Merge commit 'jrollins/master'

9 files changed, 501 insertions, 75 deletions

diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index e40c4b1..8d9ab2f 100755
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ install: all installman
 	mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/bin $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/sbin $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/share/monkeysphere
 	mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/share/doc/monkeysphere
 	mkdir -p $(DESTDIR)$(ETCPREFIX)/etc/monkeysphere
-	install src/monkeysphere src/monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand src/keytrans/openpgp2ssh $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/bin
+	install src/monkeysphere src/monkeysphere-ssh-proxycommand src/keytrans/openpgp2ssh src/keytrans/pem2openpgp $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/bin
 	install src/monkeysphere-server $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/sbin
 	install -m 0644 src/common $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/share/monkeysphere
 	install doc/* $(DESTDIR)$(PREFIX)/share/doc/monkeysphere
diff --git a/doc/george/changelog b/doc/george/changelog
index 83d6843..7cd700c 100644
--- a/doc/george/changelog
+++ b/doc/george/changelog
@@ -7,6 +7,28 @@
 *  changes to this system (first command at top, last at bottom)             *
 ******************************************************************************
 
+2009-01-31 - jrollins
+	* applied diff represented in commit
+	f75a5747a8b99e04c02c475791c476f1fbd2b674 to change log level for
+	unacceptable untranslatable keys.
+
+2009-01-30 - micah
+	* Replaced nullmailer with postfix, nullmailer doesn't handle aliases
+	  and insisted either on constantly respooling mail when there was no
+	  where to go. 
+
+2009-01-24 - micah
+	* Configured /etc/aliases to have root go to mjgoins, micah, dkg, jrollins
+	* Configured /etc/nullmailer/remotes to have mail.riseup.net so remote delivery will work
+	* Removed the hundreds of queued cron emails that had resulted in 30gig of mail.err logs
+	* Rotated the giant logs out 
+
+2009-01-11 - dkg
+	* extended the expiration date for george's key three months into
+	the future.
+	* aptitude update && aptitude full-upgrade (brings monkeysphere to
+	0.22-1)
+	
 2008-10-29 - dkg
 	* aptitude update && aptitude full-upgrade
 	* brought monkeysphere up to 0.19-1
diff --git a/man/man1/openpgp2ssh.1 b/man/man1/openpgp2ssh.1
index 89df047..8374a9f 100644
--- a/man/man1/openpgp2ssh.1
+++ b/man/man1/openpgp2ssh.1
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ only acts on keys associated with the first primary key
 passed in.  If you send it more than one primary key, it will silently
 ignore later ones.
 .Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr pem2openpgp 1 ,
 .Xr monkeysphere 1 ,
 .Xr monkeysphere 7 ,
 .Xr ssh 1 ,
diff --git a/src/common b/src/common
index eb3a083..815aacc 100644
--- a/src/common
+++ b/src/common
@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ process_user_id() {
 		else
 		    log debug "  - unacceptable primary key."
 		    if [ -z "$sshKey" ] ; then
-			log error "    ! primary key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
+			log debug "    ! primary key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
 		    else
 			echo "1:${sshKey}"
 		    fi
@@ -732,7 +732,7 @@ process_user_id() {
 		else
 		    log debug "  - unacceptable sub key."
 		    if [ -z "$sshKey" ] ; then
-			log error "    ! sub key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
+			log debug "    ! sub key could not be translated (not RSA or DSA?)."
 		    else
 			echo "1:${sshKey}"
 		    fi
diff --git a/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp b/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp
index 2fa221d..3d9f6f8 100755
--- a/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp
+++ b/src/keytrans/pem2openpgp
@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
 #!/usr/bin/perl -w -T
 
 # pem2openpgp: take a PEM-encoded RSA private-key on standard input, a
-# User ID as the first argument, and generate an OpenPGP certificate
-# from it.
+# User ID as the first argument, and generate an OpenPGP secret key
+# and certificate from it.
+
+# WARNING: the secret key material *will* appear on stdout (albeit in
+# OpenPGP form) -- if you redirect stdout to a file, make sure the
+# permissions on that file are appropriately locked down!
 
 # Usage:
 
@@ -21,6 +25,7 @@ use strict;
 use warnings;
 use Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA;
 use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum;
+use Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX;
 use Digest::SHA1;
 use MIME::Base64;
 
@@ -32,6 +37,185 @@ my $uid = shift;
 # FIXME: fail if there is no given user ID; or should we default to
 # hostname_long() from Sys::Hostname::Long ?
 
