ -232,6 +230,7 @@ PROMPT=${MONKEYSPHERE_PROMPT:=$PROMPT}
# other variables
GNUPGHOME_HOST=${MONKEYSPHERE_GNUPGHOME_HOST:="${MHDATADIR}"}
+LOG_PREFIX=${MONKEYSPHERE_LOG_PREFIX:='ms: '}
# export variables needed in su invocation
export DATE
@@ -315,7 +314,7 @@ case $COMMAND in
;;
'version'|'v')
- echo "$VERSION"
+ version
;;
'--help'|'help'|'-h'|'h'|'?')
@@ -327,5 +326,3 @@ case $COMMAND in
Type '$PGRM help' for usage."
;;
esac
-
-exit "$RETURN"
diff --git a/src/openpgp2ssh b/src/openpgp2ssh
new file mode 120000
index 0000000..edcb6a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/openpgp2ssh
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+share/keytrans \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/pem2openpgp b/src/pem2openpgp
new file mode 120000
index 0000000..edcb6a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pem2openpgp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+share/keytrans \ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/share/common b/src/share/common
index 5e0cb6a..ea872ba 100644
--- a/src/share/common
+++ b/src/share/common
@@ -14,33 +14,13 @@
# file) and are considered global
########################################################################
-### COMMON VARIABLES
-
-# managed directories
-SYSCONFIGDIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSCONFIGDIR:-"/etc/monkeysphere"}
-export SYSCONFIGDIR
-
-# monkeysphere version
-VERSION=0.23~pre
-
-# default log level
-LOG_LEVEL="INFO"
-
-# default keyserver
-KEYSERVER="pool.sks-keyservers.net"
-
-# whether or not to check keyservers by defaul
-CHECK_KEYSERVER="true"
-
-# default monkeysphere user
-MONKEYSPHERE_USER="monkeysphere"
-
-# default about whether or not to prompt
-PROMPT="true"
-
-########################################################################
### UTILITY FUNCTIONS
+# output version info
+version() {
+ cat "${SYSSHAREDIR}/VERSION"
+}
+
# failure function. exits with code 255, unless specified otherwise.
failure() {
[ "$1" ] && echo "$1" >&2
@@ -96,11 +76,10 @@ log() {
fi
if [ "$priority" = "$level" -a "$output" = 'true' ] ; then
if [ "$1" ] ; then
- echo -n "ms: " >&2
- echo "$@" >&2
+ echo "$@"
else
- cat >&2
- fi
+ cat
+ fi | sed 's/^/'"${LOG_PREFIX}"'/' >&2
fi
done
}
@@ -334,52 +313,6 @@ passphrase_prompt() {
fi
}
-test_gnu_dummy_s2k_extension() {
-
-# this block contains a demonstration private key that has had the
-# primary key stripped out using the GNU S2K extension known as
-# "gnu-dummy" (see /usr/share/doc/gnupg/DETAILS.gz). The subkey is
-# present in cleartext, however.
-
-# openpgp2ssh will be able to deal with this based on whether the
-# local copy of GnuTLS contains read_s2k support that can handle it.
-
-# read up on that here:
-
-# http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/gnutls-devel/2008-08/msg00005.html
-
-echo "
------BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
-Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
-
-lQCVBEO3YdABBACRqqEnucag4+vyZny2M67Pai5+5suIRRvY+Ly8Ms5MvgCi3EVV
-xT05O/+0ShiRaf+QicCOFrhbU9PZzzU+seEvkeW2UCu4dQfILkmj+HBEIltGnHr3
-G0yegHj5pnqrcezERURf2e17gGFWX91cXB9Cm721FPXczuKraphKwCA9PwARAQAB
-/gNlAkdOVQG0OURlbW9uc3RyYXRpb24gS2V5IGZvciBTMksgR05VIGV4dGVuc2lv
-biAxMDAxIC0tIGdudS1kdW1teYi8BBMBAgAmBQJDt2HQAhsDBQkB4TOABgsJCAcD
-AgQVAggDBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQQZUwSa4UDezTOQP/TMQXUVrWzHYZGopoPZ2+
-ZS3qddiznBHsgb7MGYg1KlTiVJSroDUBCHIUJvdQKZV9zrzrFl47D07x6hGyUPHV
-aZXvuITW8t1o5MMHkCy3pmJ2KgfDvdUxrBvLfgPMICA4c6zA0mWquee43syEW9NY
-g3q61iPlQwD1J1kX1wlimLCdAdgEQ7dh0AEEANAwa63zlQbuy1Meliy8otwiOa+a
-mH6pxxUgUNggjyjO5qx+rl25mMjvGIRX4/L1QwIBXJBVi3SgvJW1COZxZqBYqj9U
-8HVT07mWKFEDf0rZLeUE2jTm16cF9fcW4DQhW+sfYm+hi2sY3HeMuwlUBK9KHfW2
-+bGeDzVZ4pqfUEudABEBAAEAA/0bemib+wxub9IyVFUp7nPobjQC83qxLSNzrGI/
-RHzgu/5CQi4tfLOnwbcQsLELfker2hYnjsLrT9PURqK4F7udrWEoZ1I1LymOtLG/
-4tNZ7Mnul3wRC2tCn7FKx8sGJwGh/3li8vZ6ALVJAyOia5TZ/buX0+QZzt6+hPKk
-7MU1WQIA4bUBjtrsqDwro94DvPj3/jBnMZbXr6WZIItLNeVDUcM8oHL807Am97K1
-ueO/f6v1sGAHG6lVPTmtekqPSTWBfwIA7CGFvEyvSALfB8NUa6jtk27NCiw0csql
-kuhCmwXGMVOiryKEfegkIahf2bAd/gnWHPrpWp7bUE20v8YoW22I4wIAhnm5Wr5Q
-Sy7EHDUxmJm5TzadFp9gq08qNzHBpXSYXXJ3JuWcL1/awUqp3tE1I6zZ0hZ38Ia6
-SdBMN88idnhDPqPoiKUEGAECAA8FAkO3YdACGyAFCQHhM4AACgkQQZUwSa4UDezm
-vQP/ZhK+2ly9oI2z7ZcNC/BJRch0/ybQ3haahII8pXXmOThpZohr/LUgoWgCZdXg
-vP6yiszNk2tIs8KphCAw7Lw/qzDC2hEORjWO4f46qk73RAgSqG/GyzI4ltWiDhqn
-vnQCFl3+QFSe4zinqykHnLwGPMXv428d/ZjkIc2ju8dRsn4=
-=CR5w
------END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
-" | openpgp2ssh 4129E89D17C1D591 >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
-
-}
-
# remove all lines with specified string from specified file
remove_line() {
local file
@@ -420,12 +353,15 @@ remove_monkeysphere_lines() {
file="$1"
- if [ -z "$file" ] ; then
+ # return error if file does not exist
+ if [ ! -e "$file" ] ; then
return 1
fi
- if [ ! -e "$file" ] ; then
- return 1
+ # just return ok if the file is empty, since there aren't any
+ # lines to remove
+ if [ ! -s "$file" ] ; then
+ return 0
fi
tempfile=$(mktemp "${file}.XXXXXXX") || \
@@ -493,18 +429,21 @@ check_key_file_permissions() {
# return 1 if path has invalid owner
if [ "$owner" != "$uname" -a "$owner" != 'root' ] ; then
- log error "improper ownership on path '$path'."
