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-rw-r--r--src/share/common124
-rw-r--r--src/share/defaultenv29
-rwxr-xr-xsrc/share/keytrans802
-rw-r--r--src/share/m/subkey_to_ssh_agent63
-rw-r--r--src/share/ma/add_certifier2
-rw-r--r--src/share/ma/diagnostics2
-rw-r--r--src/share/ma/setup6
-rw-r--r--src/share/ma/update_users10
-rw-r--r--src/share/mh/diagnostics4
9 files changed, 913 insertions, 129 deletions
diff --git a/src/share/common b/src/share/common
index 5e0cb6a..ea872ba 100644
--- a/src/share/common
+++ b/src/share/common
@@ -14,33 +14,13 @@
# file) and are considered global
########################################################################
-### COMMON VARIABLES
-
-# managed directories
-SYSCONFIGDIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSCONFIGDIR:-"/etc/monkeysphere"}
-export SYSCONFIGDIR
-
-# monkeysphere version
-VERSION=0.23~pre
-
-# default log level
-LOG_LEVEL="INFO"
-
-# default keyserver
-KEYSERVER="pool.sks-keyservers.net"
-
-# whether or not to check keyservers by defaul
-CHECK_KEYSERVER="true"
-
-# default monkeysphere user
-MONKEYSPHERE_USER="monkeysphere"
-
-# default about whether or not to prompt
-PROMPT="true"
-
-########################################################################
### UTILITY FUNCTIONS
+# output version info
+version() {
+ cat "${SYSSHAREDIR}/VERSION"
+}
+
# failure function. exits with code 255, unless specified otherwise.
failure() {
[ "$1" ] && echo "$1" >&2
@@ -96,11 +76,10 @@ log() {
fi
if [ "$priority" = "$level" -a "$output" = 'true' ] ; then
if [ "$1" ] ; then
- echo -n "ms: " >&2
- echo "$@" >&2
+ echo "$@"
else
- cat >&2
- fi
+ cat
+ fi | sed 's/^/'"${LOG_PREFIX}"'/' >&2
fi
done
}
@@ -334,52 +313,6 @@ passphrase_prompt() {
fi
}
-test_gnu_dummy_s2k_extension() {
-
-# this block contains a demonstration private key that has had the
-# primary key stripped out using the GNU S2K extension known as
-# "gnu-dummy" (see /usr/share/doc/gnupg/DETAILS.gz). The subkey is
-# present in cleartext, however.
-
-# openpgp2ssh will be able to deal with this based on whether the
-# local copy of GnuTLS contains read_s2k support that can handle it.
-
-# read up on that here:
-
-# http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/gnutls-devel/2008-08/msg00005.html
-
-echo "
------BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
-Version: GnuPG v1.4.9 (GNU/Linux)
-
-lQCVBEO3YdABBACRqqEnucag4+vyZny2M67Pai5+5suIRRvY+Ly8Ms5MvgCi3EVV
-xT05O/+0ShiRaf+QicCOFrhbU9PZzzU+seEvkeW2UCu4dQfILkmj+HBEIltGnHr3
-G0yegHj5pnqrcezERURf2e17gGFWX91cXB9Cm721FPXczuKraphKwCA9PwARAQAB
-/gNlAkdOVQG0OURlbW9uc3RyYXRpb24gS2V5IGZvciBTMksgR05VIGV4dGVuc2lv
-biAxMDAxIC0tIGdudS1kdW1teYi8BBMBAgAmBQJDt2HQAhsDBQkB4TOABgsJCAcD
-AgQVAggDBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQQZUwSa4UDezTOQP/TMQXUVrWzHYZGopoPZ2+
-ZS3qddiznBHsgb7MGYg1KlTiVJSroDUBCHIUJvdQKZV9zrzrFl47D07x6hGyUPHV
-aZXvuITW8t1o5MMHkCy3pmJ2KgfDvdUxrBvLfgPMICA4c6zA0mWquee43syEW9NY
-g3q61iPlQwD1J1kX1wlimLCdAdgEQ7dh0AEEANAwa63zlQbuy1Meliy8otwiOa+a
-mH6pxxUgUNggjyjO5qx+rl25mMjvGIRX4/L1QwIBXJBVi3SgvJW1COZxZqBYqj9U
-8HVT07mWKFEDf0rZLeUE2jTm16cF9fcW4DQhW+sfYm+hi2sY3HeMuwlUBK9KHfW2
-+bGeDzVZ4pqfUEudABEBAAEAA/0bemib+wxub9IyVFUp7nPobjQC83qxLSNzrGI/
-RHzgu/5CQi4tfLOnwbcQsLELfker2hYnjsLrT9PURqK4F7udrWEoZ1I1LymOtLG/
-4tNZ7Mnul3wRC2tCn7FKx8sGJwGh/3li8vZ6ALVJAyOia5TZ/buX0+QZzt6+hPKk
-7MU1WQIA4bUBjtrsqDwro94DvPj3/jBnMZbXr6WZIItLNeVDUcM8oHL807Am97K1
-ueO/f6v1sGAHG6lVPTmtekqPSTWBfwIA7CGFvEyvSALfB8NUa6jtk27NCiw0csql
-kuhCmwXGMVOiryKEfegkIahf2bAd/gnWHPrpWp7bUE20v8YoW22I4wIAhnm5Wr5Q
-Sy7EHDUxmJm5TzadFp9gq08qNzHBpXSYXXJ3JuWcL1/awUqp3tE1I6zZ0hZ38Ia6
-SdBMN88idnhDPqPoiKUEGAECAA8FAkO3YdACGyAFCQHhM4AACgkQQZUwSa4UDezm
-vQP/ZhK+2ly9oI2z7ZcNC/BJRch0/ybQ3haahII8pXXmOThpZohr/LUgoWgCZdXg
-vP6yiszNk2tIs8KphCAw7Lw/qzDC2hEORjWO4f46qk73RAgSqG/GyzI4ltWiDhqn
-vnQCFl3+QFSe4zinqykHnLwGPMXv428d/ZjkIc2ju8dRsn4=
-=CR5w
------END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
-" | openpgp2ssh 4129E89D17C1D591 >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
-
-}
-
# remove all lines with specified string from specified file
remove_line() {
local file
@@ -420,12 +353,15 @@ remove_monkeysphere_lines() {
file="$1"
- if [ -z "$file" ] ; then
+ # return error if file does not exist
+ if [ ! -e "$file" ] ; then
return 1
fi
- if [ ! -e "$file" ] ; then
- return 1
+ # just return ok if the file is empty, since there aren't any
+ # lines to remove
+ if [ ! -s "$file" ] ; then
+ return 0
fi
tempfile=$(mktemp "${file}.XXXXXXX") || \
@@ -493,18 +429,21 @@ check_key_file_permissions() {
# return 1 if path has invalid owner
if [ "$owner" != "$uname" -a "$owner" != 'root' ] ; then
- log error "improper ownership on path '$path'."