+
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.1 (ignoring deprecated algorithms for now)
+my $asym_algos = { rsa => 1,
+		   elgamal => 16,
+		   dsa => 17,
+		   };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.2
+my $ciphers = { plaintext => 0,
+		idea => 1,
+		tripledes => 2,
+		cast5 => 3,
+		blowfish => 4,
+		aes128 => 7,
+		aes192 => 8,
+		aes256 => 9,
+		twofish => 10,
+	      };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.3
+my $zips = { uncompressed => 0,
+	     zip => 1,
+	     zlib => 2,
+	     bzip2 => 3,
+	   };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 9.4
+my $digests = { md5 => 1,
+		sha1 => 2,
+		ripemd160 => 3,
+		sha256 => 8,
+		sha384 => 9,
+		sha512 => 10,
+		sha224 => 11,
+	      };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.21
+my $usage_flags = { certify => 0x01,
+		    sign => 0x02,
+		    encrypt_comms => 0x04,
+		    encrypt_storage => 0x08,
+		    encrypt => 0x0c, ## both comms and storage
+		    split => 0x10, # the private key is split via secret sharing
+		    authenticate => 0x20,
+		    shared => 0x80, # more than one person holds the entire private key
+		  };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 4.3
+my $packet_types = { pubkey_enc_session => 1,
+		     sig => 2,
+		     symkey_enc_session => 3,
+		     onepass_sig => 4,
+		     seckey => 5,
+		     pubkey => 6,
+		     sec_subkey => 7,
+		     compressed_data => 8,
+		     symenc_data => 9,
+		     marker => 10,
+		     literal => 11,
+		     trust => 12,
+		     uid => 13,
+		     pub_subkey => 14,
+		     uat => 17,
+		     symenc_w_integrity => 18,
+		     mdc => 19,
+		   };
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.1
+my $sig_types = { binary_doc => 0x00,
+		  text_doc => 0x01,
+		  standalone => 0x02,
+		  generic_certification => 0x10,
+		  persona_certification => 0x11,
+		  casual_certification => 0x12,
+		  positive_certification => 0x13,
+		  subkey_binding => 0x18,
+		  primary_key_binding => 0x19,
+		  key_signature => 0x1f,
+		  key_revocation => 0x20,
+		  subkey_revocation => 0x28,
+		  certification_revocation => 0x30,
+		  timestamp => 0x40,
+		  thirdparty => 0x50,
+		};
+
+
+# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.1
+my $subpacket_types = { sig_creation_time => 2,
+			sig_expiration_time => 3,
+			exportable => 4,
+			trust_sig => 5,
+			regex => 6,
+			revocable => 7,
+			key_expiration_time => 9,
+			preferred_cipher => 11,
+			revocation_key => 12,
+			issuer => 16,
+			notation => 20,
+			preferred_digest => 21,
+			preferred_compression => 22,
+			keyserver_prefs => 23,
+			preferred_keyserver => 24,
+			primary_uid => 25,
+			policy_uri => 26,
+			usage_flags => 27,
+			signers_uid => 28,
+			revocation_reason => 29,
+			features => 30,
+			signature_target => 31,
+			embedded_signature => 32,
+		       };
+
+# bitstring (see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.24)
+my $features = { mdc => 0x01
+	       };
+
+# bitstring (see RFC 4880 5.2.3.17)
+my $keyserver_prefs = { nomodify => 0x80
+		      };
+
+###### end lookup tables ######
+
+# FIXME: if we want to be able to interpret openpgp data as well as
+# produce it, we need to produce key/value-swapped lookup tables as well.
+
+
+########### Math/Utility Functions ##############
+
+
+# see the bottom of page 43 of RFC 4880
+sub simple_checksum {
+  my $bytes = shift;
+
+  return unpack("%32W*",$bytes) % 65536;
+}
+
+# calculate the multiplicative inverse of a mod b this is euclid's
+# extended algorithm.  For more information see:
+# http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extended_Euclidean_algorithm the
+# arguments here should be Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum objects.  $a should
+# be the larger of the two values, and the two values should be
+# coprime.
+
+sub modular_multi_inverse {
+  my $a = shift;
+  my $b = shift;
+
+  my $ctx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum::CTX->new();
+  my $x = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero();
+  my $y = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one();
+  my $lastx = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->one();
+  my $lasty = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->zero();
+
+  while (! $b->is_zero()) {
+    my ($quotient, $remainder) = $a->div($b, $ctx);
+
+    $a = $b;
+    $b = $remainder;
+
+    my $temp = $x;
+    $x = $lastx->sub($quotient->mul($x, $ctx));
+    $lastx = $temp;
+
+    $temp = $y;
+    $y = $lasty->sub($quotient->mul($y, $ctx));
+    $lasty = $temp;
+  }
+
+  if (!$a->is_one()) {
+    die "did this math wrong.\n";
+  }
+
+  return $lastx;
+}
+
+
+############ OpenPGP formatting functions ############
+
 # make an old-style packet out of the given packet type and body.
 # old-style  (see RFC 4880 section 4.2)
 sub make_packet {
@@ -82,7 +266,7 @@ sub mpi_pack {
   return pack('n', $mpilen).$val;
 }
 