+ log error "improper ownership on path '$path':"
+ log error " $owner != ($uname|root)"
return 1
fi
# return 2 if path has group or other writability
if is_write "$gAccess" || is_write "$oAccess" ; then
- log error "improper group or other writability on path '$path'."
+ log error "improper group or other writability on path '$path':"
+ log error " group: $gAccess, other: $oAcess"
return 2
fi
# return zero if all clear, or go to next path
if [ "$path" = '/' ] ; then
+ log debug "path ok."
return 0
else
check_key_file_permissions "$uname" $(dirname "$path")
@@ -732,14 +671,14 @@ process_user_id() {
if [ "$keyOK" -a "$uidOK" -a "$lastKeyOK" ] ; then
log verbose " * acceptable primary key."
if [ -z "$sshKey" ] ; then
- log error " ! primary key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
+ log error " ! primary key could not be translated (not RSA?)."
else
echo "0:${sshKey}"
fi
else
log debug " - unacceptable primary key."
if [ -z "$sshKey" ] ; then
- log debug " ! primary key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
+ log debug " ! primary key could not be translated (not RSA?)."
else
echo "1:${sshKey}"
fi
@@ -790,14 +729,14 @@ process_user_id() {
if [ "$keyOK" -a "$uidOK" -a "$lastKeyOK" ] ; then
log verbose " * acceptable sub key."
if [ -z "$sshKey" ] ; then
- log error " ! sub key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
+ log error " ! sub key could not be translated (not RSA?)."
else
echo "0:${sshKey}"
fi
else
log debug " - unacceptable sub key."
if [ -z "$sshKey" ] ; then
- log debug " ! sub key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
+ log debug " ! sub key could not be translated (not RSA?)."
else
echo "1:${sshKey}"
fi
@@ -909,7 +848,7 @@ update_known_hosts() {
(umask 0022 && touch "$KNOWN_HOSTS")
# check permissions on the known_hosts file path
- check_key_file_permissions "$USER" "$KNOWN_HOSTS" || failure
+ check_key_file_permissions $(whoami) "$KNOWN_HOSTS" || failure
# create a lockfile on known_hosts:
lock create "$KNOWN_HOSTS"
@@ -970,7 +909,8 @@ process_known_hosts() {
failure "known_hosts file '$KNOWN_HOSTS' does not exist."
fi
- log debug "processing known_hosts file..."
+ log debug "processing known_hosts file:"
+ log debug " $KNOWN_HOSTS"
hosts=$(meat "$KNOWN_HOSTS" | cut -d ' ' -f 1 | grep -v '^|.*$' | tr , ' ' | tr '\n' ' ')
@@ -1058,8 +998,11 @@ update_authorized_keys() {
nIDsOK=0
nIDsBAD=0
+ log debug "updating authorized_keys file:"
+ log debug " $AUTHORIZED_KEYS"
+
# check permissions on the authorized_keys file path
- check_key_file_permissions "$USER" "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS" || failure
+ check_key_file_permissions $(whoami) "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS" || failure
# create a lockfile on authorized_keys
lock create "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS"
@@ -1131,10 +1074,11 @@ process_authorized_user_ids() {
failure "authorized_user_ids file '$authorizedUserIDs' does not exist."
fi
- # check permissions on the authorized_user_ids file path
- check_key_file_permissions "$USER" "$authorizedUserIDs" || failure
+ log debug "processing authorized_user_ids file:"
+ log debug " $authorizedUserIDs"
- log debug "processing authorized_user_ids file..."
+ # check permissions on the authorized_user_ids file path
+ check_key_file_permissions $(whoami) "$authorizedUserIDs" || failure
if ! meat "$authorizedUserIDs" > /dev/null ; then
log debug " no user IDs to process."
diff --git a/src/share/defaultenv b/src/share/defaultenv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b54a518
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/share/defaultenv
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# -*-shell-script-*-
+# This should be sourced by bash (though we welcome changes to make it POSIX sh compliant)
+
+# Shared sh variables for the monkeysphere
+#
+# Written by
+# Jameson Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>
+#
+# Copyright 2009, released under the GPL, version 3 or later
+
+# managed directories
+SYSCONFIGDIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSCONFIGDIR:-"/etc/monkeysphere"}
+export SYSCONFIGDIR
+
+# default log level
+LOG_LEVEL="INFO"
+
+# default keyserver
+KEYSERVER="pool.sks-keyservers.net"
+
+# whether or not to check keyservers by defaul
+CHECK_KEYSERVER="true"
+
+# default monkeysphere user
+MONKEYSPHERE_USER="monkeysphere"
+
+# default about whether or not to prompt
+PROMPT="true"
+
diff --git a/src/share/keytrans b/src/share/keytrans
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..8b2e2ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/share/keytrans
@@ -0,0 +1,802 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl -w -T
+
+# keytrans: this is an RSA key translation utility; it is capable of
+# transforming RSA keys (both public keys and secret keys) between
+# several popular representations, including OpenPGP, PEM-encoded
+# PKCS#1 DER, and OpenSSH-style public key lines.
+
+# How it behaves depends on the name under which it is invoked. The
+# two implementations currently are: pem2openpgp and openpgp2ssh.
+
+
+
+# pem2openpgp: take a PEM-encoded RSA private-key on standard input, a
+# User ID as the first argument, and generate an OpenPGP secret key
+# and certificate from it.
+
+# WARNING: the secret key material *will* appear on stdout (albeit in
+# OpenPGP form) -- if you redirect stdout to a file, make sure the
+# permissions on that file are appropriately locked down!
+
+# Usage:
+
+# pem2openpgp 'ssh://'$(hostname -f) < /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key | gpg --import
+
+
+
+
+# openpgp2ssh: take a stream of OpenPGP packets containing public or
+# secret key material on standard input, and a Key ID (or fingerprint)
+# as the first argument. Find the matching key in the input stream,
+# and emit it on stdout in an OpenSSH-compatible format. If the input
+# key is an OpenPGP public key (either primary or subkey), the output
+# will be an OpenSSH single-line public key. If the input key is an
+# OpenPGP secret key, the output will be a PEM-encoded RSA key.