+ log error "improper ownership on path '$path':"
+ log error " $owner != ($uname|root)"
return 1
fi
# return 2 if path has group or other writability
if is_write "$gAccess" || is_write "$oAccess" ; then
- log error "improper group or other writability on path '$path'."
+ log error "improper group or other writability on path '$path':"
+ log error " group: $gAccess, other: $oAcess"
return 2
fi
# return zero if all clear, or go to next path
if [ "$path" = '/' ] ; then
+ log debug "path ok."
return 0
else
check_key_file_permissions "$uname" $(dirname "$path")
@@ -732,14 +671,14 @@ process_user_id() {
if [ "$keyOK" -a "$uidOK" -a "$lastKeyOK" ] ; then
log verbose " * acceptable primary key."
if [ -z "$sshKey" ] ; then
- log error " ! primary key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
+ log error " ! primary key could not be translated (not RSA?)."
else
echo "0:${sshKey}"
fi
else
log debug " - unacceptable primary key."
if [ -z "$sshKey" ] ; then
- log debug " ! primary key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
+ log debug " ! primary key could not be translated (not RSA?)."
else
echo "1:${sshKey}"
fi
@@ -790,14 +729,14 @@ process_user_id() {
if [ "$keyOK" -a "$uidOK" -a "$lastKeyOK" ] ; then
log verbose " * acceptable sub key."
if [ -z "$sshKey" ] ; then
- log error " ! sub key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
+ log error " ! sub key could not be translated (not RSA?)."
else
echo "0:${sshKey}"
fi
else
log debug " - unacceptable sub key."
if [ -z "$sshKey" ] ; then
- log debug " ! sub key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
+ log debug " ! sub key could not be translated (not RSA?)."
else
echo "1:${sshKey}"
fi
@@ -909,7 +848,7 @@ update_known_hosts() {
(umask 0022 && touch "$KNOWN_HOSTS")
# check permissions on the known_hosts file path
- check_key_file_permissions "$USER" "$KNOWN_HOSTS" || failure
+ check_key_file_permissions $(whoami) "$KNOWN_HOSTS" || failure
# create a lockfile on known_hosts:
lock create "$KNOWN_HOSTS"
@@ -970,7 +909,8 @@ process_known_hosts() {
failure "known_hosts file '$KNOWN_HOSTS' does not exist."
fi
- log debug "processing known_hosts file..."
+ log debug "processing known_hosts file:"
+ log debug " $KNOWN_HOSTS"
hosts=$(meat "$KNOWN_HOSTS" | cut -d ' ' -f 1 | grep -v '^|.*$' | tr , ' ' | tr '\n' ' ')
@@ -1058,8 +998,11 @@ update_authorized_keys() {
nIDsOK=0
nIDsBAD=0
+ log debug "updating authorized_keys file:"
+ log debug " $AUTHORIZED_KEYS"
+
# check permissions on the authorized_keys file path
- check_key_file_permissions "$USER" "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS" || failure
+ check_key_file_permissions $(whoami) "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS" || failure
# create a lockfile on authorized_keys
lock create "$AUTHORIZED_KEYS"
@@ -1131,10 +1074,11 @@ process_authorized_user_ids() {
failure "authorized_user_ids file '$authorizedUserIDs' does not exist."
fi
- # check permissions on the authorized_user_ids file path
- check_key_file_permissions "$USER" "$authorizedUserIDs" || failure
+ log debug "processing authorized_user_ids file:"
+ log debug " $authorizedUserIDs"
- log debug "processing authorized_user_ids file..."
+ # check permissions on the authorized_user_ids file path
+ check_key_file_permissions $(whoami) "$authorizedUserIDs" || failure
if ! meat "$authorizedUserIDs" > /dev/null ; then
log debug " no user IDs to process."
diff --git a/src/share/defaultenv b/src/share/defaultenv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b54a518
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/share/defaultenv
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# -*-shell-script-*-
+# This should be sourced by bash (though we welcome changes to make it POSIX sh compliant)
+
+# Shared sh variables for the monkeysphere
+#
+# Written by
+# Jameson Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>
+#
+# Copyright 2009, released under the GPL, version 3 or later
+
+# managed directories
+SYSCONFIGDIR=${MONKEYSPHERE_SYSCONFIGDIR:-"/etc/monkeysphere"}
+export SYSCONFIGDIR
+
+# default log level
+LOG_LEVEL="INFO"
+
+# default keyserver
+KEYSERVER="pool.sks-keyservers.net"
+
+# whether or not to check keyservers by defaul
+CHECK_KEYSERVER="true"
+
+# default monkeysphere user
+MONKEYSPHERE_USER="monkeysphere"
+
+# default about whether or not to prompt
+PROMPT="true"
+
diff --git a/src/share/keytrans b/src/share/keytrans
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..8b2e2ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/share/keytrans
@@ -0,0 +1,802 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl -w -T
+
+# keytrans: this is an RSA key translation utility; it is capable of
+# transforming RSA keys (both public keys and secret keys) between
+# several popular representations, including OpenPGP, PEM-encoded
+# PKCS#1 DER, and OpenSSH-style public key lines.