-# FIXME: genericize this to accept either RSA or DSA keys:
+# FIXME: genericize these to accept either RSA or DSA keys:
 sub make_rsa_pub_key_body {
   my $key = shift;
   my $timestamp = shift;
@@ -91,10 +275,37 @@ sub make_rsa_pub_key_body {
 
   return
     pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
-      pack('C', 1). # RSA
+      pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
 	mpi_pack($n).
 	  mpi_pack($e);
+}
+
+sub make_rsa_sec_key_body {
+  my $key = shift;
+  my $timestamp = shift;
 
+  # we're not using $a and $b, but we need them to get to $c.
+  my ($n, $e, $d, $p, $q) = $key->get_key_parameters();
+
+  my $secret_material = mpi_pack($d).
+    mpi_pack($p).
+      mpi_pack($q).
+	mpi_pack(modular_multi_inverse($p, $q));
+
+  # according to Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA, the closest value we can get out
+  # of get_key_parameters is 1/q mod p; but according to sec 5.5.3 of
+  # RFC 4880, we're actually looking for u, the multiplicative inverse
+  # of p, mod q.  This is why we're calculating the value directly
+  # with modular_multi_inverse.
+
+  return
+    pack('CN', 4, $timestamp).
+      pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa}).
+	mpi_pack($n).
+	  mpi_pack($e).
+	    pack('C', 0). # seckey material is not encrypted -- see RFC 4880 sec 5.5.3
+	      $secret_material.
+		pack('n', simple_checksum($secret_material));
 }
 
 # expects an RSA key (public or private) and a timestamp
@@ -107,23 +318,6 @@ sub fingerprint {
   return Digest::SHA1::sha1(pack('Cn', 0x99, length($rsabody)).$rsabody);
 }
 
-# FIXME: make tables of relevant identifiers: digest algorithms,
-# ciphers, asymmetric crypto, packet types, subpacket types, signature
-# types.  As these are created, replace the opaque numbers below with
-# semantically-meaningful code.
-
-# see RFC 4880 section 5.2.3.21
-my $usage_flags = { certify => 0x01,
-		    sign => 0x02,
-		    encrypt_comms => 0x04,
-		    encrypt_storage => 0x08,
-		    encrypt => 0x0c, ## both comms and storage
-		    split => 0x10, # the private key is split via secret sharing
-		    authenticate => 0x20,
-		    shared => 0x80, # more than one person holds the entire private key
-		  };
-
-
 # we're just not dealing with newline business right now.  slurp in
 # the whole file.
 undef $/;
@@ -133,7 +327,10 @@ my $buf = <STDIN>;
 my $rsa = Crypt::OpenSSL::RSA->new_private_key($buf);
 
 $rsa->use_sha1_hash();
-$rsa->use_no_padding();
+
+# see page 22 of RFC 4880 for why i think this is the right padding
+# choice to use:
+$rsa->use_pkcs1_padding();
 
 if (! $rsa->check_key()) {
   die "key does not check";
@@ -141,50 +338,70 @@ if (! $rsa->check_key()) {
 
 my $version = pack('C', 4);
 # strong assertion of identity:
-my $sigtype = pack('C', 0x13);
+my $sigtype = pack('C', $sig_types->{positive_certification});
 # RSA
-my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', 1);
+my $pubkey_algo = pack('C', $asym_algos->{rsa});
 # SHA1
-my $hash_algo = pack('C', 2);
+my $hash_algo = pack('C', $digests->{sha1});
 
 # FIXME: i'm worried about generating a bazillion new OpenPGP
 # certificates from the same key, which could easily happen if you run
-# this script more than once against the same key.  How can we prevent
-# this?
+# this script more than once against the same key (because the
+# timestamps will differ).  How can we prevent this?
 