+
+# Example usage:
+
+# gpg --export-secret-subkeys --export-options export-reset-subkey-passwd $KEYID | \
+# openpgp2ssh $KEYID | ssh-add /dev/stdin
+
+
+# Authors:
+# Jameson Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>
+# Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+
+# Started on: 2009-01-07 02:01:19-0500
+
+# License: GPL v3 or later (we may need to adjust this given that this
+# connects to OpenSSL via perl)
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use File::Basename;
+use Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA;
+use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum;
+use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX;
+use Digest::SHA1;
+use MIME::Base64;
+use POSIX;
+
+## make sure all length() and substr() calls use bytes only:
+use bytes;
+
+my $old_format_packet_lengths = { one => 0,
+ two => 1,
+ four => 2,
+ indeterminate => 3,
+};
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.1 (ignoring deprecated algorithms for now)
+my $asym_algos = { rsa => 1,
+ elgamal => 16,
+ dsa => 17,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.2
+my $ciphers = { plaintext => 0,
+ idea => 1,
+ tripledes => 2,
+ cast5 => 3,
+ blowfish => 4,
+ aes128 => 7,
+ aes192 => 8,
+ aes256 => 9,
+ twofish => 10,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.3
+my $zips = { uncompressed => 0,
+ zip => 1,
+ zlib => 2,
+ bzip2 => 3,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.4
+my $digests = { md5 => 1,
+ sha1 => 2,
+ ripemd160 => 3,
+ sha256 => 8,
+ sha384 => 9,
+ sha512 => 10,
+ sha224 => 11,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.21
+my $usage_flags = { certify => 0x01,
+ sign => 0x02,
+ encrypt_comms => 0x04,
+ encrypt_storage => 0x08,
+ encrypt => 0x0c, ## both comms and storage
+ split => 0x10, # the private key is split via secret sharing
+ authenticate => 0x20,
+ shared => 0x80, # more than one person holds the entire private key
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 4.3
+my $packet_types = { pubkey_enc_session => 1,
+ sig => 2,
+ symkey_enc_session => 3,
+ onepass_sig => 4,
+ seckey => 5,
+ pubkey => 6,
+ sec_subkey => 7,
+ compressed_data => 8,
+ symenc_data => 9,
+ marker => 10,
+ literal => 11,
+ trust => 12,
+ uid => 13,
+ pub_subkey => 14,
+ uat => 17,
+ symenc_w_integrity => 18,
+ mdc => 19,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.1
+my $sig_types = { binary_doc => 0x00,
+ text_doc => 0x01,
+ standalone => 0x02,
+ generic_certification => 0x10,
+ persona_certification => 0x11,
+ casual_certification => 0x12,
+ positive_certification => 0x13,
+ subkey_binding => 0x18,
+ primary_key_binding => 0x19,
+ key_signature => 0x1f,
+ key_revocation => 0x20,
+ subkey_revocation => 0x28,
+ certification_revocation => 0x30,
+ timestamp => 0x40,
+ thirdparty => 0x50,
+ };
+
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.1
+my $subpacket_types = { sig_creation_time => 2,
+ sig_expiration_time => 3,
+ exportable => 4,
+ trust_sig => 5,
+ regex => 6,
+ revocable => 7,
+ key_expiration_time => 9,
+ preferred_cipher => 11,
+ revocation_key => 12,
+ issuer => 16,
+ notation => 20,
+ preferred_digest => 21,
+ preferred_compression => 22,
+ keyserver_prefs => 23,
+ preferred_keyserver => 24,
+ primary_uid => 25,
+ policy_uri => 26,
+ usage_flags => 27,
+ signers_uid => 28,
+ revocation_reason => 29,
+ features => 30,
+ signature_target => 31,
+ embedded_signature => 32,
+ };
+
+# bitstring (see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.24)
+my $features = { mdc => 0x01
+ };
+
+# bitstring (see RFC 4880 5.2.3.17)
+my $keyserver_prefs = { nomodify => 0x80
+ };
+
+###### end lookup tables ######
+
+# FIXME: if we want to be able to interpret openpgp data as well as
+# produce it, we need to produce key/value-swapped lookup tables as well.
+
+
+########### Math/Utility Functions ##############
+
+
+# see the bottom of page 43 of RFC 4880
+sub simple_checksum {
+ my $bytes = shift;
+
+ return unpack("%32W*",$bytes) % 65536;
+}
+
+# calculate the multiplicative inverse of a mod b this is euclid's
+# extended algorithm. For more information see:
+# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Euclidean_algorithm the
+# arguments here should be Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum objects. $a should
+# be the larger of the two values, and the two values should be
+# coprime.
+
+sub modular_multi_inverse {
+ my $a = shift;
+ my $b = shift;
+
+
+ my $origdivisor = $b->copy();
+
+ my $ctx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX->new();
+ my $x = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero();
+ my $y = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one();
+ my $lastx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one();
+ my $lasty = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero();
+
+ my $finalquotient;
+ my $finalremainder;
+
+ while (! $b->is_zero()) {
+ my ($quotient, $remainder) = $a->div($b, $ctx);
+
+ $a = $b;
+ $b = $remainder;
+
+ my $temp = $x;
+ $x = $lastx->sub($quotient->mul($x, $ctx));
+ $lastx = $temp;
+
+ $temp = $y;
+ $y = $lasty->sub($quotient->mul($y, $ctx));
+ $lasty = $temp;
+ }
+
+ if (!$a->is_one()) {
+ die "did this math wrong.\n";
+ }
+
+ # let's make sure that we return a positive value because RFC 4880,
+ # section 3.2 only allows unsigned values:
+
+ ($finalquotient, $finalremainder) = $lastx->add($origdivisor)->div($origdivisor, $ctx);
+
+ return $finalremainder;
+}
+
+
+############ OpenPGP formatting functions ############
+
+# make an old-style packet out of the given packet type and body.
+# old-style (see RFC 4880 section 4.2)
+sub make_packet {
+ my $type = shift;
+ my $body = shift;
+ my $options = shift;
+
+ my $len = length($body);
+ my $pseudolen = $len;
+
+ # if the caller wants to use at least N octets of packet length,
+ # pretend that we're using that many.