+
+# How it behaves depends on the name under which it is invoked. The
+# two implementations currently are: pem2openpgp and openpgp2ssh.
+
+
+
+# pem2openpgp: take a PEM-encoded RSA private-key on standard input, a
+# User ID as the first argument, and generate an OpenPGP secret key
+# and certificate from it.
+
+# WARNING: the secret key material *will* appear on stdout (albeit in
+# OpenPGP form) -- if you redirect stdout to a file, make sure the
+# permissions on that file are appropriately locked down!
+
+# Usage:
+
+# pem2openpgp 'ssh://'$(hostname -f) < /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key | gpg --import
+
+
+
+
+# openpgp2ssh: take a stream of OpenPGP packets containing public or
+# secret key material on standard input, and a Key ID (or fingerprint)
+# as the first argument. Find the matching key in the input stream,
+# and emit it on stdout in an OpenSSH-compatible format. If the input
+# key is an OpenPGP public key (either primary or subkey), the output
+# will be an OpenSSH single-line public key. If the input key is an
+# OpenPGP secret key, the output will be a PEM-encoded RSA key.
+
+# Example usage:
+
+# gpg --export-secret-subkeys --export-options export-reset-subkey-passwd $KEYID | \
+# openpgp2ssh $KEYID | ssh-add /dev/stdin
+
+
+# Authors:
+# Jameson Rollins <jrollins@finestructure.net>
+# Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
+
+# Started on: 2009-01-07 02:01:19-0500
+
+# License: GPL v3 or later (we may need to adjust this given that this
+# connects to OpenSSL via perl)
+
+use strict;
+use warnings;
+use File::Basename;
+use Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA;
+use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum;
+use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX;
+use Digest::SHA1;
+use MIME::Base64;
+use POSIX;
+
+## make sure all length() and substr() calls use bytes only:
+use bytes;
+
+my $old_format_packet_lengths = { one => 0,
+ two => 1,
+ four => 2,
+ indeterminate => 3,
+};
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.1 (ignoring deprecated algorithms for now)
+my $asym_algos = { rsa => 1,
+ elgamal => 16,
+ dsa => 17,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.2
+my $ciphers = { plaintext => 0,
+ idea => 1,
+ tripledes => 2,
+ cast5 => 3,
+ blowfish => 4,
+ aes128 => 7,
+ aes192 => 8,
+ aes256 => 9,
+ twofish => 10,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.3
+my $zips = { uncompressed => 0,
+ zip => 1,
+ zlib => 2,
+ bzip2 => 3,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.4
+my $digests = { md5 => 1,
+ sha1 => 2,
+ ripemd160 => 3,
+ sha256 => 8,
+ sha384 => 9,
+ sha512 => 10,
+ sha224 => 11,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.21
+my $usage_flags = { certify => 0x01,
+ sign => 0x02,
+ encrypt_comms => 0x04,
+ encrypt_storage => 0x08,
+ encrypt => 0x0c, ## both comms and storage
+ split => 0x10, # the private key is split via secret sharing
+ authenticate => 0x20,
+ shared => 0x80, # more than one person holds the entire private key
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 4.3
+my $packet_types = { pubkey_enc_session => 1,
+ sig => 2,
+ symkey_enc_session => 3,
+ onepass_sig => 4,
+ seckey => 5,
+ pubkey => 6,
+ sec_subkey => 7,
+ compressed_data => 8,
+ symenc_data => 9,
+ marker => 10,
+ literal => 11,
+ trust => 12,
+ uid => 13,
+ pub_subkey => 14,
+ uat => 17,
+ symenc_w_integrity => 18,
+ mdc => 19,
+ };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.1
+my $sig_types = { binary_doc => 0x00,
+ text_doc => 0x01,
+ standalone => 0x02,
+ generic_certification => 0x10,
+ persona_certification => 0x11,
+ casual_certification => 0x12,
+ positive_certification => 0x13,
+ subkey_binding => 0x18,
+ primary_key_binding => 0x19,
+ key_signature => 0x1f,
+ key_revocation => 0x20,
+ subkey_revocation => 0x28,
+ certification_revocation => 0x30,
+ timestamp => 0x40,
+ thirdparty => 0x50,
+ };
+
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.1
+my $subpacket_types = { sig_creation_time => 2,
+ sig_expiration_time => 3,
+ exportable => 4,
+ trust_sig => 5,
+ regex => 6,
+ revocable => 7,
+ key_expiration_time => 9,
+ preferred_cipher => 11,
+ revocation_key => 12,
+ issuer => 16,
+ notation => 20,
+ preferred_digest => 21,
+ preferred_compression => 22,
+ keyserver_prefs => 23,
+ preferred_keyserver => 24,
+ primary_uid => 25,
+ policy_uri => 26,
+ usage_flags => 27,
+ signers_uid => 28,
+ revocation_reason => 29,
+ features => 30,
+ signature_target => 31,
+ embedded_signature => 32,
+ };
+
+# bitstring (see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.24)
+my $features = { mdc => 0x01
+ };
+
+# bitstring (see RFC 4880 5.2.3.17)
+my $keyserver_prefs = { nomodify => 0x80
+ };
+
+###### end lookup tables ######
+
+# FIXME: if we want to be able to interpret openpgp data as well as
+# produce it, we need to produce key/value-swapped lookup tables as well.