-# could an environment variable (if set) override the current time?
+# could an environment variable (if set) override the current time, to
+# be able to create a standard key?  If we read the key from a file
+# instead of stdin, should we use the creation time on the file?
 my $timestamp = time();
 
-my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, 2, $timestamp);
+my $creation_time_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{sig_creation_time}, $timestamp);
 
 
 # FIXME: HARDCODED: what if someone wants to select a different set of
-# usage flags?  For now, we do only authentication.
-my $flags = $usage_flags->{authenticate};
-my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, 27, $flags);
+# usage flags?  For now, we do only authentication because that's what
+# monkeysphere needs.
+my $usage_packet = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{usage_flags}, $usage_flags->{authenticate});
 
 
 # FIXME: HARDCODED: how should we determine how far off to set the
 # expiration date?  default is to expire in 2 days, which is insanely
-# short (but good for testing).
+# short (but good for testing).  The user ought to be able to decide
+# this directly, rather than having to do "monkeysphere-server
+# extend-key".
 my $expires_in = 86400*2;
-my $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, 9, $expires_in);
+my $expiration_packet = pack('CCN', 5, $subpacket_types->{key_expiration_time}, $expires_in);
 
 
 # prefer AES-256, AES-192, AES-128, CAST5, 3DES:
-my $pref_sym_algos = pack('CCCCCCC', 6, 11, 9, 8, 7, 3, 2);
+my $pref_sym_algos = pack('CCCCCCC', 6, $subpacket_types->{preferred_cipher},
+			  $ciphers->{aes256},
+			  $ciphers->{aes192},
+			  $ciphers->{aes128},
+			  $ciphers->{cast5},
+			  $ciphers->{tripledes}
+			 );
 
 # prefer SHA-1, SHA-256, RIPE-MD/160
-my $pref_hash_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, 21, 2, 8, 3);
+my $pref_hash_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_digest},
+			   $digests->{sha1},
+			   $digests->{sha256},
+			   $digests->{ripemd160}
+			  );
 
 # prefer ZLIB, BZip2, ZIP
-my $pref_zip_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, 22, 2, 3, 1);
+my $pref_zip_algos = pack('CCCCC', 4, $subpacket_types->{preferred_compression},
+			  $zips->{zlib},
+			  $zips->{bzip2},
+			  $zips->{zip}
+			 );
 
 # we support the MDC feature:
-my $features = pack('CCC', 2, 30, 1);
+my $feature_subpacket = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{features},
+			     $features->{mdc});
 
 # keyserver preference: only owner modify (???):
-my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, 23, 0x80);
+my $keyserver_pref = pack('CCC', 2, $subpacket_types->{keyserver_prefs},
+			  $keyserver_prefs->{nomodify});
 
 my $subpackets_to_be_hashed =
   $creation_time_packet.
@@ -193,7 +410,7 @@ my $subpackets_to_be_hashed =
   $pref_sym_algos.
   $pref_hash_algos.
   $pref_zip_algos.
-  $features.
+  $feature_subpacket.
   $keyserver_pref;
 
 my $subpacket_octets = pack('n', length($subpackets_to_be_hashed));
@@ -207,9 +424,9 @@ my $sig_data_to_be_hashed =
   $subpackets_to_be_hashed;
 
 my $pubkey = make_rsa_pub_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
+my $seckey = make_rsa_sec_key_body($rsa, $timestamp);
 
-#open(KEYFILE, "</home/wt215/gpg-test/key-data");
-my $key_data = make_packet(6, $pubkey);
+my $key_data = make_packet($packet_types->{pubkey}, $pubkey);
 
 # take the last 8 bytes of the fingerprint as the keyid:
 my $keyid = substr(fingerprint($rsa, $timestamp), 20 - 8, 8);
@@ -233,7 +450,7 @@ my $datatosign =
 my $data_hash = Digest::SHA1::sha1_hex($datatosign);
 
 
-my $issuer_packet = pack('CCa8', 9, 16, $keyid);
+my $issuer_packet = pack('CCa8', 9, $subpacket_types->{issuer}, $keyid);
 
 my $sig = Crypt::OpenSSL::Bignum->new_from_bin($rsa->sign($datatosign));
 