+ if (defined $options && defined $options->{'packet_length'}) {
+ $pseudolen = 2**($options->{'packet_length'} * 8) - 1;
+ }
+ if ($pseudolen < $len) {
+ $pseudolen = $len;
+ }
+
+ my $lenbytes;
+ my $lencode;
+
+ if ($pseudolen < 2**8) {
+ $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{one};
+ $lencode = 'C';
+ } elsif ($pseudolen < 2**16) {
+ $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{two};
+ $lencode = 'n';
+ } elsif ($pseudolen < 2**31) {
+ ## not testing against full 32 bits because i don't want to deal
+ ## with potential overflow.
+ $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{four};
+ $lencode = 'N';
+ } else {
+ ## what the hell do we do here?
+ $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{indeterminate};
+ $lencode = '';
+ }
+
+ return pack('C'.$lencode, 0x80 + ($type * 4) + $lenbytes, $len).
+ $body;
+}
+
+
+# takes a Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum, returns it formatted as OpenPGP MPI
+# (RFC 4880 section 3.2)
+sub mpi_pack {
+ my $num = shift;
+
+ my $val = $num->to_bin();
+ my $mpilen = length($val)*8;
+
+# this is a kludgy way to get the number of significant bits in the
+# first byte:
+ my $bitsinfirstbyte = length(sprintf("%b", ord($val)));
+
+ $mpilen -= (8 - $bitsinfirstbyte);
+
+ return pack('n', $mpilen).$val;
+}
+
+# takes a Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum, returns an MPI packed in preparation
+# for an OpenSSH-style public key format. see:
+# http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=121866301718839&w=2
+sub openssh_mpi_pack {
+ my $num = shift;
+
+ my $val = $num->to_bin();
+ my $mpilen = length($val);
+
+ my $ret = pack('N', $mpilen);
+
+ # if the first bit of the leading byte is high, we should include a
+ # 0 byte:
+ if (ord($val) & 0x80) {
+ $ret = pack('NC', $mpilen+1, 0);
+ }
+
+ return $ret.$val;
+}
+
+sub openssh_pubkey_pack {
+ my $key = shift;
+
+ my ($modulus, $exponent) = $key->get_key_parameters();
+
+ return openssh_mpi_pack(Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin("ssh-rsa")).
+ openssh_mpi_pack($exponent).
+ openssh_mpi_pack($modulus);
+}
+
+# pull an OpenPGP-specified MPI off of a given stream, returning it as
+# a Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum.
+sub read_mpi {
+ my $instr = shift;
+ my $readtally = shift;
+
+ my $bitlen;
+ read($instr, $bitlen, 2) or die "could not read MPI length.\n";
+ $bitlen = unpack('n', $bitlen);
+ $$readtally += 2;
+
+ my $bytestoread = POSIX::floor(($bitlen + 7)/8);
+ my $ret;
+ read($instr, $ret, $bytestoread) or die "could not read MPI body.\n";
+ $$readtally += $bytestoread;
+ return Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($ret);
+}
+
+
+# FIXME: genericize these to accept either RSA or DSA keys:
+sub make_rsa_pub_key_body {
+ my $key = shift;
+ my $timestamp = shift;
+
+ my ($n, $e) = $key->get_key_parameters();
+
+ return
+ pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
+ pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
+ mpi_pack($n).
+ mpi_pack($e);
+}
+
+sub make_rsa_sec_key_body {
+ my $key = shift;
+ my $timestamp = shift;
+
+ # we're not using $a and $b, but we need them to get to $c.
+ my ($n, $e, $d, $p, $q) = $key->get_key_parameters();
+
+ my $c3 = modular_multi_inverse($p, $q);
+
+ my $secret_material = mpi_pack($d).
+ mpi_pack($p).
+ mpi_pack($q).
+ mpi_pack($c3);
+
+ # according to Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA, the closest value we can get out
+ # of get_key_parameters is 1/q mod p; but according to sec 5.5.3 of
+ # RFC 4880, we're actually looking for u, the multiplicative inverse
+ # of p, mod q. This is why we're calculating the value directly
+ # with modular_multi_inverse.
+
+ return
+ pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
+ pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
+ mpi_pack($n).
+ mpi_pack($e).
+ pack('C', 0). # seckey material is not encrypted -- see RFC 4880 sec 5.5.3
+ $secret_material.
+ pack('n', simple_checksum($secret_material));
+}
+
+# expects an RSA key (public or private) and a timestamp
+sub fingerprint {
+ my $key = shift;
+ my $timestamp = shift;
+
+ my $rsabody = make_rsa_pub_key_body($key, $timestamp);
+
+ return Digest::SHA1::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody);
+}
+
+
+# FIXME: handle DSA keys as well!
+sub pem2openpgp {
+ my $rsa = shift;
+ my $uid = shift;
+ my $args = shift;
+
+ $rsa->use_sha1_hash();
+
+ # see page 22 of RFC 4880 for why i think this is the right padding
+ # choice to use:
+ $rsa->use_pkcs1_padding();
+
+ if (! $rsa->check_key()) {
+ die "key does not check";
+ }
+
+ my $version = pack('C', 4);
+ # strong assertion of identity:
+ my $sigtype = pack('C', $sig_types->{positive_certification});
+ # RSA
+ my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa});
+ # SHA1
+ my $hash_algo = pack('C', $digests->{sha1});
+
+ # FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP
+ # certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run
+ # this script more than once against the same key (because the
+ # timestamps will differ). How can we prevent this?
+
+ # this environment variable (if set) overrides the current time, to
+ # be able to create a standard key? If we read the key from a file
+ # instead of stdin, should we use the creation time on the file?
+ my $timestamp = 0;
+ if (defined $args->{timestamp}) {
+ $timestamp = ($args->{timestamp} + 0);
+ } else {
+ $timestamp = time();
+ }
+
+ my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{sig_creation_time}, $timestamp);
+
+
+ my $flags = 0;
+ if (! defined $args->{usage_flags}) {
+ $flags = $usage_flags->{certify};
+ } else {
+ my @ff = split(",", $args->{usage_flags});
+ foreach my $f (@ff) {
+ if (! defined $usage_flags->{$f}) {
+ die "No such flag $f";
+ }
+ $flags |= $usage_flags->{$f};
+ }
+ }
+
+ my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{usage_flags}, $flags);
+
+
+ # how should we determine how far off to set the expiration date?
+ # default is no expiration. Specify the timestamp in seconds from the
+ # key creation.