+
+
+########### Math/Utility Functions ##############
+
+
+# see the bottom of page 43 of RFC 4880
+sub simple_checksum {
+ my $bytes = shift;
+
+ return unpack("%32W*",$bytes) % 65536;
+}
+
+# calculate the multiplicative inverse of a mod b this is euclid's
+# extended algorithm. For more information see:
+# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Euclidean_algorithm the
+# arguments here should be Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum objects. $a should
+# be the larger of the two values, and the two values should be
+# coprime.
+
+sub modular_multi_inverse {
+ my $a = shift;
+ my $b = shift;
+
+
+ my $origdivisor = $b->copy();
+
+ my $ctx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX->new();
+ my $x = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero();
+ my $y = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one();
+ my $lastx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one();
+ my $lasty = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero();
+
+ my $finalquotient;
+ my $finalremainder;
+
+ while (! $b->is_zero()) {
+ my ($quotient, $remainder) = $a->div($b, $ctx);
+
+ $a = $b;
+ $b = $remainder;
+
+ my $temp = $x;
+ $x = $lastx->sub($quotient->mul($x, $ctx));
+ $lastx = $temp;
+
+ $temp = $y;
+ $y = $lasty->sub($quotient->mul($y, $ctx));
+ $lasty = $temp;
+ }
+
+ if (!$a->is_one()) {
+ die "did this math wrong.\n";
+ }
+
+ # let's make sure that we return a positive value because RFC 4880,
+ # section 3.2 only allows unsigned values:
+
+ ($finalquotient, $finalremainder) = $lastx->add($origdivisor)->div($origdivisor, $ctx);
+
+ return $finalremainder;
+}
+
+
+############ OpenPGP formatting functions ############
+
+# make an old-style packet out of the given packet type and body.
+# old-style (see RFC 4880 section 4.2)
+sub make_packet {
+ my $type = shift;
+ my $body = shift;
+ my $options = shift;
+
+ my $len = length($body);
+ my $pseudolen = $len;
+
+ # if the caller wants to use at least N octets of packet length,
+ # pretend that we're using that many.
+ if (defined $options && defined $options->{'packet_length'}) {
+ $pseudolen = 2**($options->{'packet_length'} * 8) - 1;
+ }
+ if ($pseudolen < $len) {
+ $pseudolen = $len;
+ }
+
+ my $lenbytes;
+ my $lencode;
+
+ if ($pseudolen < 2**8) {
+ $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{one};
+ $lencode = 'C';
+ } elsif ($pseudolen < 2**16) {
+ $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{two};
+ $lencode = 'n';
+ } elsif ($pseudolen < 2**31) {
+ ## not testing against full 32 bits because i don't want to deal
+ ## with potential overflow.
+ $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{four};
+ $lencode = 'N';
+ } else {
+ ## what the hell do we do here?
+ $lenbytes = $old_format_packet_lengths->{indeterminate};
+ $lencode = '';
+ }
+
+ return pack('C'.$lencode, 0x80 + ($type * 4) + $lenbytes, $len).
+ $body;
+}
+
+
+# takes a Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum, returns it formatted as OpenPGP MPI
+# (RFC 4880 section 3.2)
+sub mpi_pack {
+ my $num = shift;
+
+ my $val = $num->to_bin();
+ my $mpilen = length($val)*8;
+
+# this is a kludgy way to get the number of significant bits in the
+# first byte:
+ my $bitsinfirstbyte = length(sprintf("%b", ord($val)));
+
+ $mpilen -= (8 - $bitsinfirstbyte);
+
+ return pack('n', $mpilen).$val;
+}
+
+# takes a Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum, returns an MPI packed in preparation
+# for an OpenSSH-style public key format. see:
+# http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=121866301718839&w=2
+sub openssh_mpi_pack {
+ my $num = shift;
+
+ my $val = $num->to_bin();
+ my $mpilen = length($val);
+
+ my $ret = pack('N', $mpilen);
+
+ # if the first bit of the leading byte is high, we should include a
+ # 0 byte:
+ if (ord($val) & 0x80) {
+ $ret = pack('NC', $mpilen+1, 0);
+ }
+
+ return $ret.$val;
+}
+
+sub openssh_pubkey_pack {
+ my $key = shift;
+
+ my ($modulus, $exponent) = $key->get_key_parameters();
+
+ return openssh_mpi_pack(Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin("ssh-rsa")).
+ openssh_mpi_pack($exponent).
+ openssh_mpi_pack($modulus);
+}
+
+# pull an OpenPGP-specified MPI off of a given stream, returning it as
+# a Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum.
+sub read_mpi {
+ my $instr = shift;
+ my $readtally = shift;
+
+ my $bitlen;
+ read($instr, $bitlen, 2) or die "could not read MPI length.\n";
+ $bitlen = unpack('n', $bitlen);
+ $$readtally += 2;
+
+ my $bytestoread = POSIX::floor(($bitlen + 7)/8);
+ my $ret;
+ read($instr, $ret, $bytestoread) or die "could not read MPI body.\n";
+ $$readtally += $bytestoread;
+ return Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($ret);
+}
+
+
+# FIXME: genericize these to accept either RSA or DSA keys:
+sub make_rsa_pub_key_body {
+ my $key = shift;
+ my $timestamp = shift;
+
+ my ($n, $e) = $key->get_key_parameters();
+
+ return
+ pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
+ pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
+ mpi_pack($n).
+ mpi_pack($e);
+}
+
+sub make_rsa_sec_key_body {
+ my $key = shift;
+ my $timestamp = shift;
+
+ # we're not using $a and $b, but we need them to get to $c.
