From e4b096ac411494416d73e344e0aaeaacabf2f266 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "http://schmonz.livejournal.com/" Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2008 14:27:35 -0400 Subject: http(oop)s --- doc/plugins/contrib/unixauth.mdwn | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/doc/plugins/contrib/unixauth.mdwn b/doc/plugins/contrib/unixauth.mdwn index 6cdf87f6a..f369cd6ad 100644 --- a/doc/plugins/contrib/unixauth.mdwn +++ b/doc/plugins/contrib/unixauth.mdwn @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ Config variables that affect the behavior of `unixauth`: __Security__: [As with passwordauth](/security/#index14h2), be wary of sending usernames and passwords in cleartext. Unlike passwordauth, sniffing `unixauth` credentials can get an attacker much further than mere wiki access. Therefore, this plugin defaults to not even _displaying_ the login form fields unless we're running under SSL. Nobody should be able to do anything remotely dumb until the admin has done at least a little thinking. After that, dumb things are always possible. ;-) +_XXX hang on, looks like we don't have the huge CGI environment so testing for ${HTTPS} always fails; need another way to be sure_ + [[!toggle id="code" text="unixauth.pm"]] [[!toggleable id="code" text=""" -- cgit v1.2.3