@@ -245,8 +462,8 @@ my $sig_body =
   mpi_pack($sig);
 
 print
-  make_packet(6, $pubkey).
-  make_packet(13, $uid).
-  make_packet(2, $sig_body);
+  make_packet($packet_types->{seckey}, $seckey).
+  make_packet($packet_types->{uid}, $uid).
+  make_packet($packet_types->{sig}, $sig_body);
 
 
diff --git a/src/monkeysphere b/src/monkeysphere
index 5444cb0..463a1b1 100755
--- a/src/monkeysphere
+++ b/src/monkeysphere
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ Monkeysphere client tool.
 subcommands:
  update-known_hosts (k) [HOST]...    update known_hosts file
  update-authorized_keys (a)          update authorized_keys file
+ import-subkey (i)                   import existing ssh key as gpg subkey
+   --keyfile (-f) FILE                 key file to import
+   --expire (-e) EXPIRE                date to expire
  gen-subkey (g) [KEYID]              generate an authentication subkey
    --length (-l) BITS                  key length in bits (2048)
    --expire (-e) EXPIRE                date to expire
@@ -51,6 +54,47 @@ subcommands:
 EOF
 }
 
+# import an existing ssh key as a gpg subkey
+import_subkey() {
+    local keyFile="~/.ssh/id_rsa"
+    local keyExpire
+    local keyID
+    local gpgOut
+    local userID
+
+    # get options
+    while true ; do
+	case "$1" in
+	    -f|--keyfile)
+		keyFile="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
+	    -e|--expire)
+		keyExpire="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
+	    *)
+		if [ "$(echo "$1" | cut -c 1)" = '-' ] ; then
+		    failure "Unknown option '$1'.
+Type '$PGRM help' for usage."
+		fi
+		break
+		;;
+	esac
+    done
+
+    log verbose "importing ssh key..."
+    fifoDir=$(mktemp -d ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/tmp.XXXXXXXXXX)
+    (umask 077 && mkfifo "$fifoDir/pass")
+    ssh2openpgp | gpg --passphrase-fd 3 3< "$fifoDir/pass" --expert --command-fd 0 --import &
+
+    passphrase_prompt  "Please enter your passphrase for $keyID: " "$fifoDir/pass"
+
+    rm -rf "$fifoDir"
+    wait
+    log verbose "done."
+}
+
 # generate a subkey with the 'a' usage flags set
 gen_subkey(){
     local keyLength
@@ -59,10 +103,6 @@ gen_subkey(){
     local gpgOut
     local userID
 
-    # set default key parameter values
-    keyLength=
-    keyExpire=
-
     # get options
     while true ; do
 	case "$1" in
@@ -376,6 +416,10 @@ case $COMMAND in
 	RETURN="$?"
 	;;
 
+    'import-subkey'|'i')
+	import_key "$@"
+	;;
+
     'gen-subkey'|'g')
 	gen_subkey "$@"
 	;;
diff --git a/src/monkeysphere-server b/src/monkeysphere-server
index ba3fa8d..96f5b56 100755
--- a/src/monkeysphere-server
+++ b/src/monkeysphere-server
@@ -46,13 +46,20 @@ Monkeysphere server admin tool.
 subcommands:
  update-users (u) [USER]...          update user authorized_keys files
 
- gen-key (g) [NAME[:PORT]]           generate gpg key for the server
+ import-key (i)                      import existing ssh key to gpg
+   --hostname (-h) NAME[:PORT]         hostname for key user ID
+   --keyfile (-f) FILE                 key file to import
+   --expire (-e) EXPIRE                date to expire
+ gen-key (g)                         generate gpg key for the host
+   --hostname (-h) NAME[:PORT]         hostname for key user ID
    --length (-l) BITS                  key length in bits (2048)
    --expire (-e) EXPIRE                date to expire
    --revoker (-r) FINGERPRINT          add a revoker
- extend-key (e) EXPIRE               extend expiration to EXPIRE
- add-hostname (n+) NAME[:PORT]       add hostname user ID to server key
+ extend-key (e) EXPIRE               extend host key expiration
+ add-hostname (n+) NAME[:PORT]       add hostname user ID to host key
  revoke-hostname (n-) NAME[:PORT]    revoke hostname user ID
+ add-revoker (o) FINGERPRINT         add a revoker to the host key
+ revoke-key (r)                      revoke host key
  show-key (s)                        output all server host key information
  publish-key (p)                     publish server host key to keyserver
  diagnostics (d)                     report on server monkeysphere status
@@ -64,7 +71,8 @@ subcommands:
  remove-id-certifier (c-) KEYID      remove a certification key
  list-id-certifiers (c)              list certification keys
 