+ my ($n, $e, $d, $p, $q) = $key->get_key_parameters();
+
+ my $c3 = modular_multi_inverse($p, $q);
+
+ my $secret_material = mpi_pack($d).
+ mpi_pack($p).
+ mpi_pack($q).
+ mpi_pack($c3);
+
+ # according to Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA, the closest value we can get out
+ # of get_key_parameters is 1/q mod p; but according to sec 5.5.3 of
+ # RFC 4880, we're actually looking for u, the multiplicative inverse
+ # of p, mod q. This is why we're calculating the value directly
+ # with modular_multi_inverse.
+
+ return
+ pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
+ pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
+ mpi_pack($n).
+ mpi_pack($e).
+ pack('C', 0). # seckey material is not encrypted -- see RFC 4880 sec 5.5.3
+ $secret_material.
+ pack('n', simple_checksum($secret_material));
+}
+
+# expects an RSA key (public or private) and a timestamp
+sub fingerprint {
+ my $key = shift;
+ my $timestamp = shift;
+
+ my $rsabody = make_rsa_pub_key_body($key, $timestamp);
+
+ return Digest::SHA1::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody);
+}
+
+
+# FIXME: handle DSA keys as well!
+sub pem2openpgp {
+ my $rsa = shift;
+ my $uid = shift;
+ my $args = shift;
+
+ $rsa->use_sha1_hash();
+
+ # see page 22 of RFC 4880 for why i think this is the right padding
+ # choice to use:
+ $rsa->use_pkcs1_padding();
+
+ if (! $rsa->check_key()) {
+ die "key does not check";
+ }
+
+ my $version = pack('C', 4);
+ # strong assertion of identity:
+ my $sigtype = pack('C', $sig_types->{positive_certification});
+ # RSA
+ my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa});
+ # SHA1
+ my $hash_algo = pack('C', $digests->{sha1});
+
+ # FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP
+ # certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run
+ # this script more than once against the same key (because the
+ # timestamps will differ). How can we prevent this?
+
+ # this environment variable (if set) overrides the current time, to
+ # be able to create a standard key? If we read the key from a file
+ # instead of stdin, should we use the creation time on the file?
+ my $timestamp = 0;
+ if (defined $args->{timestamp}) {
+ $timestamp = ($args->{timestamp} + 0);
+ } else {
+ $timestamp = time();
+ }
+
+ my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{sig_creation_time}, $timestamp);
+
+
+ my $flags = 0;
+ if (! defined $args->{usage_flags}) {
+ $flags = $usage_flags->{certify};
+ } else {
+ my @ff = split(",", $args->{usage_flags});
+ foreach my $f (@ff) {
+ if (! defined $usage_flags->{$f}) {
+ die "No such flag $f";
+ }
+ $flags |= $usage_flags->{$f};
+ }
+ }
+
+ my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{usage_flags}, $flags);
+
+
+ # how should we determine how far off to set the expiration date?
+ # default is no expiration. Specify the timestamp in seconds from the
+ # key creation.
+ my $expiration_packet = '';
+ if (defined $args->{expiration}) {
+ my $expires_in = $args->{expiration} + 0;
+ $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{key_expiration_time}, $expires_in);
+ }
+
+
+ # prefer AES-256, AES-192, AES-128, CAST5, 3DES:
+ my $pref_sym_algos = pack('CCCCCCC', 6, $subpacket_types->{preferred_cipher},
+ $ciphers->{aes256},
+ $ciphers->{aes192},
+ $ciphers->{aes128},
+ $ciphers->{cast5},
+ $ciphers->{tripledes}
+ );
+
+ # prefer SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPE-MD/160
+ my $pref_hash_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_digest},
+ $digests->{sha1},
+ $digests->{sha256},
+ $digests->{ripemd160}
+ );
+
+ # prefer ZLIB, BZip2, ZIP
+ my $pref_zip_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_compression},
+ $zips->{zlib},
+ $zips->{bzip2},
+ $zips->{zip}
+ );
+
+ # we support the MDC feature:
+ my $feature_subpacket = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{features},
+ $features->{mdc});
+
+ # keyserver preference: only owner modify (???):
+ my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{keyserver_prefs},
+ $keyserver_prefs->{nomodify});
+
+ my $subpackets_to_be_hashed =
+ $creation_time_packet.
+ $usage_packet.
+ $expiration_packet.
+ $pref_sym_algos.
+ $pref_hash_algos.
+ $pref_zip_algos.
+ $feature_subpacket.
+ $keyserver_pref;
+
+ my $subpacket_octets = pack('n', length($subpackets_to_be_hashed));
+
+ my $sig_data_to_be_hashed =
+ $version.
+ $sigtype.
+ $pubkey_algo.
+ $hash_algo.
+ $subpacket_octets.
+ $subpackets_to_be_hashed;
+
+ my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
+ my $seckey = make_rsa_sec_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
+
+ # this is for signing. it needs to be an old-style header with a
+ # 2-packet octet count.
+
+ my $key_data = make_packet($packet_types->{pubkey}, $pubkey, {'packet_length'=>2});
+
+ # take the last 8 bytes of the fingerprint as the keyid:
+ my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $timestamp), 20 - 8, 8);
+
+ # the v4 signature trailer is:
+
+ # version number, literal 0xff, and then a 4-byte count of the
+ # signature data itself.
+ my $trailer = pack('CCN', 4, 0xff, length($sig_data_to_be_hashed));
+
+ my $uid_data =
+ pack('CN', 0xb4, length($uid)).
+ $uid;
+
+ my $datatosign =
+ $key_data.
+ $uid_data.
+ $sig_data_to_be_hashed.
+ $trailer;
+
+ my $data_hash = Digest::SHA1::sha1_hex($datatosign);
+
+ my $issuer_packet = pack('CCa8', 9, $subpacket_types->{issuer}, $keyid);
+
+ my $sig = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($rsa->sign($datatosign));
+
+ my $sig_body =
+ $sig_data_to_be_hashed.
