diff options
| author | http://brian.may.myopenid.com/ <http://brian.may.myopenid.com/@web> | 2008-07-22 01:28:20 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Joey Hess <joey@kitenet.net> | 2008-07-22 01:28:20 -0400 |
| commit | 4515726bfebb4a4bec78daf2cdc986cc1cad3392 (patch) | |
| tree | c9b72db4e3d055ed10dc82ba0f48169e1542a142 | |
| parent | 88ff7480e6b2f639aa62af53dbb9e63cc3632571 (diff) | |
response to response
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/bugs/ssl_certificates_not_checked_with_openid.mdwn | 13 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/doc/bugs/ssl_certificates_not_checked_with_openid.mdwn b/doc/bugs/ssl_certificates_not_checked_with_openid.mdwn index 171874951..cb4c706f0 100644 --- a/doc/bugs/ssl_certificates_not_checked_with_openid.mdwn +++ b/doc/bugs/ssl_certificates_not_checked_with_openid.mdwn @@ -22,4 +22,15 @@ For now, I want to try and resolve the issues with net\_ssl\_test, and run more > is good. > --[[Joey]] -[[!tag done]] +>> Ok, so I guess the worst that could happen when ikiwiki talks to the http +>> address is that it gets intercepted, and ikiwiki gets the wrong address. +>> ikiwiki will then redirect the browser to the wrong address. An attacker could +>> trick ikiwiki to redirect to their site which always validates the user +>> and then redirects back to ikiwiki. The legitimate user may not even notice. +>> That doesn't so seem secure to me... + +>> All the attacker needs is access to the network somewhere between ikiwiki +>> and http://joey.kitenet.net/ or the ability to inject false DNS host names +>> for use by ikiwiki and the rest is simple. + +>> -- Brian May |