- gpg-authentication-cmd CMD          gnupg-authentication command
+ gpg-authentication-cmd CMD          give a gpg command to the
+                                     authentication keyring
 
  version (v)                         show version number
  help (h,?)                          this help
@@ -311,28 +319,107 @@ update_users() {
     done
 }
 
+# import an existing ssh key to a gpg key
+import_key() {
+    local hostName=$(hostname -f)
+    local keyFile="/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key"
+    local keyExpire
+    local userID
+
+    # check for presense of secret key
+    # FIXME: is this the proper test to be doing here?
+    fingerprint_server_key >/dev/null \
+	&& failure "An OpenPGP host key already exists."
+
+    # get options
+    while true ; do
+	case "$1" in
+	    -h|--hostname)
+		hostName="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
+	    -f|--keyfile)
+		keyFile="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
+	    -e|--expire)
+		keyExpire="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
+	    *)
+		if [ "$(echo "$1" | cut -c 1)" = '-' ] ; then
+		    failure "Unknown option '$1'.
+Type '$PGRM help' for usage."
+		fi
+		break
+		;;
+	esac
+    done
+
+    if [ ! -f "$keyFile" ] ; then
+	failure "SSH secret key file '$keyFile' not found."
+    fi
+
+    userID="ssh://${hostName}"
+
+    # prompt about key expiration if not specified
+    keyExpire=$(get_gpg_expiration "$keyExpire")
+
+    echo "The following key parameters will be used for the host private key:"
+    echo "Import: $keyFile"
+    echo "Name-Real: $userID"
+    echo "Expire-Date: $keyExpire"
+
+    read -p "Import key? (Y/n) " OK; OK=${OK:=Y}
+    if [ ${OK/y/Y} != 'Y' ] ; then
+	failure "aborting."
+    fi
+
+    log verbose "importing ssh key..."
+    # translate ssh key to a private key
+    (umask 077 && \
+	pem2openpgp "$userID" "$keyExpire" < "$sshKey" | gpg_host --import)
+
+    # find the key fingerprint of the newly converted key
+    fingerprint=$(fingerprint_server_key)
+
+    # export host ownertrust to authentication keyring
+    log verbose "setting ultimate owner trust for host key..."
+    echo "${fingerprint}:6:" | gpg_host "--import-ownertrust"
+    echo "${fingerprint}:6:" | gpg_authentication "--import-ownertrust"
+
+    # export public key to file
+    gpg_authentication "--export-options export-minimal --armor --export 0x${fingerprint}\!" > "${SYSDATADIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub.gpg"
+    log info "SSH host public key in OpenPGP form: ${SYSDATADIR}/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub.gpg"
+
+    # show info about new key
+    show_server_key
+}
+
 # generate server gpg key
 gen_key() {
-    local keyType
-    local keyLength
-    local keyUsage
+    local keyType="RSA"
+    local keyLength="2048"
+    local keyUsage="auth"
     local keyExpire
     local revoker
-    local hostName
+    local hostName=$(hostname -f)
     local userID
     local keyParameters
     local fingerprint
 
-    # set default key parameter values
-    keyType="RSA"
-    keyLength="2048"
-    keyUsage="auth"
-    keyExpire=
-    revoker=
+    # check for presense of secret key
+    # FIXME: is this the proper test to be doing here?
+    fingerprint_server_key >/dev/null \
+	&& failure "An OpenPGP host key already exists."
 
