From 4515726bfebb4a4bec78daf2cdc986cc1cad3392 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "http://brian.may.myopenid.com/" Date: Tue, 22 Jul 2008 01:28:20 -0400 Subject: response to response --- doc/bugs/ssl_certificates_not_checked_with_openid.mdwn | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'doc/bugs/ssl_certificates_not_checked_with_openid.mdwn') diff --git a/doc/bugs/ssl_certificates_not_checked_with_openid.mdwn b/doc/bugs/ssl_certificates_not_checked_with_openid.mdwn index 171874951..cb4c706f0 100644 --- a/doc/bugs/ssl_certificates_not_checked_with_openid.mdwn +++ b/doc/bugs/ssl_certificates_not_checked_with_openid.mdwn @@ -22,4 +22,15 @@ For now, I want to try and resolve the issues with net\_ssl\_test, and run more > is good. > --[[Joey]] -[[!tag done]] +>> Ok, so I guess the worst that could happen when ikiwiki talks to the http +>> address is that it gets intercepted, and ikiwiki gets the wrong address. +>> ikiwiki will then redirect the browser to the wrong address. An attacker could +>> trick ikiwiki to redirect to their site which always validates the user +>> and then redirects back to ikiwiki. The legitimate user may not even notice. +>> That doesn't so seem secure to me... + +>> All the attacker needs is access to the network somewhere between ikiwiki +>> and http://joey.kitenet.net/ or the ability to inject false DNS host names +>> for use by ikiwiki and the rest is simple. + +>> -- Brian May -- cgit v1.2.3