+ my $expiration_packet = '';
+ if (defined $args->{expiration}) {
+ my $expires_in = $args->{expiration} + 0;
+ $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{key_expiration_time}, $expires_in);
+ }
+
+
+ # prefer AES-256, AES-192, AES-128, CAST5, 3DES:
+ my $pref_sym_algos = pack('CCCCCCC', 6, $subpacket_types->{preferred_cipher},
+ $ciphers->{aes256},
+ $ciphers->{aes192},
+ $ciphers->{aes128},
+ $ciphers->{cast5},
+ $ciphers->{tripledes}
+ );
+
+ # prefer SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPE-MD/160
+ my $pref_hash_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_digest},
+ $digests->{sha1},
+ $digests->{sha256},
+ $digests->{ripemd160}
+ );
+
+ # prefer ZLIB, BZip2, ZIP
+ my $pref_zip_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_compression},
+ $zips->{zlib},
+ $zips->{bzip2},
+ $zips->{zip}
+ );
+
+ # we support the MDC feature:
+ my $feature_subpacket = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{features},
+ $features->{mdc});
+
+ # keyserver preference: only owner modify (???):
+ my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{keyserver_prefs},
+ $keyserver_prefs->{nomodify});
+
+ my $subpackets_to_be_hashed =
+ $creation_time_packet.
+ $usage_packet.
+ $expiration_packet.
+ $pref_sym_algos.
+ $pref_hash_algos.
+ $pref_zip_algos.
+ $feature_subpacket.
+ $keyserver_pref;
+
+ my $subpacket_octets = pack('n', length($subpackets_to_be_hashed));
+
+ my $sig_data_to_be_hashed =
+ $version.
+ $sigtype.
+ $pubkey_algo.
+ $hash_algo.
+ $subpacket_octets.
+ $subpackets_to_be_hashed;
+
+ my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
+ my $seckey = make_rsa_sec_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
+
+ # this is for signing. it needs to be an old-style header with a
+ # 2-packet octet count.
+
+ my $key_data = make_packet($packet_types->{pubkey}, $pubkey, {'packet_length'=>2});
+
+ # take the last 8 bytes of the fingerprint as the keyid:
+ my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $timestamp), 20 - 8, 8);
+
+ # the v4 signature trailer is:
+
+ # version number, literal 0xff, and then a 4-byte count of the
+ # signature data itself.
+ my $trailer = pack('CCN', 4, 0xff, length($sig_data_to_be_hashed));
+
+ my $uid_data =
+ pack('CN', 0xb4, length($uid)).
+ $uid;
+
+ my $datatosign =
+ $key_data.
+ $uid_data.
+ $sig_data_to_be_hashed.
+ $trailer;
+
+ my $data_hash = Digest::SHA1::sha1_hex($datatosign);
+
+ my $issuer_packet = pack('CCa8', 9, $subpacket_types->{issuer}, $keyid);
+
+ my $sig = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($rsa->sign($datatosign));
+
+ my $sig_body =
+ $sig_data_to_be_hashed.
+ pack('n', length($issuer_packet)).
+ $issuer_packet.
+ pack('n', hex(substr($data_hash, 0, 4))).
+ mpi_pack($sig);
+
+ return
+ make_packet($packet_types->{seckey}, $seckey).
+ make_packet($packet_types->{uid}, $uid).
+ make_packet($packet_types->{sig}, $sig_body);
+}
+
+
+sub openpgp2ssh {
+ my $instr = shift;
+ my $fpr = shift;
+
+ if (defined $fpr) {
+ if (length($fpr) < 8) {
+ die "We need at least 8 hex digits of fingerprint.\n";
+ }
+ $fpr = uc($fpr);
+ }
+
+ my $packettag;
+ my $dummy;
+ my $tag;
+
+ my $key;
+
+ while (! eof($instr)) {
+ read($instr, $packettag, 1);
+ $packettag = ord($packettag);
+
+ my $packetlen;
+ if ( ! (0x80 & $packettag)) {
+ die "This is not an OpenPGP packet\n";
+ }
+ if (0x40 & $packettag) {
+ $tag = (0x3f & $packettag);
+ my $nextlen = 0;
+ read($instr, $nextlen, 1);
+ $nextlen = ord($nextlen);
+ if ($nextlen < 192) {
+ $packetlen = $nextlen;
+ } elsif ($nextlen < 224) {
+ my $newoct;
+ read($instr, $newoct, 1);
+ $newoct = ord($newoct);
+ $packetlen = (($nextlen - 192) << 8) + ($newoct) + 192;
+ } elsif ($nextlen == 255) {
+ read($instr, $nextlen, 4);
+ $packetlen = unpack('N', $nextlen);
+ } else {
+ # packet length is undefined.
+ }
+ } else {
+ my $lentype;
+ $lentype = 0x03 & $packettag;
+ $tag = ( 0x3c & $packettag ) >> 2;
+ if ($lentype == 0) {
+ read($instr, $packetlen, 1) or die "could not read packet length\n";
+ $packetlen = unpack('C', $packetlen);
+ } elsif ($lentype == 1) {
+ read($instr, $packetlen, 2) or die "could not read packet length\n";
+ $packetlen = unpack('n', $packetlen);
+ } elsif ($lentype == 2) {
+ read($instr, $packetlen, 4) or die "could not read packet length\n";
+ $packetlen = unpack('N', $packetlen);
+ } else {
+ # packet length is undefined.
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (! defined($packetlen)) {
+ die "Undefined packet lengths are not supported.\n";
+ }
+
+ if ($tag == $packet_types->{pubkey} ||
+ $tag == $packet_types->{pub_subkey} ||
+ $tag == $packet_types->{seckey} ||
+ $tag == $packet_types->{sec_subkey}) {
+ my $ver;
+ my $readbytes = 0;
+ read($instr, $ver, 1) or die "could not read key version\n";
+ $readbytes += 1;
+ $ver = ord($ver);
+
+ if ($ver != 4) {
+ printf(STDERR "We only work with version 4 keys. This key appears to be version %s.\n", $ver);
+ read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+ } else {
+
+ my $timestamp;
+ read($instr, $timestamp, 4) or die "could not read key timestamp.\n";
+ $readbytes += 4;
+ $timestamp = unpack('N', $timestamp);
+
+ my $algo;
+ read($instr, $algo, 1) or die "could not read key algorithm.\n";
+ $readbytes += 1;
+ $algo = ord($algo);
+ if ($algo != $asym_algos->{rsa}) {
+ printf(STDERR "We only support RSA keys (this key used algorithm %d).\n", $algo);
+ read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+ } else {
+ ## we have an RSA key.
+ my $modulus = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+ my $exponent = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+
+ my $pubkey = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_key_from_parameters($modulus, $exponent);
+ my $foundfpr = fingerprint($pubkey, $timestamp);
+
+ my $foundfprstr = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($foundfpr)->to_hex();
+
+ # is this a match?