+ pack('n', length($issuer_packet)).
+ $issuer_packet.
+ pack('n', hex(substr($data_hash, 0, 4))).
+ mpi_pack($sig);
+
+ return
+ make_packet($packet_types->{seckey}, $seckey).
+ make_packet($packet_types->{uid}, $uid).
+ make_packet($packet_types->{sig}, $sig_body);
+}
+
+
+sub openpgp2ssh {
+ my $instr = shift;
+ my $fpr = shift;
+
+ if (defined $fpr) {
+ if (length($fpr) < 8) {
+ die "We need at least 8 hex digits of fingerprint.\n";
+ }
+ $fpr = uc($fpr);
+ }
+
+ my $packettag;
+ my $dummy;
+ my $tag;
+
+ my $key;
+
+ while (! eof($instr)) {
+ read($instr, $packettag, 1);
+ $packettag = ord($packettag);
+
+ my $packetlen;
+ if ( ! (0x80 & $packettag)) {
+ die "This is not an OpenPGP packet\n";
+ }
+ if (0x40 & $packettag) {
+ $tag = (0x3f & $packettag);
+ my $nextlen = 0;
+ read($instr, $nextlen, 1);
+ $nextlen = ord($nextlen);
+ if ($nextlen < 192) {
+ $packetlen = $nextlen;
+ } elsif ($nextlen < 224) {
+ my $newoct;
+ read($instr, $newoct, 1);
+ $newoct = ord($newoct);
+ $packetlen = (($nextlen - 192) << 8) + ($newoct) + 192;
+ } elsif ($nextlen == 255) {
+ read($instr, $nextlen, 4);
+ $packetlen = unpack('N', $nextlen);
+ } else {
+ # packet length is undefined.
+ }
+ } else {
+ my $lentype;
+ $lentype = 0x03 & $packettag;
+ $tag = ( 0x3c & $packettag ) >> 2;
+ if ($lentype == 0) {
+ read($instr, $packetlen, 1) or die "could not read packet length\n";
+ $packetlen = unpack('C', $packetlen);
+ } elsif ($lentype == 1) {
+ read($instr, $packetlen, 2) or die "could not read packet length\n";
+ $packetlen = unpack('n', $packetlen);
+ } elsif ($lentype == 2) {
+ read($instr, $packetlen, 4) or die "could not read packet length\n";
+ $packetlen = unpack('N', $packetlen);
+ } else {
+ # packet length is undefined.
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (! defined($packetlen)) {
+ die "Undefined packet lengths are not supported.\n";
+ }
+
+ if ($tag == $packet_types->{pubkey} ||
+ $tag == $packet_types->{pub_subkey} ||
+ $tag == $packet_types->{seckey} ||
+ $tag == $packet_types->{sec_subkey}) {
+ my $ver;
+ my $readbytes = 0;
+ read($instr, $ver, 1) or die "could not read key version\n";
+ $readbytes += 1;
+ $ver = ord($ver);
+
+ if ($ver != 4) {
+ printf(STDERR "We only work with version 4 keys. This key appears to be version %s.\n", $ver);
+ read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+ } else {
+
+ my $timestamp;
+ read($instr, $timestamp, 4) or die "could not read key timestamp.\n";
+ $readbytes += 4;
+ $timestamp = unpack('N', $timestamp);
+
+ my $algo;
+ read($instr, $algo, 1) or die "could not read key algorithm.\n";
+ $readbytes += 1;
+ $algo = ord($algo);
+ if ($algo != $asym_algos->{rsa}) {
+ printf(STDERR "We only support RSA keys (this key used algorithm %d).\n", $algo);
+ read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+ } else {
+ ## we have an RSA key.
+ my $modulus = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+ my $exponent = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+
+ my $pubkey = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_key_from_parameters($modulus, $exponent);
+ my $foundfpr = fingerprint($pubkey, $timestamp);
+
+ my $foundfprstr = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($foundfpr)->to_hex();
+
+ # is this a match?
+ if ((!defined($fpr)) ||
+ (substr($foundfprstr, -1 * length($fpr)) eq $fpr)) {
+ if (defined($key)) {
+ die "Found two matching keys.\n";
+ }
+ $key = $pubkey;
+ }
+
+ if ($tag == $packet_types->{seckey} ||
+ $tag == $packet_types->{sec_subkey}) {
+ if (!defined($key)) { # we don't think the public part of
+ # this key matches
+ read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+ } else {
+ my $s2k;
+ read($instr, $s2k, 1) or die "Could not read S2K octet.\n";
+ $readbytes += 1;
+ $s2k = ord($s2k);
+ if ($s2k == 0) {
+ # secret material is unencrypted
+ # see http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.3
+ my $d = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+ my $p = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+ my $q = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+ my $u = read_mpi($instr, \$readbytes);
+
+ my $checksum;
+ read($instr, $checksum, 2) or die "Could not read checksum of secret key material.\n";
+ $readbytes += 2;
+ $checksum = unpack('n', $checksum);
+
+ # FIXME: compare with the checksum! how? the data is
+ # gone into the Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum
+
+ $key = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_key_from_parameters($modulus,
+ $exponent,
+ $d,
+ $p,
+ $q);
+
+ $key->check_key() or die "Secret key is not a valid RSA key.\n";
+ } else {
+ print(STDERR "We cannot handle encrypted secret keys. Skipping!\n") ;
+ read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen - $readbytes) or die "Could not skip past this packet.\n";
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ read($instr, $dummy, $packetlen) or die "Could not skip past this packet!\n";
+ }
+ }
+
+ return $key;
+}
+
+
+for (basename($0)) {
+ if (/^pem2openpgp$/) {
+ my $rsa;
+ my $stdin;
+
+ my $uid = shift;
+ defined($uid) or die "You must specify a user ID string.\n";
+
+ # FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID; or should we default to
+ # hostname_long() from Sys::Hostname::Long ?