     # get options
     while true ; do
 	case "$1" in
+	    -h|--hostname)
+		hostName="$2"
+		shift 2
+		;;
 	    -l|--length)
 		keyLength="$2"
 		shift 2
@@ -355,14 +442,8 @@ Type '$PGRM help' for usage."
 	esac
     done
 
-    hostName=${1:-$(hostname -f)}
     userID="ssh://${hostName}"
 
-    # check for presense of secret key
-    # FIXME: is this the proper test to be doing here?
-    fingerprint_server_key >/dev/null \
-	&& failure "A key for this host already exists."
-
     # prompt about key expiration if not specified
     keyExpire=$(get_gpg_expiration "$keyExpire")
 
@@ -399,14 +480,14 @@ Revoker: 1:${revoker} sensitive"
 %commit
 %echo done"
 
-    log verbose "generating server key..."
+    log verbose "generating host key..."
     echo "$keyParameters" | gpg_host --batch --gen-key
 
     # find the key fingerprint of the newly generated key
     fingerprint=$(fingerprint_server_key)
 
     # export host ownertrust to authentication keyring
-    log verbose "setting ultimate owner trust for server key..."
+    log verbose "setting ultimate owner trust for host key..."
     echo "${fingerprint}:6:" | gpg_authentication "--import-ownertrust"
 
     # translate the private key to ssh format, and export to a file
@@ -584,6 +665,18 @@ EOF
     fi
 }
 
+# add a revoker to the host key
+add_revoker() {
+    # FIXME: implement!
+    failure "not implemented yet!"
+}
+
+# revoke the host key
+revoke_key() {
+    # FIXME: implement!
+    failure "not implemented yet!"
+}
+
 # publish server key to keyserver
 publish_server_key() {
     read -p "Really publish host key to $KEYSERVER? (y/N) " OK; OK=${OK:=N}
@@ -1006,6 +1099,11 @@ case $COMMAND in
 	update_users "$@"
 	;;
 
+    'import-key'|'i')
+	check_user
+	import_key "$@"
+	;;
+
     'gen-key'|'g')
 	check_user
 	gen_key "$@"
@@ -1029,6 +1127,18 @@ case $COMMAND in
 	revoke_hostname "$@"
 	;;
 
+    'add-revoker'|'o')
+	check_user
+	check_host_keyring
+	add_revoker "$@"
+	;;
+
+    'revoke-key'|'r')
+	check_user
+	check_host_keyring
+	revoke_key "$@"
+	;;
+
     'show-key'|'show'|'s')
 	show_server_key
 	;;
diff --git a/website/sidebar.mdwn b/website/sidebar.mdwn
index 420cd7e..4783d2a 100644
--- a/website/sidebar.mdwn
+++ b/website/sidebar.mdwn
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 [[COMMUNITY|community]]
 <a href="https://labs.riseup.net/code/wiki/monkeysphere">WIKI</a>
 <a href="https://labs.riseup.net/code/projects/monkeysphere/issues">BUGS</a>
+[[VISION|vision]]
 </td>
 </tr>
 </table>
diff --git a/website/vision.mdwn b/website/vision.mdwn
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..281bc72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/website/vision.mdwn
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+[[meta title="Our vision for the future of the monkeysphere"]]
+
+## External Validation Agent ##
+
+This is probably at the crux of the Monkeysphere vision for the future:
+
+* [Simon Josefsson proposed out-of-process certificate verification model in gnutls-devel](http://news.gmane.org/find-root.php?group=gmane.comp.encryption.gpg.gnutls.devel&article=3231)
+* [Werner Koch's dirmngr](http://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/dirmngr/)
+* [GnuTLS wiki external validation](http://redmine.josefsson.org/wiki/gnutls/GnuTLSExternalValidation)
+* [Pathfinder PKI validation](http://code.google.com/p/pathfinder-pki/) (includes validation plugins for OpenSSL and LibNSS).
+
+## TLS transition strategies ##
+
+While [RFC 5081](http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5081) is quite a while
+off from widespread adoption, it would be good to have an interim
+translation step.  This is analogous to the SSH work we've done, where
+the on-the-wire protocol remains the same, but the keys themselves are
+looked up in the OpenPGP WoT.
+
+Firefox extensions that deal with certificate validation seem to be
+the easiest path toward demonstrating this technique.  We should look
+at:
+
+* [SSL Blacklist](http://codefromthe70s.org/sslblacklist.aspx)
+* [Perspectives](http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~perspectives/firefox.html)
+* there is another firefox extension that basically disables all TLS certificate checking.  The download page says things like "this is a bad idea" and "do not install this extension", but i'm unable to find it at the moment.
+
+## Related discussions ##
+
+* [Wandering Thoughts blog discussion about Web of Trust flaws](http://utcc.utoronto.ca/~cks/space/blog/tech/WebOfTrustFlaws?showcomments)
+* [Wandering Thoughts blog discussion about certificate authorities](http://utcc.utoronto.ca/~cks/space/blog/web/SSLCANeed?showcomments)