+ if ((!defined($fpr)) ||
+ (substr($foundfprstr, -1 * length($fpr)) eq $fpr)) {
+ if (defined($key)) {
+ die "Found two matching keys.\n";
+ }
+ $key = $pubkey;
+ }
+
+ if ($tag == $packet_types->{seckey} ||
+ $tag == $packet_types->{sec_subkey}) {
+ if (!defined($key)) { # we don't think the public part of
+ # this key matches
+ read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+ } else {
+ my $s2k;
+ read($instr, $s2k, 1) or die "Could not read S2K octet.\n";
+ $readbytes += 1;
+ $s2k = ord($s2k);
+ if ($s2k == 0) {
+ # secret material is unencrypted
+ # see http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.3
+ my $d = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+ my $p = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+ my $q = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+ my $u = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+
+ my $checksum;
+ read($instr, $checksum, 2) or die "Could not read checksum of secret key material.\n";
+ $readbytes += 2;
+ $checksum = unpack('n', $checksum);
+
+ # FIXME: compare with the checksum! how? the data is
+ # gone into the Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum
+
+ $key = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_key_from_parameters($modulus,
+ $exponent,
+ $d,
+ $p,
+ $q);
+
+ $key->check_key() or die "Secret key is not a valid RSA key.\n";
+ } else {
+ print(STDERR "We cannot handle encrypted secret keys. Skipping!\n") ;
+ read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen) or die "Could not skip past this packet!\n";
+ }
+ }
+
+ return $key;
+}
+
+
+for (basename($0)) {
+ if (/^pem2openpgp$/) {
+ my $rsa;
+ my $stdin;
+
+ my $uid = shift;
+ defined($uid) or die "You must specify a user ID string.\n";
+
+ # FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID; or should we default to
+ # hostname_long() from Sys::Hostname::Long ?
+
+
+ if (defined $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_NEWKEY}) {
+ $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key($ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_NEWKEY});
+ } else {
+ $stdin = do {
+ local $/; # slurp!
+ <STDIN>;
+ };
+
+ $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($stdin);
+ }
+
+ print pem2openpgp($rsa,
+ $uid,
+ { timestamp => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_TIMESTAMP},
+ expiration => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_EXPIRATION},
+ usage_flags => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_USAGE_FLAGS},
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ elsif (/^openpgp2ssh$/) {
+ my $fpr = shift;
+ my $instream;
+ open($instream,'-');
+ binmode($instream, ":bytes");
+ my $key = openpgp2ssh($instream, $fpr);
+ if (defined($key)) {
+ if ($key->is_private()) {
+ print $key->get_private_key_string();
+ } else {
+ print "ssh-rsa ".encode_base64(openssh_pubkey_pack($key), '')."\n";
+ }
+ } else {
+ die "No matching key found.\n";
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ die "Unrecognized keytrans call.\n";
+ }
+}
+
diff --git a/src/share/m/subkey_to_ssh_agent b/src/share/m/subkey_to_ssh_agent
index 4ce14f8..aa647a6 100644
--- a/src/share/m/subkey_to_ssh_agent
+++ b/src/share/m/subkey_to_ssh_agent
@@ -26,14 +26,6 @@ subkey_to_ssh_agent() {
local publine
local kname
- if ! test_gnu_dummy_s2k_extension ; then
- failure "Your version of GnuTLS does not seem capable of using with gpg's exported subkeys.
-You may want to consider patching or upgrading to GnuTLS 2.6 or later.
-
-For more details, see:
- http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/gnutls-devel/2008-08/msg00005.html"
- fi
-
# if there's no agent running, don't bother:
if [ -z "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] || ! which ssh-add >/dev/null ; then
failure "No ssh-agent available."
@@ -45,26 +37,34 @@ For more details, see:
if [ "$sshaddresponse" = "2" ]; then
failure "Could not connect to ssh-agent"
fi
-
- # get list of secret keys (to work around bug
- # https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue945):
- secretkeys=$(gpg_user --list-secret-keys --with-colons --fixed-list-mode \
- --fingerprint | \
- grep '^fpr:' | cut -f10 -d: | awk '{ print "0x" $1 "!" }')
-
- if [ -z "$secretkeys" ]; then
- failure "You have no secret keys in your keyring!
+
+ # if the MONKEYSPHERE_SUBKEYS_FOR_AGENT variable is set, use the
+ # keys specified there
+ if [ "$MONKEYSPHERE_SUBKEYS_FOR_AGENT" ] ; then
+ authsubkeys="$MONKEYSPHERE_SUBKEYS_FOR_AGENT"
+
+ # otherwise find all authentication-capable subkeys and use those
+ else
+ # get list of secret keys
+ # (to work around bug https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue945):
+ secretkeys=$(gpg_user --list-secret-keys --with-colons --fixed-list-mode \
+ --fingerprint | \
+ grep '^fpr:' | cut -f10 -d: | awk '{ print "0x" $1 "!" }')
+
+ if [ -z "$secretkeys" ]; then
+ failure "You have no secret keys in your keyring!
You might want to run 'gpg --gen-key'."
- fi
+ fi
- authsubkeys=$(gpg_user --list-secret-keys --with-colons --fixed-list-mode \
- --fingerprint --fingerprint $secretkeys | \
- cut -f1,5,10,12 -d: | grep -A1 '^ssb:[^:]*::[^:]*a[^:]*$' | \
- grep '^fpr::' | cut -f3 -d: | sort -u)
-
- if [ -z "$authsubkeys" ]; then
- failure "no authentication-capable subkeys available.
-You might want to 'monkeysphere gen-subkey'"
+ authsubkeys=$(gpg_user --list-secret-keys --with-colons --fixed-list-mode \
+ --fingerprint --fingerprint $secretkeys | \
+ cut -f1,5,10,12 -d: | grep -A1 '^ssb:[^:]*::[^:]*a[^:]*$' | \
+ grep '^fpr::' | cut -f3 -d: | sort -u)
+
+ if [ -z "$authsubkeys" ]; then
+ failure "no authentication-capable subkeys available.
+You might want to run 'monkeysphere gen-subkey'."
+ fi
fi
workingdir=$(msmktempdir)
@@ -76,7 +76,16 @@ You might want to 'monkeysphere gen-subkey'"
# through to ssh-add. should we limit it to known ones? For
# example: -d or -c and/or -t <lifetime>
- for subkey in $authsubkeys; do
+ for subkey in $authsubkeys; do
+ # test that the subkey has proper capability
+ capability=$(gpg_user --list-secret-keys --with-colons --fixed-list-mode \
+ --fingerprint --fingerprint "0x${subkey}!" \
+ | egrep -B 1 "^fpr:::::::::${subkey}:$" | grep "^ssb:" | cut -d: -f12)
+ if ! check_capability "$capability" 'a' ; then
+ log error "Did not find authentication-capable subkey with key ID '$subkey'."