+
+
+ if (defined $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_NEWKEY}) {
+ $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->generate_key($ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_NEWKEY});
+ } else {
+ $stdin = do {
+ local $/; # slurp!
+ <STDIN>;
+ };
+
+ $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($stdin);
+ }
+
+ print pem2openpgp($rsa,
+ $uid,
+ { timestamp => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_TIMESTAMP},
+ expiration => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_EXPIRATION},
+ usage_flags => $ENV{PEM2OPENPGP_USAGE_FLAGS},
+ }
+ );
+ }
+ elsif (/^openpgp2ssh$/) {
+ my $fpr = shift;
+ my $instream;
+ open($instream,'-');
+ binmode($instream, ":bytes");
+ my $key = openpgp2ssh($instream, $fpr);
+ if (defined($key)) {
+ if ($key->is_private()) {
+ print $key->get_private_key_string();
+ } else {
+ print "ssh-rsa ".encode_base64(openssh_pubkey_pack($key), '')."\n";
+ }
+ } else {
+ die "No matching key found.\n";
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ die "Unrecognized keytrans call.\n";
+ }
+}
+
diff --git a/src/share/m/subkey_to_ssh_agent b/src/share/m/subkey_to_ssh_agent
index 4ce14f8..aa647a6 100644
--- a/src/share/m/subkey_to_ssh_agent
+++ b/src/share/m/subkey_to_ssh_agent
@@ -26,14 +26,6 @@ subkey_to_ssh_agent() {
local publine
local kname
- if ! test_gnu_dummy_s2k_extension ; then
- failure "Your version of GnuTLS does not seem capable of using with gpg's exported subkeys.
-You may want to consider patching or upgrading to GnuTLS 2.6 or later.
-
-For more details, see:
- http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/gnutls-devel/2008-08/msg00005.html"
- fi
-
# if there's no agent running, don't bother:
if [ -z "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] || ! which ssh-add >/dev/null ; then
failure "No ssh-agent available."
@@ -45,26 +37,34 @@ For more details, see:
if [ "$sshaddresponse" = "2" ]; then
failure "Could not connect to ssh-agent"
fi
-
- # get list of secret keys (to work around bug
- # https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue945):
- secretkeys=$(gpg_user --list-secret-keys --with-colons --fixed-list-mode \
- --fingerprint | \
- grep '^fpr:' | cut -f10 -d: | awk '{ print "0x" $1 "!" }')
-
- if [ -z "$secretkeys" ]; then
- failure "You have no secret keys in your keyring!
+
+ # if the MONKEYSPHERE_SUBKEYS_FOR_AGENT variable is set, use the
+ # keys specified there
+ if [ "$MONKEYSPHERE_SUBKEYS_FOR_AGENT" ] ; then
+ authsubkeys="$MONKEYSPHERE_SUBKEYS_FOR_AGENT"
+
+ # otherwise find all authentication-capable subkeys and use those
+ else
+ # get list of secret keys
+ # (to work around bug https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue945):
+ secretkeys=$(gpg_user --list-secret-keys --with-colons --fixed-list-mode \
+ --fingerprint | \
+ grep '^fpr:' | cut -f10 -d: | awk '{ print "0x" $1 "!" }')
+
+ if [ -z "$secretkeys" ]; then
+ failure "You have no secret keys in your keyring!
You might want to run 'gpg --gen-key'."
- fi
+ fi
- authsubkeys=$(gpg_user --list-secret-keys --with-colons --fixed-list-mode \
- --fingerprint --fingerprint $secretkeys | \
- cut -f1,5,10,12 -d: | grep -A1 '^ssb:[^:]*::[^:]*a[^:]*$' | \
- grep '^fpr::' | cut -f3 -d: | sort -u)
-
- if [ -z "$authsubkeys" ]; then
- failure "no authentication-capable subkeys available.
-You might want to 'monkeysphere gen-subkey'"
+ authsubkeys=$(gpg_user --list-secret-keys --with-colons --fixed-list-mode \
+ --fingerprint --fingerprint $secretkeys | \
+ cut -f1,5,10,12 -d: | grep -A1 '^ssb:[^:]*::[^:]*a[^:]*$' | \
+ grep '^fpr::' | cut -f3 -d: | sort -u)
+
+ if [ -z "$authsubkeys" ]; then
+ failure "no authentication-capable subkeys available.
+You might want to run 'monkeysphere gen-subkey'."
+ fi
fi
workingdir=$(msmktempdir)
@@ -76,7 +76,16 @@ You might want to 'monkeysphere gen-subkey'"
# through to ssh-add. should we limit it to known ones? For
# example: -d or -c and/or -t <lifetime>
- for subkey in $authsubkeys; do
+ for subkey in $authsubkeys; do
+ # test that the subkey has proper capability
+ capability=$(gpg_user --list-secret-keys --with-colons --fixed-list-mode \
+ --fingerprint --fingerprint "0x${subkey}!" \
+ | egrep -B 1 "^fpr:::::::::${subkey}:$" | grep "^ssb:" | cut -d: -f12)
+ if ! check_capability "$capability" 'a' ; then
+ log error "Did not find authentication-capable subkey with key ID '$subkey'."
+ continue
+ fi
+
# choose a label by which this key will be known in the agent:
# we are labelling the key by User ID instead of by
# fingerprint, but filtering out all / characters to make sure
diff --git a/src/share/ma/add_certifier b/src/share/ma/add_certifier
index 6f85ecf..544a3f0 100644
--- a/src/share/ma/add_certifier
+++ b/src/share/ma/add_certifier
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ if [ -f "$keyID" -o "$keyID" = '-' ] ; then
fi
# load the key
- gpg_sphere "--import" <"$keyID" \
+ gpg_sphere "--import" <"$keyID" 2>/dev/null \
|| failure "could not read key from '$keyID'"
# else, get the key from the keyserver
diff --git a/src/share/ma/diagnostics b/src/share/ma/diagnostics
index 8fc4b31..8eca586 100644
--- a/src/share/ma/diagnostics
+++ b/src/share/ma/diagnostics
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ fi
# make sure that at least one identity certifier exists
echo
echo "Checking for Identity Certifiers..."
-if ! monkeysphere-authentication list-identity-certifiers | egrep -q '^[A-F0-9]{40}:' then
+if ! ( monkeysphere-authentication list-identity-certifiers | egrep '^[A-F0-9]{40}:' >/dev/null ) ; then
echo "! No Identity Certifiers found!"
echo " - Recommendation: once you know who should be able to certify the identities of
connecting users, you should add their key, with:
diff --git a/src/share/ma/setup b/src/share/ma/setup
index e77afff..b453f3c 100644
--- a/src/share/ma/setup
+++ b/src/share/ma/setup
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ EOF
if [ -z "$CORE_FPR" ] ; then
log info "setting up Monkeysphere authentication trust core..."
- local CORE_UID=$(printf "Monkeysphere authentication trust core UID (random string: %s)" $(head -c21 </dev/urandom | base64))
+ local CORE_UID=$(printf "Monkeysphere authentication trust core UID (random string: %s)" $(head -c21 </dev/urandom | perl -MMIME::Base64 -ne 'print encode_base64($_)'))
log debug "generating monkeysphere authentication trust core key ($CORE_KEYLENGTH bits)..."
PEM2OPENPGP_USAGE_FLAGS=certify \
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ EOF
# ensure that the authentication sphere checker has absolute ownertrust on the expected key.
log debug "setting ultimate owner trust on core key in gpg_sphere..."
- printf "%s:6:\n" "$CORE_FPR" | gpg_sphere "--import-ownertrust"
+ printf "%s:6:\n" "$CORE_FPR" | gpg_sphere "--import-ownertrust" 2>&1 | log verbose
gpg_sphere "--export-ownertrust" 2>&1 | log debug
# check the owner trust
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ EOF
# our preferences are reasonable (i.e. 3 marginal OR 1 fully
# trusted certifications are sufficient to grant full validity.
log debug "checking trust model for authentication ..."
- local TRUST_MODEL=$(gpg_sphere "--with-colons --fixed-list-mode --list-keys" \
+ local TRUST_MODEL=$(gpg_sphere "--with-colons --fixed-list-mode --list-keys" 2>/dev/null \
| head -n1 | grep "^tru:" | cut -d: -f3,6,7)
log debug "sphere trust model: $TRUST_MODEL"
if [ "$TRUST_MODEL" != '1:3:1' ] ; then
diff --git a/src/share/ma/update_users b/src/share/ma/update_users
index bfefc31..3a5c006 100644
--- a/src/share/ma/update_users
+++ b/src/share/ma/update_users
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
update_users() {
+local returnCode=0
local unames
local uname
local authorizedKeysDir
@@ -26,8 +27,6 @@ else
unames=$(getent passwd | cut -d: -f1)
fi
-RETURN=0
-
# set mode
MODE="authorized_keys"
@@ -81,6 +80,7 @@ for uname in $unames ; do
# translating ssh-style path variables
authorizedUserIDs=$(translate_ssh_variables "$uname" "$AUTHORIZED_USER_IDS")
if [ -s "$authorizedUserIDs" ] ; then
+ log debug "authorized_user_ids file found."
# check permissions on the authorized_user_ids file path
if check_key_file_permissions "$uname" "$authorizedUserIDs" ; then
# copy user authorized_user_ids file to temporary
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ for uname in $unames ; do
# process authorized_user_ids file, as monkeysphere user
su_monkeysphere_user \
". ${SYSSHAREDIR}/common; process_authorized_user_ids $TMP_AUTHORIZED_USER_IDS" \
- || RETURN="$?"
+ || returnCode="$?"
else
log debug "not processing authorized_user_ids."
fi
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ for uname in $unames ; do
log error "Failed to install authorized_keys for '$uname'!"
rm -f "${authorizedKeysDir}/${uname}"
# indicate that there has been a failure:
- RETURN=1
+ returnCode=1
}
else
rm -f "${authorizedKeysDir}/${uname}"
@@ -154,5 +154,5 @@ for uname in $unames ; do
rm -rf "$TMPLOC"
done
-return $RETURN
+return $returnCode
}
diff --git a/src/share/mh/diagnostics b/src/share/mh/diagnostics
index 2f65f89..3746020 100644
--- a/src/share/mh/diagnostics
+++ b/src/share/mh/diagnostics
@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@ else
if [ "$expire" ]; then
if (( "$expire" < "$curdate" )); then
echo "! Host key is expired."
- echo " - Recommendation: extend lifetime of key with 'monkeysphere-host extend-key'"
+ echo " - Recommendation: extend lifetime of key with 'monkeysphere-host set-expire'"
problemsfound=$(($problemsfound+1))
elif (( "$expire" < "$warndate" )); then
echo "! Host key expires in less than $warnwindow:" $(advance_date $(( $expire - $curdate )) seconds +%F)
- echo " - Recommendation: extend lifetime of key with 'monkeysphere-host extend-key'"
+ echo " - Recommendation: extend lifetime of key with 'monkeysphere-host set-expire'"
problemsfound=$(($problemsfound+1))
fi
fi
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-01-14 22:47:11 +0000