+ continue
+ fi
+
# choose a label by which this key will be known in the agent:
# we are labelling the key by User ID instead of by
# fingerprint, but filtering out all / characters to make sure
diff --git a/src/share/ma/add_certifier b/src/share/ma/add_certifier
index 6f85ecf..544a3f0 100644
--- a/src/share/ma/add_certifier
+++ b/src/share/ma/add_certifier
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ if [ -f "$keyID" -o "$keyID" = '-' ] ; then
fi
# load the key
- gpg_sphere "--import" <"$keyID" \
+ gpg_sphere "--import" <"$keyID" 2>/dev/null \
|| failure "could not read key from '$keyID'"
# else, get the key from the keyserver
diff --git a/src/share/ma/diagnostics b/src/share/ma/diagnostics
index 8fc4b31..8eca586 100644
--- a/src/share/ma/diagnostics
+++ b/src/share/ma/diagnostics
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ fi
# make sure that at least one identity certifier exists
echo
echo "Checking for Identity Certifiers..."
-if ! monkeysphere-authentication list-identity-certifiers | egrep -q '^[A-F0-9]{40}:' then
+if ! ( monkeysphere-authentication list-identity-certifiers | egrep '^[A-F0-9]{40}:' >/dev/null ) ; then
echo "! No Identity Certifiers found!"
echo " - Recommendation: once you know who should be able to certify the identities of
connecting users, you should add their key, with:
diff --git a/src/share/ma/setup b/src/share/ma/setup
index e77afff..b453f3c 100644
--- a/src/share/ma/setup
+++ b/src/share/ma/setup
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ EOF
if [ -z "$CORE_FPR" ] ; then
log info "setting up Monkeysphere authentication trust core..."
- local CORE_UID=$(printf "Monkeysphere authentication trust core UID (random string: %s)" $(head -c21 </dev/urandom | base64))
+ local CORE_UID=$(printf "Monkeysphere authentication trust core UID (random string: %s)" $(head -c21 </dev/urandom | perl -MMIME::Base64 -ne 'print encode_base64($_)'))
log debug "generating monkeysphere authentication trust core key ($CORE_KEYLENGTH bits)..."
PEM2OPENPGP_USAGE_FLAGS=certify \
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ EOF
# ensure that the authentication sphere checker has absolute ownertrust on the expected key.
log debug "setting ultimate owner trust on core key in gpg_sphere..."
- printf "%s:6:\n" "$CORE_FPR" | gpg_sphere "--import-ownertrust"
+ printf "%s:6:\n" "$CORE_FPR" | gpg_sphere "--import-ownertrust" 2>&1 | log verbose
gpg_sphere "--export-ownertrust" 2>&1 | log debug
# check the owner trust
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ EOF
# our preferences are reasonable (i.e. 3 marginal OR 1 fully
# trusted certifications are sufficient to grant full validity.
log debug "checking trust model for authentication ..."
- local TRUST_MODEL=$(gpg_sphere "--with-colons --fixed-list-mode --list-keys" \
+ local TRUST_MODEL=$(gpg_sphere "--with-colons --fixed-list-mode --list-keys" 2>/dev/null \
| head -n1 | grep "^tru:" | cut -d: -f3,6,7)
log debug "sphere trust model: $TRUST_MODEL"
if [ "$TRUST_MODEL" != '1:3:1' ] ; then
diff --git a/src/share/ma/update_users b/src/share/ma/update_users
index bfefc31..3a5c006 100644
--- a/src/share/ma/update_users
+++ b/src/share/ma/update_users
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
update_users() {
+local returnCode=0
local unames
local uname
local authorizedKeysDir
@@ -26,8 +27,6 @@ else
unames=$(getent passwd | cut -d: -f1)
fi
-RETURN=0
-
# set mode
MODE="authorized_keys"
@@ -81,6 +80,7 @@ for uname in $unames ; do
# translating ssh-style path variables
authorizedUserIDs=$(translate_ssh_variables "$uname" "$AUTHORIZED_USER_IDS")
if [ -s "$authorizedUserIDs" ] ; then
+ log debug "authorized_user_ids file found."
# check permissions on the authorized_user_ids file path
if check_key_file_permissions "$uname" "$authorizedUserIDs" ; then
# copy user authorized_user_ids file to temporary
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ for uname in $unames ; do
# process authorized_user_ids file, as monkeysphere user
su_monkeysphere_user \
". ${SYSSHAREDIR}/common; process_authorized_user_ids $TMP_AUTHORIZED_USER_IDS" \
- || RETURN="$?"
+ || returnCode="$?"
else
log debug "not processing authorized_user_ids."
fi
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ for uname in $unames ; do
log error "Failed to install authorized_keys for '$uname'!"
rm -f "${authorizedKeysDir}/${uname}"
# indicate that there has been a failure:
- RETURN=1
+ returnCode=1
}
else
rm -f "${authorizedKeysDir}/${uname}"
@@ -154,5 +154,5 @@ for uname in $unames ; do
rm -rf "$TMPLOC"
done
-return $RETURN
+return $returnCode
}
diff --git a/src/share/mh/diagnostics b/src/share/mh/diagnostics
index 2f65f89..3746020 100644
--- a/src/share/mh/diagnostics
+++ b/src/share/mh/diagnostics
@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ else
if [ "$expire" ]; then
if (( "$expire" < "$curdate" )); then
echo "! Host key is expired."
- echo " - Recommendation: extend lifetime of key with 'monkeysphere-host extend-key'"
+ echo " - Recommendation: extend lifetime of key with 'monkeysphere-host set-expire'"
problemsfound=$(($problemsfound+1))
elif (( "$expire" < "$warndate" )); then
echo "! Host key expires in less than $warnwindow:" $(advance_date $(( $expire - $curdate )) seconds +%F)
- echo " - Recommendation: extend lifetime of key with 'monkeysphere-host extend-key'"
+ echo " - Recommendation: extend lifetime of key with 'monkeysphere-host set-expire'"
problemsfound=$(($problemsfound+1))
fi
fi
diff --git a/src/transitions/0.23 b/src/transitions/0.23
index f09dfff..3964558 100755
--- a/src/transitions/0.23
+++ b/src/transitions/0.23
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
set -e
SYSDATADIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSDATADIR:-"/var/lib/monkeysphere"}
+SYSCONFIGDIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSCONFIGDIR:-"/etc/monkeysphere"}
MADATADIR="${SYSDATADIR}/authentication"
MHDATADIR="${SYSDATADIR}/host"
@@ -43,6 +44,13 @@ is_domain_name() {
printf "%s" "$1" | egrep -q '^[[:alnum:]][[:alnum:]-.]*[[:alnum:]]$'
}
+
+# move the old server conf file to be the authentication conf file
+if [ -f "$SYSCONFIGDIR"/monkeysphere-server.conf -a \
+ ! -f "$SYSCONFIGDIR"/monkeysphere-authentication.conf ] ; then
+ mv "$SYSCONFIGDIR"/monkeysphere-server.conf "$SYSCONFIGDIR"/monkeysphere-authentication.conf
+fi
+
# run the authentication setup (this is also the first chance to bail
# if 0.23 is not fully-installed, because m-a did not exist before
# 0.23)
@@ -63,7 +71,7 @@ if [ -d "$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host ] ; then
# get the old host keygrip (don't know why there would be more
# than one, but we'll transfer all tsigs made by any key that
# had been given ultimate ownertrust):
- for authgrip in $(GNUPGHOME="$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host gpg --no-permission-warning --export-ownertrust | \
+ for authgrip in $(GNUPGHOME="$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host gpg --quiet --no-tty --no-permission-warning --export-ownertrust | \
grep ':6:$' | \
sed -r 's/^[A-F0-9]{24}([A-F0-9]{16}):6:$/\1/') ; do
@@ -79,7 +87,7 @@ if [ -d "$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host ] ; then
# one of those certifications (even if later
# certifications had different parameters).
- GNUPGHOME="$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host gpg --no-permission-warning --fingerprint --with-colons --fixed-list-mode --check-sigs | \
+ GNUPGHOME="$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host gpg --quiet --no-tty --no-permission-warning --fingerprint --with-colons --fixed-list-mode --check-sigs | \
cut -f 1,2,5,8,9,10 -d: | \
egrep '^(fpr:::::|sig:!:'"$authgrip"':[[:digit:]]+ [[:digit:]]+:)' | \
while IFS=: read -r type validity grip trustparams trustdomain fpr ; do
@@ -121,7 +129,7 @@ if [ -d "$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host ] ; then
CERTKEY=$(mktemp ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/mstransition.XXXXXXXX)
log "Adding identity certifier with fingerprint %s\n" "$keyfpr"
- GNUPGHOME="$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host gpg --no-permission-warning --export "0x$keyfpr" --export-options export-clean >"$CERTKEY"
+ GNUPGHOME="$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host gpg --quiet --no-tty --no-permission-warning --export "0x$keyfpr" --export-options export-clean >"$CERTKEY"
MONKEYSPHERE_PROMPT=false monkeysphere-authentication add-identity-certifier $finaldomain --trust "$truststring" --depth "$trustdepth" "$CERTKEY"
rm -f "$CERTKEY"
# clear the fingerprint so that we don't
@@ -141,16 +149,39 @@ if [ -d "$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host ] ; then
log "Not transferring host key info because host directory already exists.\n"
else
if [ -s "$SYSDATADIR"/ssh_host_rsa_key ] || \
- GNUPGHOME="$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host gpg --no-permission-warning --with-colons --list-secret-keys | grep -q '^sec:' ; then
+ GNUPGHOME="$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host gpg --quiet --no-tty --no-permission-warning --with-colons --list-secret-keys | grep -q '^sec:' ; then
+
+ FPR=$(GNUPGHOME="$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host gpg --quiet --no-tty --no-permission-warning --with-colons --fixed-list-mode --list-secret-keys --fingerprint | awk -F: '/^fpr:/{ print $10 }' )
# create host home
- mkdir -p "${MHDATADIR}"
- chmod 0700 "${MHDATADIR}"
+ mkdir -p $(dirname "$MHDATADIR")
+ NEWDATADIR=$(mktemp -d "${MHDATADIR}.XXXXXX")
+ chmod 0700 "${NEWDATADIR}"
log "importing host key from old monkeysphere installation\n"
- GNUPGHOME="$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host gpg --no-permission-warning --export-secret-keys | \
- GNUPGHOME="$MHDATADIR" gpg --quiet --no-tty --import
+
+# export from the pubring as well as the that new (non-expired)
+# self-sigs are available, otherwise the secret key import may fail
+
+# FIXME: turns out the secret key import fails anyway, stupidly :(
+
+# FIXME: if all self-sigs are expired, then the secret key import may
+# fail anyway. How should we deal with that?
+ if (GNUPGHOME="$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host gpg --quiet --no-tty --no-permission-warning --export-secret-keys && \
+ GNUPGHOME="$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host gpg --quiet --no-tty --no-permission-warning --export "$FPR") | \
+ GNUPGHOME="$NEWDATADIR" gpg --quiet --no-tty --import ; then
+ : we are in good shape!
+ else
+ if ! GNUPGHOME="$NEWDATADIR" gpg --quiet --no-tty --list-secret-key >/dev/null ; then
+ log "The old host key (%s) was not imported properly.\n" "$FPR"
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ fi
+
+ # if we get here cleanly, then we're OK to move forward:
+ mv "$NEWDATADIR" "$MHDATADIR"
+
monkeysphere-host update-gpg-pub-file
else
log "No host key found in old monkeysphere install; not importing any host key.\n"
@@ -162,7 +193,7 @@ if [ -d "$SYSDATADIR"/gnupg-host ] ; then
mkdir -p "$STASHDIR"
chmod 0700 "$STASHDIR"
- mv "${SYSDATADIR}/gnupg-host" "$STASHDIR"
+ mv "${SYSDATADIR}/gnupg-host" "$STASHDIR"/gnupg-host.$(date '+%F_%T%z')
fi
@@ -171,10 +202,12 @@ fi
# the new authentication keyring.
if [ -d "${SYSDATADIR}/gnupg-authentication" ] ; then
- GNUPGHOME="${SYSDATADIR}/gnupg-authentication" gpg --no-permission-warning --export | \
- monkeysphere-authentication gpg-cmd --import
+ GNUPGHOME="${SYSDATADIR}/gnupg-authentication" \
+ gpg --quiet --no-tty --no-permission-warning --export 2>/dev/null | \
+ monkeysphere-authentication gpg-cmd --import 2>/dev/null || \
+ log "No OpenPGP certificates imported into monkeysphere-authentication trust sphere.\n"
mkdir -p "$STASHDIR"
chmod 0700 "$STASHDIR"
- mv "${SYSDATADIR}/gnupg-authentication" "$STASHDIR"
+ mv "${SYSDATADIR}/gnupg-authentication" "$STASHDIR"/gnupg-authentication.$(date '+%F_%T%z')
fi
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-01-14 22:20:48 +0000